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Abstract
We consider the artist-programmer, who creates work through its description as source code.
e artist-programmer grandstands computer language, giving unique vantage over human-
computer interaction in a creative context. We focus on the human in this relationship, noting
that humans use an amalgam of language and gesture to express themselves. Accordingly we
expose the deep relationship between computer languages and continuous expression, exam-
ining how these realms may support one another, and how the artist-programmer may fully
engage with both.
Our argument takes us up through layers of representation, starting with symbols, then
words, language and notation, to consider the role that these representations may play in hu-
man creativity. We form a cross-disciplinary perspective from psychology, computer science,
linguistics, human-computer interaction, computational creativity, music technology and the
arts.
We develop and demonstrate the potential of this view to inform arts practice, through
the practical introduction of soware prototypes, artworks, programming languages and im-
provised performances. In particular, we introduce works which demonstrate the role of per-
ception in symbolic semantics, embed the representation of time in programming language,
include visuospatial arrangement in syntax, and embed the activity of programming in the
improvisation and experience of art.
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C 1
Introduction
e history of computation is embedded in the history of humankind. Computation did not
arrive with the machine, it is something that humans do. We did not invent computers, we
invented machines to help us compute. Indeed, before the arrival of mechanical computers,
“computer” was a job title for a human employed to carry out calculations. In principle, these
workers could compute anything that modern digital computers can, given enough pencils,
paper and time.
e textile industry saw the ﬁrst programmable machine to reach wide use: the head of
the Jacquard loom, a technology still used today. Long strips of card are fed into the Jacquard
head, which reads paerns punched into the card to guide intricate paerning of weaves. e
Jacquard head does not itself compute, but was much admired by Charles Babbage, inspir-
ing work on his mechanical analytical engine (Essinger, 2004), the ﬁrst conception of a pro-
grammable universal computer. Although Babbage did not succeed in building the analytical
engine, his design includes a similar card input mechanism to the Jacquard head, but with
punched paerns describing abstract calculations rather than textile weaves. While the in-
dustrial revolution had troubling consequences, it is somewhat comforting to note this shared
heritage of computer source code and cloth, which contemporary artists still reﬂect upon in
their work (Carpenter and Laccei, 2006).
is early computer technology was later met with theoretical work in mathematics, such
as Church’s lambda calculus (Church, 1941) and the Turing machine (Turing, 1992, orig. 1947),
which seeded the new ﬁeld of computer science. Computer programmers may be exposed to
these theoretical roots through their education, having great impact on their cra. As it is
now practised however, computer programming is far from a pure discipline, with inﬂuences
including linguistics, engineering and architecture, as well as mathematics. Digital computers
now underpin the operation of business, military, academic and governing institutions, with
impacts across human activity. ese diverse backgrounds bring diﬀerent approaches to pro-
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gramming, a great challenge for computer programming education.
As abstract machines, computers are multi-purpose, and are used in many ways towards
many diﬀerent ends. Judging by the contents of newstand magazines dedicated to them, the
computer arts are most oen framed as the use of soware applications as design tools. Here
soware is produced by soware houses, and bought and used by creative professionals. is
situation has its merits, but is a diversion from our theme: we are interested in artists who
write programs, not in those who only use programs wrien by others. Neither are we greatly
concerned with the notion of computer programs as autonomous creative agents, although
we will touch on this within broader discussion of programmer creativity (ch. 6). Instead we
are interested in the practice of artists who get directly involved with computer languages as
environments in which to create. ey are end-user programmers, in that they create soware
not for others to use as tools, but as a means to realise their own work. We refer to such people
as artist-programmers.
1.1 Artist-Programmers
e use of the term artist-programmer could be seen as over defensive. Alone, the word pro-
grammer is oen used to imply a technician, tending a computing machine, or realising a de-
signer’s dream. We could bemore assertive, and use the word programmer to establish a similar
context eﬀect to that which the word painter enjoys in the ﬁne arts. But for the present thesis
we keep the arts context explicit, while confronting the singular identity of the programmer as
artist.
1.1.1 Computer art
We situate artist-programmmers within the computer arts, and so inherit important context
from this ﬁeld. Wewill ﬁrst examine the role of industrial and military institutions in computer
arts, before moving on to the issue of authorship and autonomy in the following section.
In Great Britain, computer art became established following the Cybernetic Serendipity ex-
hibition shown in the Institute of Contemporary Arts, curated by Jasia Reichardt in 1968. On the
whole this exhibition was well received, both in terms of reviews and the number and diversity
of visitors. However as Usselmann (2003) notes, while the exhibition was successful in bringing
some of the possibilities of computer art to public consciousness, it was signiﬁcantly compro-
mised. Despite the turbulence of the late sixties, there was no political dimension apparent
in the exhibition, which Usselmann aributes to the inclusion of sponsoring corporations in
the exhibition itself. He argues that this exhibition cast computer art into a form which later
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proved to be well suited for interactive museum exhibits, but has contributed lile to critical
debate around technology. As Usselmann notes, visitors were compelled by the ICA to “lose
their fear of computers”, whereas dissenting voices would advise otherwise, even then.
e model described by Usselmann persists far beyond Cybernetic Serendipity, for exam-
ple the Decode exhibition at the Victoria and Albert museum in 2009 was sponsored by SAP
AG, who commissioned the Bit.Code artwork greeting visitors to the exhibition. In their press
release, SAP noted that “Bit.Code is themed around the concept of clarity, which also reﬂects
SAP’s focus on transparency of data in business, and of how people process and use digital
information.” In a 40 year echo of Cybernetic Serendipity, the artworks were used to promote
humanising aspects of technology, with the artists tacitly taking on the political stance of their
sponsor.
Despite such compromises in the public presentation of computer art, there have always
been computer artists who engage closely with the sociopolitical context around their work.
A few years aer Cybernetic Serendipity, Nake (1971) published his essay “ere should be no
computer art” in response to the political compromises he then saw as implicit in computer
art. Nake also took aim beyond computer art, giving a leist perspective decrying the wider
model of art dealer and art gallery, where art is sold for the aesthetic pleasure of the ruling
elite. Taking the perspective of Usselmann (2003) alone, we might consider computer art as
compromised, but Nake suggests that it is the whole art world that is compromised, and that
the new computational media should establish alternative practices.
In a second 40 year echo, this time of Nake’s essay, Oliver et al. (2011) focus on the social
rather than artistic role of the critical engineer, quoting from their manifesto:
e Critical Engineer notes that wrien code expands into social and psycho-
logical realms, regulating behaviour between people and the machines they inter-
act with. By understanding this, the Critical Engineer seeks to reconstruct user-
constraints and social action through means of digital excavation.
Oliver et al. (2011) are established artists, and exemplify the strong theme of activism
present in contemporary digital arts. ey highlight the unique opportunity for engaging
with political themes where the boundary between digital arts and activism is blurred. is
boundary has been explored by artists from the outset, with their work well charted by Neural
magazine (http://neural.it).
Perhaps this dichotomy between politically engaged and disinterested art could reﬂect two
distinct views of the relationship between programmer and soware. is brings us to the
subject of authorship in computer art.
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1.1.2 Generative vs Soware art
e diﬀerent approaches to digital art described above can be understood in terms of a di-
chotomy drawn between generative art and soware art. Arns (2004) describes generative art
as work which approaches use of technology as a black box, with focus on end results. In con-
trast, she describes soware art as focusing on technology and technological culture, where
the soware itself holds meaning.
Some argue that comparing generative and soware art in this way is a category error. e
most commonly referenced deﬁnition of generative art, and the one addressed by Arns (2004),
is provided by Philip Galanter:
Generative art refers to any art practicewhere the artist uses a system, such as a
set of natural language rules, a computer program, a machine, or other procedural
invention, which is set into motion with some degree of autonomy contributing to
or resulting in a completed work of art. (Galanter, 2003, p.4)
Galanter (2003) states that his deﬁnition of generative art does not say anything about
why an artwork might be made or anything about its content, as a deﬁnition of soware art
might. It is instead concerned only with a high level aspect of how art is made. He argues
that the questioning theme of soware art runs orthogonal to the deﬁnition of generative art,
and therefore that the two do not bear comparison. However, central to Galanter’s deﬁnition
is the issue of autonomy: “Generative art must be well deﬁned and self-contained enough to
operate autonomously.” (Galanter, 2003, p.4). Contrary to Galanter’s assertion, the requirement
of autonomy oﬀers a strong constraint to the why of generative art; its operation must be
considered separable from the programmer, who is in the business of creating activity external
to their own inﬂuence. Soware art by contrast admits views of soware as an extension of
the human, where the computer provides language which allows human expression to reach
further.
According to Galanter’s deﬁnition, we view the generative artist as emphasising distance
between themselves and their work, and the soware artist as embedding the activity of their
soware in their own actions. We position the artist-programmer towards the laer, directly
engaging and interacting with their code as an integral aspect of their work. In the case of
generative art, authorship becomes a fundamental question, who or what produces the art: is
it the programmer or their autonomous process? In the case of soware art, this question need
not arise, as the process may just be viewed as part of the human artist’s activity.
From the above we can see evidence of a divide throughout the history of computer art,
between focus on aesthetic output, and focus on the processes of soware, including its role in
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society. ese are not mutually exclusive, and indeed Nake advocates both in balance. How-
ever, there is a tendency for computer artists and their audiences to focus on processes as dis-
embodied, autonomous activity (x4.1). By exposing the activity of programming, perhaps we
can adjust the balance towards focus on human interaction rather than autonomous processes.
1.1.3 Discussion
In the following chapters, sociopolitical context and critical frameworks around computer art
are not our focus. Instead we turn our aention inward towards the intimate relationship
between artist-programmers and their systems of language, understanding programming as
a human interaction. e artist is considered for their role as a visionary, in exploring and
extending their human experience. We consider technological support in terms of extending
their vision through processes of perception and reﬂection in bricolage creativity. In particular,
we expand upon the remarkable notion of programming language, to consider the role of these
languages in the activity of creative art.
1.2 Programming Languages for the Arts
e ‘tools’ that artist-programmers use to make their work are formal, artiﬁcial languages.
ese languages are artiﬁcial in that they are constructed by individuals, rather than emerging
from a wider cultural process as with natural languages. e word artiﬁcial is problematic in
implying fakery, but as we will argue in x4.1, computer languages are only artiﬁcial in the sense
that a desk fan produces artiﬁcial wind – the air still moves.
ere are many thousands of programming languages, but they tend to fall within a small
number of functional, structural and object oriented programming paradigms largely devel-
oped between the 1950s and 1970s. e most widely used programming languages1 across
institutions include Java, C, Basic and Python. ese are all general purpose languages, with a
core deﬁnition abstract from any particular task, albeit with add-on libraries which may target
a particular problem domain. In using general purpose programming languages, artists must
build their work using technology ostensibly designed for the general case, but in practice de-
signed for the expression of discrete, logical structures, in an abstract medium ungrounded in
human experience.
In the present thesis we question the extent to which contemporary, general purpose pro-
gramming language environments are suitable for Artist-Programmers. We will argue for new
approaches to the design of programming languages for the arts, with human cognition and
1An index of programming language popularity is maintained at http://www.tiobe.com/.
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perception as primarymotivating factors. In particular, language environments that relate both
discrete and continuous representations, that consider visuospatial and temporal experience in
the design of their notations, and that support soware development as creative activity.
1.3 Aims
e work described by the present thesis is conducted towards two primary aims.
 To characterise human-computer interaction as a means for the improvisation of music
and art, from the viewpoint of cognitive psychology, with strong focus on the human
role in computer programming.
 To develop and demonstrate the potential of this theoretical understanding to enrich arts
practice, through free/open source soware applications and programming languages,
installation art, live coding performances and workshops.
1.4 Structure
e following ﬁve chapters provide the core of the present thesis, where each successive chap-
ter builds upon the chapter before, each time broadening in scope. Firstly Symbols (ch. 2)
will provide a representational basis for the thesis, exploring units of representation and their
role in the production and experience of computer art. e following chapter Words (ch. 3)
considers the composition of symbols into words, and the expressive role of words in speech,
music and computer programs. Next we consider the composition of words into the structures
of Language (ch. 4), in particular the expression of paern and meaning in natural languages,
computer languages, and in music. Zooming out once more we view Notation (ch. 5), looking
at the perceptual and temporal practicalities of how programmers may write programs. Finally
our discussion will take in the wider context of Creativity (ch. 6), the role of programming in a
creative exploration, with particular focus on musical improvisation.
Overall, the focus will be not on digital representations within computation, and not on
analogue expression either, but on the interactions between the two. Computers give us priv-
ileged access to the digital realm, but we must not lose sight of the analogue, because humans
experience and interact with the world as an amalgam of both.
is journey will be led by practice-based research, and research-based practice, in mutual
support. Each of the following ﬁve chapters will introduce works informing and informed by
the thesis, as listed in the above preface.
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1.5 Original contributions to knowledge
e key contributions of this thesis are:
1. e development of vocable synthesis, a system for the terse description of a particular
conception of timbre through the articulation of phonetic symbols informed by music
tradition (x3.5).
2. e representation of music paerns in live music performance, as functions of events
over time, demonstrated by Tidal (x4.5).
3. An approach to visuospatial syntax in pure functional language, based on relative dis-
tance and type-compatibility, demonstrated by Texture (x5.6).
4. A characterisation of the creative processes of the artist-programmer in relation to es-
tablished theoretical frameworks (x6.3 – 6.5).
19
C 2
Symbols
Our discussion begins in earnest with symbols, starting with discrete units of digital represen-
tation. For our purposes, a symbol is simply something that is used to represent, or signify,
something else. At their most basic level, computers use only two discrete symbols, 1 and
0, which in combination represent other symbols, such as the leers of an alphabet. For the
present discussion, there is not a great deal to say about discrete symbols in isolation. How-
ever we are not only interested in digital computers, but also the artists who work with them.
Accordingly our focus through this chapter will be on comparing the internal symbol systems
of humans with those of computers, looking for correspondences and diﬀerences upon which
to build the higher order concerns of later chapters.
While discrete computational representations are fully observable and comparatively well
understood, neuroscience is some way from providing a clear picture of the representations
underlying human thought. e pervasive cognitivist approach aempts to address this by
postulating a central role for discrete computation in human cognition, likening the logical
operation of electronic hardware to that of the carbon wetware of our brains. We will build
an alternative view based upon Dual Code theory, which admits a role of discrete symbols in
cognition, but places greater emphasis on analogue symbols. is will provide a base from
which we later consider the role of human and computer symbol systems in the practice of
computer programming.
2.1 Situating symbols
In taking a human oriented view of computer programming, we seek to understand the rela-
tionship between digital symbols and the analogue world in which they are notated. We have
already noted that a computer was once a job title (x1.1), since then however, computation has
largely been mechanised, and perhaps to some extent dehumanised. e job of ‘computer’ is
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now taken by electronic, digital machines, bringing increased speed and accuracy by several
orders. However the human has not been entirely factored out of the process; on the contrary
the role of writing program(me)s for computers to follow has developed into a rather unique
profession, where programmers oen work in large teams writing huge tracts of code deﬁn-
ing the underlying logic of modern institutions. Computer languages have been designed for
parsimony by human programmers to support this work, allowing new approaches to human
artistic expression as we will see in chapter 5. However, the underlying functional representa-
tion, of operations over sequences of discrete symbols, remains the same as when computation
was a wholly human task.
In Babbage’s Diﬀerence Engine (x1.1), 1s and 0s are represented by the punched/not
punched states of paper cards. In modern computers, these binary states are provided by the
binary on/oﬀ (or high/low) states of analogue electronic components. All discrete data may
be represented within binary states, for example the true/false values of Boolean logic, or the
ones and zeros of binary (base two) numbers. Such numbers may represent the instruction
set of the computer processor, allowing a symbolic sequence to be interpreted as a sequence
of operations over itself. is is the fundamental view of a computer program given to us by
Turing (1992, orig. 1948) – a sequence of symbols, read by a machine, which interprets them as
operations over that same sequence of symbols.
A discrete symbol system may represent aspects of the continuous world using a process
called analogue to digital conversion. For example, sampling and storing sound input from a
microphone is a process of averaging sound pressure over a given sample period, and approx-
imating the average as a discrete number. e conversion cannot be perfect, as its accuracy
depends on the granularity of the sample period and sample value. For example a period of
one sample per 44100th of a second, with a range of 16 bits (65536 possible values) is used on
standard Compact Disc recordings, and is taken to be in the same order as the distinguishing
limits of human perception. We experience such a recording through inverse digital to analogue
conversion, by sending the sampled data as stepped pulses of electricity to an electromagnet,
moving the membrane in a loudspeaker to push sound pressure waves across the room, to be
felt out by our ears.
Having digitally represented a sound signal, we may wish to perform some computation
over it. In order to do so, some aspect of the continuous world it was sampled from is oen
modelled or simulated. For example to store digital sound eﬃciently, psychoacoustic models
are oen used, so that information beyond the ability of hearing is discarded. Likewise, to
apply a reverb eﬀect, a physical room may be modelled. It is apt to extend this concept of
simulation to the function of computer hardware itself. If soware can simulate a continuous
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analogue digital
real integer
continuous discrete
image language
imagen logogen
smooth striated
amorphous pulsating
neumatic structural
plane grid
articulation sequence
nonmetric metric
modal amodal
grounded ungrounded
speciﬁc general
Table 2.1: analogue and digital - analogous antonyms.
domain in a discrete domain, then the job of hardware is to simulate a discrete domain in
the continuous domain of analogue electronics. We construct computers to simulate a digital
world, within which wemay then construct a simulation of an analogue world. is simulation
within simulation takes a recursive, fractal form, which may continue to arbitrary depth.
e paern of analogue and digital representations supporting one another also runs across
human experience. Byway of illustration, table 2.1 shows pairs of related antonyms used across
the arts and sciences. e antonyms smooth and striated bring to mind the smoothness of a
pebble and the striated lines across weathered rock, one perceived as a continuous texture
and the other as a series of discrete boundaries. But a stone can be simultaneously smooth
and striated, perhaps marked by layers of limestone but washed smooth over millennia. e
interdependence of the striated and smooth is described by Deleuze and Guaari (1987, p. 480)
as the relation between points and lines; “in the case of the striated, the line is between two
points, while in the smooth, the point is between two lines.” is is a necessarily circular
deﬁnition, as we understand one in relation to another.
e distinction and relationship between the analogue and digital carries through to our
perception of time, including within perception of music. Boulez (1990) relates striated time
with pulsating, regular rhythm, and smooth time with an amorphous, irregular ﬂow. In dis-
cussing the notation of music, he contrasts neumatic and structural representations, where
neumes are analogue lines, in contrast to the discrete structures of staﬀ notation. Boulez tends
towards the use of discrete symbols in notation, considering them more general and accurate,
but of course discrete symbols are only more accurate if you wish to notate a pulsating rather
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than amorphous temporal structure in the ﬁrst place.1 eWestern Classical tradition focuses
on the former, but amorphous time is nonetheless present as an important aspect of dynamic
performance, even when not notated. ere are however strategies for notating amorphous
time in discrete computer language, exempliﬁed by the constraint-based time seing used in
the Bol Processor language and inspired by Indian Classical music (Bel, 2001).
e distinctions in table 2.1 between articulation and sequence, and modal and amodal are
diﬀerent aspects of the distinction between grounded and ungrounded. Our environment, and
our bodies moving through it, are by nature analogue, but our experience of our environment
is both analogue and discrete. We may perceive a movement as a smooth articulation, while
simultaneously abstracting it into a discrete sequence of events, by segmenting it at perceived
points of discontinuity. Where we abstract it, we evoke a representation that is to an extent
amodal, freed from the qualities of a particular mode or sense. However ‘ungrounded’ is per-
haps too strong a term; just because we name a hue as red, it does not mean that we have lost
all connection with perception; we have simply gone from a particular experience in colour
space, to a discrete value that symbolises a region of possible experiences in colour space. We
will expand on perceptual and conceptual spaces later in this chapter (x2.2.5).
In summary then, discrete and analogue domains are distinct, but hosted within one an-
other. ey also interconnect, supporting and enriching one another. is is of great impor-
tance to the programming interface between humans and computers, profoundly so when we
consider how the analogue/digital interconnection extends into the mind of the human pro-
grammer.
2.2 Symbols in cognition
From a computer science perspective, digital symbol systems are shown to be remarkably ele-
gant and with enormous practical use, so it is unsurprising that they are oen used as a descrip-
tive model for the basis of complex phenomena, such as in biology and the cognitive sciences.
Wolfram (2002) shows that it is surprisingly likely for general computation to emerge from
what would otherwise seem to be trivial rule systems. In particular, his exploration of one
dimensional cellular automata led to the discovery of Rule 110. is rule is one of the family
where a cell’s state is based only on its preceding state and that of its two immediate neigh-
bours. It has been proved that despite this simplicity, Rule 110 is a universal computer in that
it can carry out all the operations of the Turing machine, and therefore any other digital com-
puter (Turing, 1992, orig. 1948). Wolfram takes his observation that computation falls out of
1Accuracy need not be the goal when notating amorphous structures however. e use of discrete symbols to
denote classes of amorphous structure is of course possible, and is oen the most satisfactory choice.
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such trivial interactions as evidence that the workings of nature are computational. We are in-
terested in a more speciﬁc hypothesis than Wolfram; are digital symbols the representational
basis of cognition? As computation arises from the simplest of rule sets, we certainly cannot
discount it on the basis of Occam’s razor.
Great works on the Language of ought by Fodor (1980) and Pylyshyn (2007) do indeed
point towards a discrete representational basis for cognition. Cognition is described by these
thinkers as the subconscious workings within an innate language oen dubbedmentalese. is
is not a natural language as we speak it, but an internal, universal language structuring subcon-
scious thought. is presumed language is represented using discrete symbols, with cognition
characterised as a process of computational operations over those symbols. Such computational
accounts have strong traction across the cognitive sciences, and also support understanding in
computer science; we understand the syntax of computer languages with reference to Chom-
skian transformational grammar (x4.1).
We return however to the notion of digital supported by analogue, and analogue by digital.
To focus solely on discrete computation is in denial of its essential interplay with analogue
movement and shape. In comparison with humans, digital computers appear to lead a rather
impoverished existence in terms of engagement with their analogue environment. Could this
diﬀerence be due to diﬀering symbolic foundations? ere is a line of thought which allows us
to admit computational accounts of themind, but in addition consider a second, complementary
system of representation. is second system is mental imagery; an analogue symbol system
grounded in perception.
2.2.1 Mental imagery
When presented with certain kinds of problems, a quasi-perceptualmental image may be con-
sciously manipulated to solve a task. We can examine these subjective experiences through
objective experiment, for example Shepard and Metzler (1971) identiﬁed that when matching
rotated objects, subject reaction times have a strong, linear correlation with relative degree
of rotation. is suggests that imagery is being rotated in the mind. It would appear that
these quasi-perceptual states are an analogue system of symbolic representation, used here in
cognitive problem solving.
e image in mental imagery is not speciﬁc to vision, but a broad term related to any
quasi-perceptual state. For example the use of prosodic intonation in speech is paralinguistic,
not entirely notated in wrien text, yet symbolising meaningful content. Indeed the meaning
of a spoken text can be twisted, perhaps negated with sarcasm, through subtle paralinguistic
phrasing. Furthermore, intonation is not just a concern in communication with others, the
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phenomenon of inner spee while reading silently is understood to be a function supporting
workingmemory, providing analogue, prosodic cues useful in comprehending text (Rayner and
Pollatsek, 1994, p. 216).
Mental images then, are analogue symbols underlying visuospatial cognition. An image
symbolises an object, using properties mapped directly from perception. For mental rotation
tasks, the symbolmay itself be rotated, as it shares essential geometric featureswith the object it
symbolises. Some higher order tasks, such as the analysis of complex symmetries, may however
be beyond the capabilities of mental imagery. For such tasks we may abstract properties of
imagery to create a formal language, by which we mean a system of discrete symbols governed
by grammatical rules. In the case of mental rotation, we identify group theory as a linguistic
counterpart, developed to gain mathematical understanding of symmetries (du Sautoy, 2008).
Group theory allows us to extend our understanding of symmetry with discrete logic, but does
so in relation to the mental images we experience.
Empirical understanding of the psychology of analogue and discrete symbols is provided
by Paivio (1990) through hisDual Coding theory. His contention is not that there are two codes,
but rather that there is a hierarchy of codes, which branch at the top into discrete linguistic
codes and continuous perceptual codes, which Paivio names logogens and imagens respectively.
is split is shown in their concurrent processing; humans are able to comprehend language
while simultaneously aending to imagery. Continuing with our earlier example of phrasing
in speech, humans ﬁnd it easy to simultaneously process and integrate prosodic and linguistic
information, but rather more diﬃcult to simultaneously read text and listen to speech. e
explanation oﬀered by Dual Coding theory is that there are distinct, yet integrated symbol
systems for imagery and language. is theory sits well against the background of digital and
analogue interdependence we noted in x2.1.
Neuropsychology provides support for Dual Coding through research into the fundamental
brain structure of the two distinct hemispheres. Very broadly speaking, the le hemisphere is
specialised for language, and the right for visuospatial tasks (Martin, 2006, pp. 128-129). We
must be careful however not to over-simplify this relationship: the more closely it is examined,
the less clear it gets. For example, from a meta-analysis of cerebral lateralisation of spatial
abilities (Vogel, 2003) we see there is a strong sex diﬀerence in lateralisation of spatial tasks,
where female subjects tend to show no hemisphere dominance and males tend to exhibit strong
right hemisphere dominance. e same meta-analysis ﬁnds subjects classed as ‘high imagers’
also show no hemisphere dominance in visuospatial tasks, suggesting that high imagers are
not those with a dominant ‘visual’ right hemisphere, but rather with high integration between
both hemispheres. is laer ﬁnding has statistical signiﬁcance, but is based on few studies
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and so cannot be considered robust. However while it stands, it supports the view that the
usefulness of mental imagery comes from integration between discrete and analogue codes.
2.2.2 Mental Imagery and Programming
Before we go any further, we should address Dual Coding theory to our overall theme. It
may seem that computer programming is an overwhelmingly linguistic task in a wholly dis-
crete domain, but if we focus on the programmer rather than the computer, we ﬁnd this is
not the case. Programmers may deal with formal, discrete and textual language, but they sup-
port and structure their work in a variety of ways external to computer language itself. For
example diagrammatic representations of code structure are widespread in the teaching and
practice of soware development, such as those standardised in the Structured Systems Analy-
sis and Design Method (SSADM) and Uniﬁed Modelling Language (UML). ese are highly
formalised languages, but use spatial arrangement and connecting lines to present the struc-
ture of a program in a visual manner. Further, the structure of programs is oen introduced in
programming textbooks using visual metaphor, for example as interconnected roads (Griﬃths
and Barry, 2009, pp. 13–21) . We assert then that despite the discrete nature of computation,
programmers oen use mental imagery to support their work.
Petre and Blackwell (1999) look for, and ﬁnd reports of mental imagery during programming
tasks. ey conducted verbal interviews with ten expert programmers, while they were in the
process of solving programming tasks, prompting them to explain what they were ‘seeing’ in
visual or auditory terms.2 We highlight and comment on a few reports from these interviews:
… no place holders, no pictures, no representation … just the notion, the sym-
bol entities, semantic entities and the linguistic token … atomic notions. ey just
‘are’ (Petre and Blackwell, 1999, p. 17)
We contend that this is not a report of mental imagery as Petre and Blackwell (1999) imply.
is is imaginative use of language, rather than modality-speciﬁc quasi-perceptual states.
… it moves in my head … like dancing symbols … I can see the strings [of
symbols] assemble and transform, like luminous characters suspended behind my
eyelids … (Petre and Blackwell, 1999, p. 14)
is is again a report featuring discrete symbols, but augmented with visual imagery. is
appears to be simultaneous activation of both language and imagery, in line with Dual Coding
theory.
2To counter known problems with interview protocols, the study was also complemented and to an extent
conﬁrmed by a second study, based on an undirected questionnaire of 227 programmers of the LABView visual
programming environment.
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It buzzes … there are things I know by the sounds, by the textures of sound or
the loudness … it’s like I hear the glitches, or I hear the bits that aren’t worked out
yet … (Petre and Blackwell, 1999, p. 15)
is is an intriguing example of a reported sonic image, again highlighting that mental
imagery is modality speciﬁc, but not necessarily of the visual sense. Indeed the previous quote
could be interpreted as simultaneously having both kinaesthetic and visual features. Petre
and Blackwell (1999) report that all ten experts reported sound as an element in their imagery,
although not in general as a typical element. It is worth noting however that subjects were
speciﬁcally probed for sonic imagery, which may have inﬂuenced the programmers’ mental
imagery and reports.
It’s like driving across a desert looking for a well. What you actually have is
good solutions distributed across this desert like small deep wells and your opti-
mizer trundling along looking for them… (Petre and Blackwell, 1999, p. 17)
is image appears to be visual-speciﬁc although could in addition be interpreted in a ki-
naesthetic sense. at the programmer reports imagining a three-dimensional problem space
is of relevance to the theory of Conceptual Spaces, which we will examine later in x2.2.5.
Again, it is wise to be cautious of introspective reports. Introspection is a subject of re-
search in its own right, with one theory being that introspections are nothing other than re-
constructed, ‘dramatised’ perceptions (Lyons, 1986). Nonetheless this should not discourage us
from treating mental imagery seriously as a system for symbolic reference, and these reports
give us cautious vantage over the cognitive processes of computer programming, towards un-
derstanding how programmers may use mental imagery to support their work.
2.2.3 Dual Coding in Source Code
At base, the source code for a computer program is a one dimensional sequence of discrete
symbols, ready for interpretation by a digital computer. How then could this relate to the
Dual Code in human cognition, when we assert in the previous section that programmers
employ mental imagery in their work? In answer we ﬁnd that despite the discrete underlying
representation, imagery is present both in the perception and organisation of source code.
In the Psychology of Programming ﬁeld, a discipline bridging Psychology and Human-
Computer Interaction, it is widely understood that there are notational features of source code
besides formal discrete syntax, and further that these aspects are vitally important to human
understanding of programs. Such features are known as secondary notation, which includes
spatial layout, comments, colour highlighting and variable names. Secondary notation, and
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its place within the Cognitive Dimensions of Notations framework will be further expanded
upon in x5.1, but for now we focus upon the use of spatial layout in code, with respect to
mental imagery. Consider the following code fragment wrien in the C programming language
(Kernighan and Ritchie, 1988):
if (condition == true) {
display("Welcome.");
beep();
}
All spaces in the above example could be discarded, giving this:
if(condition==true){display("Welcome.");beep();}
As far as a C language compiler is concerned, these code fragments are equivalent, as all
whitespace is discarded during tokenisation, an early stage of computer language parsing. For a
human however, the former version of the code is much easier to comprehend, and for a much
bigger program, the laer form would be close to impossible to understand on sight alone.
e computer ‘sees’ a one dimensional string of symbols, parsed into the higher order data
structure of a syntax tree. Humans however are able to perceive and navigate the fragments
and wholes of a code structure in a manner analogous to a visual Euler diagram. By way of
illustration, our code becomes even more diﬃcult to read if we replace characters to remove
the visual prompts of containment given by the symmetry of matching brackets:
if$condition==true@ˆdisplay$"Welcome."@;beep$@;&
From this we argue that while both humans and computers understand programs as discrete
symbols, humans use secondary notation to augment this representation with visual imagery.
As such, source code is an amalgam of two symbol systems, one of which is discarded in the
computational parsing process.
Programming languages with particularly visual notations are known as Visual Program-
ming Languages. Programming has a reputation for being rather diﬃcult to teach and learn
(e.g. Lister et al., 2004), and so a recurring theme in language design is ﬁnding forms of notation
that are more ‘natural’ or ‘intuitive’. A particular hope is that Visual Programming will lead to
languages grasped easily by end users with lile or no training. Early enthusiasm has however
not led to wide success, on the whole VPL has only taken hold for certain target domains, for
example LABView in engineering and Patcher languages (x5.3.1) in audio/visual digital signal
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processing. e lack of success of general purpose Visual Programming suggests that rela-
tionships between discrete symbols and mental imagery are by nature particular to the task at
hand. We should look then not for ways of adding ‘artiﬁcial’ visual metaphor to programming
as has been unsuccessful in HCI in general (Blackwell, 2006e), but for ways of supporting a
programmer’s own system of imagery, integrated with the text of source code. We will revisit
and expand upon this point in our view of the notation of programs in x5.3.
We view source code then as supporting both language and imagery. Use of discrete sym-
bols expressed within grammar rules are linguistic3, but are arranged to allow the support of
visuospatial cognition in understanding and writing programs.
2.2.4 Language and Situated Simulation
Language and Situated Simulation (LASS) theory is a recent development of Dual Coding the-
ory introduced by Barsalou et al. (2008). LASS adds empirical support broadly in agreement
with Dual Coding, but with diﬀerent detail and a strong change of emphasis. Whereas Paivio
(1990) deals with imagens and logogens even handedly, Barsalou et al. place far greater em-
phasis on imagery, which they refer to as the simulation system, reﬂecting its active role in
cognition. According to LASS, the linguistic system is superﬁcial, acting as lile more than a
control mechanism for the simulation system, which is responsible for deep conceptual struc-
ture grounded in experience.
Simulations in LASS are described as perceptual symbols, but this does not imply conscious
awareness of their use. Indeed in a break from Dual Coding theory, Barsalou (1999, x2.1.1)
asserts that perceptual symbols are a neural representation with only limited correlates in
consciousness. is proposal is similar to mentalese, in that it is an internal representation
underlying subconscious cognition. e diﬀerence is that perceptual symbols are analogue
and highly modal, being grounded in sensory-motor neural systems, whereas the notion of
mentalese is as discrete and amodal.
e programmers’ reports from research reviewed in x2.2.2 were the result of probes for
imagery in consciousness while programming, in keeping with the focus on conscious states by
Paivio (1990). However we share the view of LASS, that analogue representations extend be-
yond the conﬁnes of consciousness and aention, to structure the bulk of unconscious thought.
erefore if anything, these reported experiences of mental imagery are only the tip of the
iceberg.
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Table 2.2: Levels of representation according to the theory of Conceptual Spaces (Gardenfors, 2000), aligned
with terms from Dual Coding theory (Paivio, 1990)
Experience Gardenfors Paivio Structure
Language Symbolic Logogens Discrete symbols
Perception Conceptual Imagens Low dimensional geometry
Sensation Sub-conceptual – High dimensional neural nets
2.2.5 Conceptual Spaces
We have discussed perception with respect to analogue symbols at length, but how does this
relate to concepts? In a major review of the ﬁeld of concept theory, Murphy (2002, p. 5) deﬁnes
the term concept as “a mental representation of a class of things”. So concepts allow us to
structure our experiences through generalisation, but how is this done? e predominant view
is that perception and cognition are independent functions of the brain, but an alternative view
holds that functions of perception and concepts are integrated, relying upon shared neural
resources.
How then could concepts, abstractions from the world, be structured in the same way as
perception? Firstly it is important to recognise that perception is itself not a straightforward
reﬂection of the world, rather a low-dimensional representation of high-dimensional sensory
input, giving us a somewhat coherent, spatial view of our environment. By spatial, we do not
only mean in terms of physical objects or visual perception, but rather in terms of features in
the analogue spaces of all possible tastes, sounds, tactile textures and so on. is scene is built
through a process of dimension reduction from tens of thousands of chemo-, photo-, mechano-
and thermoreceptor signals. Gardenfors (2000) proposes that this process of dimension reduc-
tion is behind the construction of Conceptual Spaces. Moreover, he takes this as the primary
model of conceptual representation, including that of higher-level concepts somewhat abstract
from perception. at is, Conceptual Spaces are grounded in the cognitive resources of mental
imagery, but are repurposed to represent conceptual relationships in geometric spaces.
e theory of Conceptual Spaces has great explanatory power in resolving conﬂict in
the ﬁeld of artiﬁcial intelligence (AI) between proponents of the high dimensional, statisti-
cal graphs of artiﬁcial neural networks (ANNs) and the discrete symbols of good old-fashioned
artiﬁcial intelligence (GOFAI). ANNs represent concepts through trained networks of connec-
tions between cells, and GOFAI through the discrete constructs of language. In other words,
ANNs work in the realm of sensation, and GOFAI in the realm of computation. Gardenfors
seeks to unite these approaches by identifying a level of representation that mediates between
3See x4.1 for discussion of the relationship between computer and natural language.
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them: the low dimensional, geometric realm of the conceptual level.
Table 2.2 illustrates how the three levels of Conceptual Space theory align with the two
channels of Dual Coding. Note some discrepancies in terminology; Gardenfors refers to lin-
guistic representation as symbolic whereas we use the term discrete symbolic to distinguish
from analogue symbols in Dual Coding theory. Note also that Gardenfors describes ANNs
as sub-conceptual in place of the more generally used terms non- or sub-symbolic, to properly
situate them beneath the geometry of the conceptual layer.
Conceptual Space theory has some agreement with LASS, in that conceptual representa-
tion is considered to be largely outside the grasp of conscious introspection. Although these
theories use diﬀerent terms and have diﬀerent emphases, they agree that the primary form of
conceptual representation is within spaces, rather than within the syntax of the discrete sym-
bolic layer. However whereas LASS focuses on simulations of physical objects, movements
and interactions, Conceptual Space theory focuses more on the geometric structure of mental
spaces.
Conceptual spaces are structured by similarity; concepts that are closer together are more
alike. Furthermore, the dimensions of conceptual spaces are aligned with particular conceptual
qualities. is is most easily explained with the example of colour space, where more similar
colours are closer, within the quality dimensions of hue, chromaticism and brightness. As
already alluded to in x2.1, the concept red is not a point in colour space, but rather a convex
region, althoughwemay pinpoint a prototypical red as the centroid, or perhapsmore holistically
as the Voronoi generator (Okabe et al., 2000) of its region. e signiﬁcance of convexity is clear
if one considers that for any two hues of red, all the hues along the path between them will
also be red. Red as a property is a concept in its own right, but can also form part of a more
complex cross-domain concept, such as red ball.
e example of colour is straightforward, but it is rather harder to apply the theory to
concepts without clear correlates to perceptual spaces in consciousness. However the theory
of Conceptual Spaces makes the bold claim that the same processes of dimension reduction
and spatial representation are applied to the majority of concepts. Despite the lack of subjec-
tive conscious experience, we can hope to objectively identify the dimensions of higher order
concepts through psychological experiment, such as those based on multi-dimensional scal-
ing (MDS). In classic MDS experiments, human subjects are asked to grade pairs of stimuli by
similarity, with their judgements interpreted as distance measurements, and then used to re-
construct the conceptual space evoked by the stimuli. We will appraise MDS approaches in the
context of musical timbre in x3.3.1. We may also construct conceptual spaces based on estab-
lished theory: for example Forth et al. (2010) identify dimensions of musical metre based upon
31
C 2: S
music theory.
e theory of Conceptual Spaces is particularly useful for our present discussion in provid-
ing an account of how linguistic and spatial representations may interact in cognition. Rather
than placing the entire burden of higher-order representation on discrete, linguistic structure,
it instead places emphasis on metaphor, both for relating spaces together and for grounding
higher order concepts in embodied, perceptual spaces. Conceptual domains are low dimen-
sional, in general having from one to three dimensions, in common with mental imagery and
human perception in general. us, they may be explored and mapped through spatial reason-
ing, as if they were physical spaces. is includes relating features of two spaces together, in
other words drawing metaphorical relations between conceptual domains.
2.2.6 Metaphor
Metaphor is oen considered to be a form of poetic wordplay, a window dressing on lan-
guage. In introducing their Conceptual Metaphor theory, Lakoﬀ and Johnson (1980) argue on
the contrary that metaphor is of central importance to language. Conceptual Metaphor the-
ory is a deﬁning contribution to the ﬁeld of cognitive linguistics, and places metaphor in the
role of structuring concepts relative to one another within a coherent system of meaning. For
example, Lakoﬀ and Johnson claim that “Well, that boosted my spirits!” is a linguistic phrase
structured by the underlying conceptual metaphor   4. A single conceptual metaphor
may be expressed through many linguistic phrases, for example “I am depressed”, “I am feeling
down” and “My spirits sank” are instantiations of the same    metaphor.
Lakoﬀ and Johnson (1980) divide conceptual metaphors into two types; structural
metaphors such as    (e.g. “He is living on borrowed time”) and  
 (e.g. “His claims are indefensible”), and orientational metaphors such as 
  (e.g. “He is under hypnosis”) and the aforementioned   . Structural metaphors
structure one concept in terms of an other, while orientational metaphors structure a whole
system of concepts relative to fundamental directional and spatial relationships. Lakoﬀ and
Johnston assert that the majority of conceptual metaphors are orientational, coherent within
a large system of metaphors (Lakoﬀ and Johnson, 1980, p. 17). Orientational metaphors are
organised relative to the body, oen with physical motivation, for example    relates
to the erect posture of a happy person versus drooping posture of a depressed person.
Gardenfors (2000) builds the notion of orientational conceptual metaphors into his the-
ory of conceptual spaces (x2.2.5), asserting, like Lakoﬀ and Johnston, that they form the pri-
4Conceptual metaphors are by convention denoted with small block capitals, to diﬀerentiate them from the
linguistic metaphorical phrases which refer to them.
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mary structure of a human conceptual system. Orientational metaphors ground Conceptual
Metaphor theory, and therefore the theory of Conceptual Spaces, in human physical and cul-
tural experience. Gärdenfors proposes that these metaphors, and the geometric spaces they
relate together, are the basis of semantics. We will return to this subject in discussion of music
and language in x4.2.
2.3 Anthropomorphism and Metaphor in Programming
Metaphor appears to permeate our understanding of programming, as evident in the varied
reports of mental imagery in programming tasks (x2.2.2). Perhaps this is due to the abstract na-
ture of computer language syntax, requiring metaphorical constructs to ground programming
language in everyday reasoning. Blackwell (2006d) used techniques from corpus linguistics
on programming language documentation in order to investigate the conceptual systems of
programmers, identifying a number of conceptual metaphors listed in Table 2.3. Rather than
ﬁnding metaphors supporting a mechanical, mathematical or logical approach as you might
expect, components were instead described as actors with beliefs and intentions, being social
entities acting as proxies for their developers.
Blackwell (2006d) classiﬁes orientational metaphors into the metaphors P 
        , along with the related metaphor
of movement in spaces, E      . ese metaphors are
reported to occur regularly, and reﬂecting on Conceptual Metaphor theory, we would expect
orientational metaphors to provide the primary structure of programming concepts. Perhaps
these metaphors could be broken down and related in a coherent, spatial system of metaphors
such as A  U and P  F. A preliminary examination of the
corpus indicates that this may be feasible, however further work is required.
It would seem then that programmers understand the structure and operation of their pro-
grams by metaphorical relation to their experience as a human. e notion of including a com-
puter in a creative process (x6.3) is by nature anthropomorphic; by embedding the development
of an algorithm in a human creative process, the algorithm itself becomes a human expression.
However, Dijkstra strongly opposed such anthropomorphic approaches in computer science:
“I have now encountered programs wanting things, knowing things, expecting
things, believing things, etc., and each time that gave rise to avoidable confusions.
e analogy that underlies this personiﬁcation is so shallow that it is not only
misleading but also paralyzing.” (Dijkstra, 1988, p. 22)
Dijkstra’s claim is that by focusing on the operation of algorithms, the programmer submits
to a combinatorial explosion of possibilities for how a programmight run; not every case can be
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C        .
P    .
P       .
C     .
C    .
C     .
M    .
C   .
A     .
C        .
C       .
P         .
E      .
P     ,    
  .
D        .
T    .
P   .
P   .
D   ,     .
S       .
S    / .
S       .
Table 2.3: Conceptual metaphors derived from analysis of Java library documentation by Blawell (2006d).
Program components are described metaphorically as actors with beliefs and intentions, rather than me-
anical imperative or mathematical declarative models.
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covered, so programmer errors prevail. He argues for a strict, declarative approach to computer
science and programming in general. Dijkstra views computer programming as such a radical
activity that we should not associate it with our daily existence, or else limit its development
and produce bad soware.
e alternative view presented here is thatmetaphor necessarily structures our understand-
ing of computation, as it provides the basic structure of our conceptual system (x2.2.6). So-
ware now permeates Western society, and is required to function reliably according to human
perception of time and environment. Metaphors of soware as human activity are therefore
becoming ever more relevant.
2.4 Synaesthesia
Synaesthesia is a condition whereby modes of perception are cross-activated, where activa-
tion in one modality stimulates experiences in a second modality. A classic example is of the
colour!taste synaesthete, who experiences a particular taste whenever they see a particular
colour. Such activations are uni-directional – a colour!taste synaesthete will generally not
also be a taste!colour synaesthete. Synaesthetic experience diﬀers from that of conceptual
metaphor, in that for a colour!taste synaesthete, red may literally taste of earwax, as opposed
to a temperature-colour metaphor aligning the spatial dimensions of redness with warmth, by
linguistic reference to orientational metaphor.
Historically synaesthesia has not been taken particularly seriously by psychologists, dis-
missed as an insigniﬁcant function of memory, metaphor or illicit drug use (Ramachandran
and Hubbard, 2001b, p. 4). Over the last decade however a number of experiments have con-
ﬁrmed that synaesthesia is a real phenomenon, showing for example that number!colour
synaesthetes perform beer than controls at certain identiﬁcation tasks, aided by perceptual
‘pop-out’ provided by their condition (Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001a). is clear experi-
mental support for synaesthesia as a medical condition emboldened Ramachandran and Hub-
bard (2001b) to speculate on a role for synaesthesia in the evolution of language, connecting
vocal articulations and sounds with concepts, and providing a neural basis for metaphor. In the
same paper, a causal link is claimed for the high incidence of synaesthesia reported in artists,
where synaesthetes are more able to make creative metaphorical connections. ese claims
are tempered by a review by Ward et al. (2008), showing that evidence surrounding artists and
synaesthesia is unreliable, with the additional observation that the condition is automatic and
inﬂexible, whereas creative metaphor requires divergent thinking of a qualitatively diﬀerent
nature. However the automatic cross-activation of synaesthetes is at least a metaphor for the
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optional cross-domain metaphors drawn by artists, a meta-metaphor perhaps.
While theword synaesthesia is generally reserved for abnormal phenomena, there aremany
cross-modal ‘illusionary’ experiences that are experienced by the majority of the population.
Sound symbolism does not sit well with contemporary linguistic theory, but certain eﬀects
are undeniable. In his treatise on Gestalt Psychology, Kohler (1930) notes that subjects readily
associate spiked and loopy doodles with the nonsense words takete and maluma respectively,
an observation repeated in formal experiment by Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001b) with
the words kiki and bouba. Another illusion is where a single ﬂash of light, when accompanied
by a double sonic click, is perceived as a double ﬂash of light, a phenomenon conﬁrmed by
fMRI evidence (Zhang and Chen, 2006). A third example is the McGurk-McDonald eﬀect (x3.1),
which demonstrates the inﬂuence of lip reading on auditory perception. ese strong illusions
provide ground where artists may play with the senses of their audience.
2.5 Artistic synaesthesia?
In the arts, synaesthesia is frequently alluded to where a work crosses multiple media. is is
not intended to be an automatic process as with clinical synaesthesia, but the extension of an
artistic theme across modalities, in order to create a rich experience. At times this may seem
a mundane aspiration dressed in the clothes of psychological disorder. It is aer all normal to
be able to both see and hear an action in perceptual unity; modes of perception are by nature
integrated. Interest comes however where technology allowsmodalities to be related in a novel
manner.
e phrase algorithmic synaesthesia is coined by Dean et al. (2006) to describe artistic at-
tempts to connect vision and sound (or more speciﬁcally, ﬁlm and music) using digital com-
puters. e word algorithm is used rather loosely, to indicate any use of computers to connect
modalities, even if this only amounts to sharing of data between outputs; artistic license is
applied to both terms of the algorithmic-synaesthetic juncture.
Dean et al. (2006) report several interesting approaches to cross-modal integration in per-
formance. However we treat with scepticism their claim that the addition of a computer nec-
essarily brings mixed media into a new realm. ey state that their new digital ‘algorithmic
synaesthesia’ is more precise than past analogue eﬀorts, but it is not clear why; if we are con-
cerned with art that plays with analogue perception, then surely an analogue approach would
notionally be more precise. Instead we see computational developments as a continuation of
an ever-present tendency for artists to look for new correspondences between perceptual do-
mains, through both analogue and digital means.
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e use of mixed media in the arts is not new, and technology has been employed for
centuries in ﬁnding novel ways to connect the senses. For example the inventor Mary Hallock-
Greenewalt developed a colour organ (as in, a keyboard instrument to ‘play’ colour projections)
in a bid to realise her conception of Nourathar, an artform based on ﬂuctuating transpositions
of brightness and hue, with a scoring system to unite it with musical staﬀ notation (Greenewalt,
1946). Many colour organists, Hallock-Greenewalt included, have presumed their colour organs
to be novel, however experiments in this area have been a longstanding theme before and since.
Light shows and video displays have become an integral part of the live music stage, from the
psychedelic light shows of the 1960s to contemporary live generative visual art. e laer is
exempliﬁed by United Visual Artists (UVA), who began by creating stage visuals to accompany
and react to the live music of Massive Aack in 2003. UVA have since brought their work to
national galleries in the form of interactive installation art. e artistic focus of both the work
of Hallock-Greenewalt and UVA is the fusing of modes into an whole, audio-visual experience.
Hallock-Greenewalt invented analogue electric components to support her work, and UVA
workwith digital computation, but the artist JohnWhitney is a case of an artist who has worked
through both analogue and digital technology. Whitney produced experimental ﬁlms from the
1950s, ﬁrst using hand drawn animation, then analogue computers and in later years digital
computers as they became available (Youngblood, 1970, pp. 207–228). ere is lile discontinu-
ity between his works as he progresses from analogue to digital methods; all are explorations
of form through geometry. e biggest diﬀerence is in the amount of time taken to produce
the ﬁlms, a decade for his ﬁrst hand drawn ﬁlm, but much less for his later works. e depth
of his ﬁrst digitally produced ﬁlm Arabesque (1975) is breathtaking, the inﬂuence of his earlier
analogue approaches still showing in leading the viewer’s perception to an experience that is
both abstract and coherent. is continuity is shown too in the development of programming
languages for music; in particular Miller Puckee has said he thinks of his Patcher languages
(x5.3.1) as more like analogue synthesisers than programming languages (Lewis, 1993). We will
have much more to say about analogue representation in the notation of computer programs
in chapter 5.
Digital computers too oen lead artists into a trap of applying digital transformations to
data without consideration of the analogue source and destination of the data, ultimately lead-
ing to output that human perception cannot decode. While this is not always the case, analogue
methods tend towards straightforward mapping between two quality dimensions in a straight-
forward, perceptually salient manner. Digital methods on the other hand can too easily result
in transformations divorced from human perceptual processing, such as reading an image as a
one dimensional scan-line, as Dean et al. (2006) report of the MetaSynth soware. e result is
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too oen perceptually incomprehensible. Nonetheless at particular scales humans have strong
acuity for recognising discrete paerns, and indeed we will assert that this is an important
aspect of music cognition in x4.4.
e work of Whitney shows how the analogue and digital aspects of a work support one
another, and also that while electronic computers are oen extremely convenient, they are
not necessary. ere are dangers in working with electronic computers, in that by not taking
full consideration of orientational metaphor, or coherent paern, the results of digital trans-
formation are likely to be incomprehensible. However we should certainly not downplay the
potential importance of computer languages in a rich creative process, a subject we will explore
in chapter 6.
2.6 Acid Sketching – Semantic Imagery
We have discussed two ﬂavours of symbols in Dual Coding theory, analogue imagens and
discrete logogens (x2.2.1), as important to understanding human perception and cognition. We
will develop an argument for the relevance of this to programming languages in later chapters,
for now however we ground the discussion so far in practice, with a working prototype that
demonstrates the use of symbolic, analogue imagery in a user interface for music. A video of
Acid Sketching in use is contained within the accompanying DVD.
e Acid Sketing system was developed through the present research, to understand how
geometric forms and relationships can be meaningfully used in a computer system. e Acid
Sketching interface consists of an ordinary piece of paper, which is also a projection surface.
When shapes are drawn on the paper with an ink pen, they are identiﬁed and analysed using
computer vision. eir shapes are translated to sound synthesis parameters, and their relative
positions translated into a polyphonic sequence.
e procedure to turn shapes into a sequence of sound events is as follows. Shapes are
identiﬁed from a digitised image of the paper via a consumer grade webcam. is is done us-
ing the OpenCV (Open source Computer Vision) library developed by Intel Corp. Using this
library, the contours of the hand drawn lines are identiﬁed, and the shapes which they describe
are enumerated. e centroids of the shapes are calculated, and a minimum spanning tree con-
necting them is constructed. e result is the graph containing exactly one path between any
two shapes, whose spanning traversal is minimised. Starting from the most central shape, the
minimum spanning tree is followed, to place the shapes in a sequence. Time intervals between
each pair of shapes are given by the length of the edge connecting their centroids, which are
scaled relative to an adjustable beats-per-minute value. Because the minimum spanning tree
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branches, events may co-occur, which in musical terms results in polyphony.
is use of a minimum spanning tree turns a visual arrangement into a linear sequence
of events, a kind of dimension reduction. In terms of computational complexity, a simpler
approach would have been to simply disregard one dimension, for example by reading the
events from le to right. However we argue that greater richness is achieved by using this
graph structure built from the perceptually salient measure of relative distance in 2D space.
Aer all when we view a picture, our eyes do not generally read from le to right, but instead
jump aroundmultiple ﬁxation points inﬂuenced by the structure of the scene (Henderson, 2003).
Sound synthesis is provided by nekobee, a free/open source emulator of the analogue Roland
TB-303 Bass Line synthesiser. e nekobee soware is no longer actively maintained, but con-
tinues to be available in Linux operating system distributions. e TB-303 is best known for its
use in the Acid House genre, hence the name Acid Sketing (we discuss perception of synthesis
in acid house music in x3.3.3). e nature of each sound event is given by morphological mea-
surements of its corresponding shape, where each measurement is mapped to sound synthesis
parameters. Speciﬁcally, roundness is calculated as the ratio of a shape’s perimeter length to its
area, and maps to envelope modulation; angle is that of the shape’s central axis relative to the
scene, and maps to resonance; and ﬁnally, the shape’s area maps to pitch, with larger shapes
giving lower pitched sounds.
Visual feedback is projected back on to the paper using a standard data projector, with the
camera input aligned to projector output in soware. is feedback takes the form of moving
circles, tracing the path from one shape to the next along the edges of the minimum spanning
tree, ﬂood-ﬁlling each shape as its corresponding sound event is triggered.5
While soware based, Acid Sketching aims to avoid some of the traps of digital representa-
tion. One such trap is placed by the digital representation of an image, generally a two dimen-
sional array with x and y as indices, or the underlying single dimensional representation of a
scan-line. In Acid Sketching, what is signiﬁcant is placement not relative to two dimensions,
but relative to all the other marks on the page. Further, the geometric calculations used in this
Acid Sketching prototype are not formally tested, but illustrates our hypothesis that correspon-
dence between shape and timbre are straightforwardly learnable. If this hypothesis holds, this
prototype system could be developed further into an engaging interface for live music. Work
inspired by Acid Sketching is underway at the Computer Laboratory at Cambridge University,
investigating such correspondences from the perspective of human-computer interaction.
e symbolic nature of the shapes in Acid Sketching gives particular insight to our overall
theme. It demonstrates a use of analogue symbols which have morphological properties con-
5For the purposes of demonstration, the video for Acid Sketching on the DVD shows this feedbackmixed directly
with recorded video, rather than projected into the scene.
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tinuously mapped from those of what is represented. A criticismmay be that these symbols are
not truly analogue as they are represented digitally; from the perspective of the computer, we
can think of there being many millions of discrete sounds to represent, and potentially at least
the same number of discrete symbols to represent them. It is more useful however to think of
these as analogue symbols with a continuous, perceptually salient mapping to the represented
sounds. At a particular scale the underlying granular, discrete representation begins to show,
but as with atomic units in physics, this is outside of the normal limits of human perception.
e simulation is accurate enough to be perceived as analogue.
Acid Sketching demonstrates how analogue symbols may be interpreted through the use
of existing computer vision libraries. We can think of these libraries as models of perception,
which while impoverished compared to human perception, are nonetheless close enough to
be useful in interface design. While creating these perceptually salient continuous mappings
is relatively trivial, the challenge comes when we try to integrate analogue and discrete sym-
bols in a mutually supporting manner. How may we relate abstract, discrete symbols with
perceptually grounded, continuous symbols? For one answer, we look to the vocal tract.
2.7 Phonemes
For most people, the instrument that most directly grounds symbols is the vocal tract, with
paralinguistic support from their hands. For Deaf people, it is the other way around, with
hand gestures providing the ‘atoms’ of language and the mouth and face adding phrasing.
e expressive equivalence of signed and spoken languages (Suon-Spence and Woll, 1999)
demonstrates dependence of language on movement rather than sound, a point we will return
to in x3.1.
In spoken form, language is represented within the discrete symbols of phonemes, the units
which we represent with sound. e phonetics of English has a comparatively poor correspon-
dence to the leers of its alphabet, and so to unambiguously transcribe English pronunciation,
the International Phonetic Alphabet (IPA, see Ladefoged, 1990) is generally used. e IPA in-
cludes 107 leers and 52 diacritics, split into two tables, one for consonants and one for vowels.
Both tables are organised according to place of articulation, and so we can say that these sym-
bols use physical positions to classify sounds. at is, phonetics grounds speech not in sound
images, but in bodily movement. is is an important distinction, which we mark now to be
built upon later through chapter 3.
A phoneme exists in three modalities: as a discrete symbol, as a conﬁguration of the vocal
tract, and as a sound. Phonetics binds these very diﬀerent modalities together into a whole,
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allowing us to communicate discrete structures of language throughmovement, whether its the
hand that writes or signs, or voice that sounds. e following section introduces an artwork
that brings the role of movement in communication and sound perception to the fore.
2.8 Microphone
Figure 2.1: Microphone, by Communications, 2010. Media: CNC milled plywood, webcam, speaker array,
soware.
Microphone is an artwork by Communications, which is a collaboration between EunJoo
Shin and the present author. Microphone was installed at the Unleashed Devices group show
at the Watermans gallery London in Autumn 2010. Microphone invites participants to com-
municate with each other across a gallery, using two large microphones. e devices in Micro-
phone do not operate in the same way as conventional microphones as we described in 2.1. e
sounds are captured not with a conventional electronic transducer but with a digital camera,
with soware trained to produce vowel formants from mouth shapes.
e work invites participants to communicate using vocal sounds as a medium for gesture
without language, bringing focus on the role of movement in communication. It evokes a
feeling that is literally visceral, of vocal organ encoding paerns of movement into sound, and
being perceived as movements.
Microphone uses computer vision in a similar manner to Acid Sketing described above
(x2.6), in that it uses OpenCV blob detection to identify a polygon representing the shape of
the mouth. From this polygon the parameters of roundness and area are derived as with Acid
Sketching, along with the aspect ratio (height/width ratio of the minimum enclosing rectangle),
and the convex hull area. ese measures are not used directly, but instead used in combination
to calculate a measure of similarity between the given mouth shape and the ﬁve vowels a, e, i, o
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Figure 2.2: Microphone, showing a speaker array whi carried sounds between the two devices. e dis-
tance between the devices was constrained by installation in a group show.
and u. e average formant values of the three closest vowels are then calculated, weighted by
their similarity to the target shape. Although ﬁve discrete vowels are used in this calculation, a
range of sounds between them are mapped continuously, so for example the neutral ə (schwa)
vowel would be a point between them.
Microphone applies digital technology to map between modalities, but entirely analogue
means may be used to much the same ends. ere are long traditions of using the mouth as
paralinguistic, musical instrument, either alone or augmented with instruments such as the
Jew’s harp, as we will see in the following chapter. e digital foundations of this artwork
allows expectations to be confounded in interesting ways, but outwardly, Microphone is an
entirely analogue artwork.
2.9 Discussion
We have taken a fairly unconventional view of symbolic representation, but one that we have
suggested to be plausible in the context of cognitive psychology. In particular, we have taken
a view of symbolic representation that takes both analogue and discrete symbols into account.
Computation may at base be deﬁned by the manipulation of discrete symbol sequences, but
may be applied to simulate analogue systems, including aspects of the outside analogue world.
Further, human cognition, including that of computer programmers, involves both analogue
and discrete processing, lateralised and integrated.
Against this background we view programming as a human activity that spans both ana-
logue and discrete domains. e twoworkswe have presented, Acid Sketching andMicrophone
have in part been developed to explore this view. However both show the discrete aspects of
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programming as somewhat subservient to analogue aspects in the ﬁnal artwork. ey are ‘in-
teractive’ works, where participants engage with the work by making analogue gestures which
are digitised, transformed, then transduced back to analogue. In the case of Acid Sketching it
is hand drawn gestures which are digitised, and in the case of Microphone it is mouth move-
ments. e purpose of the digitisation however is to allow transformation from one analogue
domain to another.
ere is a further process of discretisation which happens in the ear and brain, perceiving
Microphone’s output as vowel categories, and Acid Sketching’s output as discrete sound events
in pitch classes. is categorical perception happens in tandem with the expressive spatial
perception, where a listener might aend to how the participant transitions from one vowel to
the next, or plays with diﬀerent timbral parameters.
e computation in Microphone and Acid Sketching is hidden behind analogue interfaces
based upon gesture, visual feedback and sound. is is the case in a great deal of ‘interactive’
computer artworks, where a great deal of energy is put into ﬁnding novel means of analogue
expression. is is also very much true in computer music interfaces, such as those demon-
strated at the New Interfaces for Musical Expression conferences.6 Analogue expression is
oen a focus in the arts, and so research exploring new analogue interaction is of course very
welcome. It has however led to some questionable claims being endemic in the electronic arts;
that analogue interfaces are somehow more advanced than discrete ones, that computation
necessarily should be hidden in art, and that computation is secondary to analogue experience.
For example the artist Simon Penny has the following to say about his piece “Fugitive 2”:
e intervention of fugitive is to present a mode of interaction which is pred-
icated on the system interpreting a person engaged in normal human bodily be-
haviors. is is in stark contrast to the conventional notion of interface, in which
ideas and concerns must be encoded, usually as alphanumeric data, demanding the
sequential pressing of lile buons on a board. is ut[t]erly impoverished inter-
face functions, in fact, as a ﬁlter, excluding all rich and diverse aspects of human
intelligence which cannot be encoded alphanumerically.7
is may seem a reasonable point of view until we notice that he is arguing against the
writing of novels as impoverished compared to (in this case) moving around before a cam-
era. To argue that either analogue or digital representations are more advanced is equivalent
to arguing whether novels or paintings are a more advanced form of expression. Indeed we
might argue that novels are ‘more advanced’ as print is a later technological development, and
indeed builds upon the accomplishments of paint. is would however be a weak position to
6http://nime.org/
7Retrieved from http://ace.uci.edu/penny/works/fugitive2.html, July 2011
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take; as we have argued through this chapter, humans are marked by the integration between
linguistic and spatial forms. It follows then that whether discrete representations are shown
in works depends entirely on the focus of the artist, whose engagement may include source
code, wrien natural language, musical notation, low-resolution lights arranged in grids, or
any other discrete, linguistic code.
From here then, we look for ways in which computer art can integrate the various codes
of language and perception, in new works that engage with full, rich experiences across both
domains.
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Words
Symbols are to words as positions are to movement. ese words that I am writing, and you
are reading, are sequences of leers wrien in the Latin alphabet, from le to right. ey are
members of a lexicon of many hundreds of thousands of words, which includes much apparent
redundancy, although every synonym has its own paern of usage. Before words came to be
wrien like this, they were only spoken. A pencil leaves a line, but air pressure waves from
the moving vocal tract sele quickly to the mean, leaving no trace behind. Except of course
the subjective trace, brought by hair movements in the cochlea, reduced by the listening brain
into a perceptual image, then perhaps reduced further into a form held in memory.
As we have seen, the English alphabet has a loose phonetic mapping. Children are con-
ventionally taught to read using phonics, teaching leers of the alphabet by typical sounds
they represent, which are strung together to pronounce words. However, there is a signiﬁcant
leap from theory to practice; this is a natural language, with much ambiguity and exceptions
for every rule. Nonetheless once learned, natural language can feel eﬀortless to the point of
invisibility. We may feel completely absorbed in a text, which is remarkable as literacy is a
comparatively recent, wholly cultural development; we have not evolved to read and write.
In programming, words are used rather diﬀerently. Aside from comments wrien in natu-
ral language, words in source code are either language keywords, or names given to variables
and functional abstractions by the programmer. As with the use of spatial arrangement exam-
ined in x2.2.3, through the process of tokenisation, the words are ignored by the language in-
terpreter as secondary notation. Words are not treated as having morphology, and are instead
reduced to unique, shapeless tokens. Even the practice of capitalising names of libraries of code
is by convention, rarely enforced by the interpreter; the naming is le entirely to the program-
mer. is diﬀers from natural language, where morphological word structure relates important
meaning, such as the suﬃx -s or -es to indicate plurals in English. Furthermore, program-
ming language does not have the sound symbolism we noted in x2.4, such as the onomatopic
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words cluer, quack and bang, or the perceptual relation between fricative consonants and
sharp shapes (Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001b). In natural language the morphology is not
only syntactic, but has structure which mirrors what may be represented. Such relations are
generally not considered important to modern study of linguistics, but nonetheless illustrate
a richness of human language, which we may draw upon in the design of human-computer
interactions.
While word morphology is absent from programming languages, allusions to it may oc-
casionally be found. In the Ruby language it is a convention for destructive methods, as in
those that directly modify mutable variables, to end in an exclamation mark (Flanagan and
Matsumoto, 2008). Regular Expression (regex) language is designed for matching strings of
text according to rules deﬁned by terse, oen single character operators and modiﬁers (Friedl,
2006). e result is a language on the word level; for example the following matches some
variants of the root word colour:
/\bcolou?r(s|ist|ing)?\b/
Despite wordmorphology not featuring signiﬁcantly in programming syntax, it is of course
important for a chosen name in source code to reﬂect what it symbolises, including morpho-
logical aspects such as s suﬃxes on methods that return multiple values, and appropriate use
of nouns and verbs to describe object classes and methods. is is convention in secondary
notation which we will cover in greater detail in x5.1.
e general absence of word structure in the syntax of source code is indicative of the lack
of articulation in the activity of programming. e particular movements of a programmer’s
ﬁngers are le behind at the keyboard, translated there into discrete on-oﬀ states. Our question
for artist-programmers working in computer music is, how can we relate our discrete repre-
sentations back to analogue movement? Words have life as articulations, as well as sounds
and symbol sequences, and so artist-programmers have much to learn from their study. In the
following we will look for greater understanding of this issue by examining the perception and
structure of words, ﬁnding motivation in vocal traditions of music.
3.1 Perceiving Speech as Movement
We begin our examination of words with a reduction of the spoken word to minimal compo-
nents. Sine wave spee is where the complex, time-varying properties of a speech sound signal
are reduced to a few sine waves (Remez et al., 2001). Typically, the frequency and amplitude of
three sine waves are mapped from the lowest three formant frequencies, and a fourth sine wave
from a fricative formant. e result is a bistable illusion, where an untrained human subject
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initially perceives sinewaves as separate, burbling artiﬁcial sounds. However once they are
directed to aend to the sounds as a human voice, they are able to perceive a single stream of
intelligible speech. It is surprising that speech is perceivable at all from these simple modulated
tones, with all hisses, pops and clicks removed. Despite the short-term acoustical properties of
speech being absent we can still perceive speech in the variance of pure tones, even identifying
particular speakers by it.
e inﬂuence that non-acoustic cues hold over speech perception is also demonstrated by
the McGurk-McDonald eﬀect (McGurk and MacDonald, 1976). A classic demonstration of this
eﬀect is where a subject is simultaneously presented with the sound /ba/, and a video of a face
mouthing the syllable /ga/, but ‘hears’ neither, instead experiencing the illusionary syllable
/da/. is perceptual eﬀect is strong for the majority of test subjects, stable even when subjects
are made fully aware of what the audio stimulus really is. What is more, the illusion persists
even when subjects are not consciously aware of what they are looking at; Rosenblum and
Salda~na (1996) reproduced the eﬀect without showing the face, but instead only point-light
movements taken from a moving face. is is a closely related result to that of sine-wave
speech; both cases show that features of the signal are not as important as how those features
vary. In other words, movements derived from the signal source are more important than
recognition of its short-term properties.
Such speech illusions have been taken as support of the Motor eory of Speech Percep-
tion (Liberman and Maingly, 1985). According to this theory, a ‘special module’ has evolved
in the human brain for speech, responsible for both speech production and perception. De-
spite having some popular notoriety, motor theory is not widely supported within the speech
perception ﬁeld, as the notion of this special module is not well deﬁned (Mole, 2009), and is
not supported by the evidence (Galantucci et al., 2006). While the concept of a special module
for language is generally no longer taken seriously, other aspects of the theory have become
widely accepted. Motoric contribution to speech perception is well supported, and sits well
with broader literature demonstrating strong motoric contribution to perception in general
(Galantucci et al., 2006). It would seem that rather than speech being ‘special’ as Liberman and
Maingly originally suggested, that meshing of action and perception is a feature of human
perception in general.
e meshing of perception and action has enjoyed renewed interest since the existence of
mirror neurons was identiﬁed by di Pellegrino et al. (1992). Mirror neurons were identiﬁed as
a class of neurons in the F5 region of the premotor cortex in a laboratory experiment with
a Macaque monkey. ese neurons were seen to ﬁre both when the Macaque observed an
assistant grabbing food, and when the Macaque himself grabbed the food. e explanation
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oﬀered by di Pellegrino et al. (1992) is that these neurons represent action understanding in
motor areas. e hypothesis is that because the same neuron ﬁres regardless of whether the
subject or an observed individual performs an action, that this is the basis of social cognition.
is experiment captured the imagination of many researchers interested in embodied social
cognition, not least Ramachandran (2000), who was driven to exclaim that the discovery of
mirror neurons was on the same level of the discovery of DNA. is enthusiasm has reached
the ﬁeld of music psychology, with Leman (2007) citing mirror neurons as a basis for social
understanding of music cognition based on gesture/perception couplings. However despite all
this enthusiasm, mirror neuron theory has a number of problems. For example, several of its
original assumptions have not held, and it fails to explain a wealth of evidence from brain lesion
studies (Hickok, 2009). A neural system underlying social cognition is certainly cause for great
interest, but it is early days for mirror neurons, and care should be taken not to extrapolate
from ﬁndings which remain controversial and unclear (Dinstein et al., 2008).
It is early days for neurobiology in general, but controversy over these initial claims does
not mean that a human mirror system does not exist in some form, with or without mirror
neurons. While fMRI studies do not give data on the level of individual neurons, a number
show overlap in performing and observing actions (e.g. Calvo-Merino et al., 2005; Chong et al.,
2008), suggesting motor simulation does have a role in action understanding. In any case, we
have seen evidence for strong motoric contribution to speech perception, demonstrating the
inﬂuence our bodies have over what we experience. is continues the theme of interaction
of continuous and discrete representations from the previous chapter; speech is a medium for
discrete units of language deeply intertwined with the continuous movement that carries it.
3.2 Vocable Words in Music Tradition
Like speech, instrumental sounds are produced via a series of articulations of the human body.
Modern digital computers allow us to synthesise sound with algorithms, but nonetheless we
perceive the result with a brain evolved and developed for deriving movement from sounds.
We have examined the role of articulation in the perception as well as production of speech,
and now consider the same or analogous relationship with the sounds of musical instruments.
In particular, we consider articulation as a perceptual bridge between musical instruments and
the human body, and will later propose a means for this bridge to be used in the design of
computer music notation.
A vocable word is simply a word that is able to be spoken and recognised, according to a
system of phonetics (x2.7). eword vocable is generally used to describe ‘nonsense’ words that
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are non-lexical, but nonetheless readily pronounceable using the phonetic sounds of a partic-
ular language. In musical tradition, vocable words are oen used to describe an articulation of
a musical instrument. For example a music instructor may use their voice to describe a sound
their student should try to make on their violin, perhaps by singing a pitch contour while using
a consonant-vowel paern to indicate a particular bowing technique. Over time the student
will learn to perceive the phonetics of their instructor’s voice as the sound categories of their
instrument.
Vocable words can be found in use across the continents and in many musical traditions.
Indian classical music has Bol syllables to ‘speak the drums’ where, for example, ṭe represents a
non-resonating stroke with the 1st ﬁnger on the centre of the dahina (right hand) drum (Kip-
pen, 1988). Bol syllables are oen used in refrain, where the tabla player switches from playing
the drums to speaking them with vocables. In the Scoish Highlands we ﬁnd Canntairead of
the bagpipes (Campbell, 1880), for example hiaradalla represents an echo of the D note in the
McArthur Canntaireachd dialect. As with Tabla, Canntaireachd is used in performance, and
the Indian Dhrupad singer Prakriti Dua and piper Barnaby Brown have collaborated to unite
the forms in vocal performance1.
Canntaireachd and Bols are largely vocal traditions, which have come to be wrien down
in recent times. Some vocables have traditionally been transcribed however, such as theien-
tzu^ notating the delicate ﬁnger techniques of the guqin (Chinese zither). For example’üan-fu
indicates that the index, middle and ring ﬁnger each pull a diﬀerent string with a light touch,
making the three strings produce one sound ‘melting’ together.
In her doctoral thesis “Non-lexical vocables in Scoish traditional music”, Chambers (1980)
divides the use of vocables as either being culturally jelled or improvisatory. Jelled vocables,
such as Bol or Canntaireachd vocables, are part of a formal system, where particular vocables
represent particular articulations of an instrument. Improvisatory vocables on the other hand
are made up during a performance, such as scat singing in Jazz. Chambers acknowledges that
the line between jelled and improvisatory is oen blurred, where for example a player for-
malises some aspects of their ‘diddling’ over time. Another distinction made by Chambers is
between imitative, onomatopoeic vocables and associative, arbitrarily assigned vocables. is
is a perceptual distinction, as Chambers reports: “Occasionally a piper will say that a vocable is
imitative (indigenous evaluation) when analysis seems to indicate that it is actually associative
(analytic evaluation) because he has connected the vocable with the speciﬁc musical detail for
so long that he can no longer divorce the two in his mind” (Chambers, 1980, p. 13). In other
words, a vocable may appear to mimic an instrumental sound on the perceptual level, without
1A video of this collaboration is available online; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I_7wh_ClamA (ac-
cessed March 2011)
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having similarity on the level of the sound signal. is seems to be true in the general context
of onomatopoeia – for example where a native English speaker hears a hen say “cluck”, their
German neighbour may perceive the same sound as “tock” (de Rijke et al., 2003). Research into
tabla Bols have however found them to be genuinely imitative, sharing audio features with
the instrumental sounds they represent, identiﬁable even by naive listeners (Patel and Iversen,
2003).
A third distinction can be made between vocable words in spoken and wrien form. A
reader of a vocable applies paralinguistic phrasing not derived from the text, but nonetheless
with great musical importance. Conversely a transcriber may resolve ambiguity in a spoken
vocable by writing a precise interpretation of the intended discrete paern. ese issues are of
course common to all notation systems, including those of natural language (x2.2.1). We can
say however that to some degree a wrien vocable may capture the discrete essence of a sound,
or at least a mnemonic focus to the whole articulation. From our discussion of Dual Coding
(x2.2), we can understand a wrien vocable as less accurate in capturing the full expressivity of
a sung vocable, but more accurate in precisely capturing aspects of its discrete structure. is
is simply a focus on either discontinuities or on smooth transitions, both important musical
features, and as such a sound may be fully understood in terms of both.
e popularity of staﬀ notation in Western Classical music has, at least in the case of Can-
ntaireachd, led to a reduction in the teaching of jelled vocables (Chambers, 1980). However in
reaction to the lack of standard means to notate articulation in staﬀ notation, Martino (1966)
proposes his own method grounded in phonetics. Each of his notational marks represent a
vocable syllable, for example the mark 0 has the phonetic representation tat, described as a
“incisive, crisp aack with similarly dosed decay”. Martino asserts that the articulatory pa-
rameters of any musical instrument can be understood as a subset of those of the voice, and as
a result that his notation applies to all instruments.
Vocables in music are oen referred to as being non-lexical (Chambers, 1980). It would
seem that the deﬁnition of jelled vocables implies a lexicon, a dictionary of words that symbol-
ise particular articulations of an instrument. On closer examination however vocable words are
sub-lexical. Canntaireachd is not so much structured by a lexicon but by a system of phonet-
ics, which in combination, generates a broad range of possible vocable words, with no lexical
reference apart from their phonetic structure. As such, improvisatory vocables are pure sound
symbolism, with reference occurring on the phonetic, and not lexical level.
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3.3 Timbre
Timbre is an important component of music, yet is lile understood. We have seen how vocable
words allow instrumental articulations to be related to articulations of the vocal tract. Artic-
ulation is closely related to timbre, where movements of instrumentalists such as of plucking
style, breath control and aer-touch have strong inﬂuence over the resulting timbre. In the
present section we will build an argument that this inﬂuence is crucial to the experience of
music, asserting that in perceptual and conceptual terms, articulation is timbre.
e American Standards Association (ASA) deﬁnes timbre in their Acoustical Terminology
standards as “…that aribute of auditory sensation in terms of which a listener can judge that
two sounds, similarly presented and having the same loudness and pitch, are diﬀerent” (Breg-
man, 1994). Where the ASA standard is quoted it is oen derided, for example Bregman (1994,
p. 92) paraphrases it as “We do not know how to deﬁne timbre, but it is not loudness and it is
not pitch”, in other words an “ill-deﬁned wastebasket category”. ere have been several re-
search aempts to establish a beer deﬁnition of timbre, but with lile success, and in a broad
review Hajda et al. (1997) highlight this lack of deﬁnition as the most lasting obstacle in the
research of timbre. Indeed without being able to deﬁne timbre, it is diﬃcult to know how to
look for other obstacles. Timbre seems to be an important part of music, but we cannot agree
on what it might be, or even how to approach deﬁning it.
For context, the same ASA document as above is also quoted as deﬁning pitch as “… that
auditory aribute of sound according to which sounds can be ordered on a scale from low to
high.” We can restate this in our terms, that ASA deﬁne pitch as an orientational metaphor
of the sort examined in x2.2.6. We infer then that the ASA believe that other aspects of sound
are not orderable along such a scale. Pitch certainly has a clear relationship with the physical
world, being the perceptual counterpart to frequency of waves of air pressure. Pitch also cor-
relates with physical body size, as smaller animals tend to have shorter vocal tracts with higher
resonant frequencies, resulting in higher pitched vocalisations. is makes pitches amenable
to being ordered along a quality dimension. However, the perceptual quality of loudness has a
similar relationship with wave amplitude and physical body size; smaller things tend to be qui-
eter. e ASA deﬁnition of pitch is under-speciﬁed; it fails to exclude orientational metaphors
whichwe claim structuremuch of the experience of music, timbre included. To look for support
for this claim, we turn to psychology of timbre literature, where the search for the dimensions
of timbre has been a common research aim.
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3.3.1 Multi-Dimensional Scaling
Unlike pitch and loudness, timbral diﬀerences do not have direct relationships with the fun-
damental features of air pressure waves, hence their consignment to a wastebasket category
(Bregman, 1994). However a number of researchers have aempted to identify distinct quality
dimensions of timbre. e hypothesis is that there are a certain number of quality dimen-
sions deﬁning a space in which timbre is perceived. ese aempts have in general applied
Multi-Dimensional Scaling (MDS; Shepard, 1962) or closely related approaches of dimension-
ality reduction. In MDS experiments, similarity judgements are collected from human subjects
and interpreted as distances, which are then used to reconstruct the perceptual space in which
the judgements are assumed to have been made. We can express this aim as capturing the di-
mensions of mental imagery (x2.2.1) or conceptual spaces (x2.2.5) at play when listeners aend
to musical timbre.
MDS similarity judgements are classically given in response to pairs of stimuli, as a mark
along a scale from very dissimilar to very similar. ey may alternatively be derived from sort-
ing tasks or closest pairs in triplets (Weller and Romney, 1988; Hajda et al., 1997), with various
eﬀects on the scope and reliability of the results (Bijmolt and Wedel, 1995). An early aempt
at applying MDS to instrumental sounds was performed by Grey (1977), where human subjects
were asked to rate pairs of sounds on a similarity scale. e stimuli were synthesised based
upon the physical properties of orchestral instruments. However Grey interpreted the MDS
solution as showing clustering that went beyond familial groupings of instruments to show-
ing articulatory features. Furthermore Wessel (1979) used MDS techniques to produce control
structures for synthesis, so that additive synthesis of timbre could be manipulated according
to movements in a perceptually salient space resulting from the scaling.
Wessel interpreted his MDS solution as having two dimensions, namely brightness and
bite. Brightness is generally quantiﬁed as the frequency of the spectral centroid, and Wessel
(1979) relates ‘bite’ to the nature of the sound onset or aa. A review of MDS timbre studies
performed since Wessel’s early work shows the majority of studies have these two dimensions
in common (Caclin et al., 2005), however besides this there is a great deal of inconsistency,
with many other dimensions identiﬁed in individual studies without broader agreement. ese
include spectral ﬂux, spectral spread, spectral irregularity and harmonic onset asynchrony.
In summary, the broad ﬁnding of MDS studies of timbre thus far is that spectral centroid
and aack time seem to be important. Lile more is agreed upon except for one important
point; inter-individual diﬀerences are signiﬁcant (Caclin et al., 2005). From our perspective,
we would certainly expect it to be so, perception being not directly against the background of
physical reality, but of personal experience of it (x4.2). Some of the inconsistency in the results
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of MDS timbre studies may be methodological, MDS is known to be highly sensitive to optional
cognitive processes inﬂuenced by test conditions, even when similarity measures are based on
Stroop interference (reaction times). For example, MDS is oen used to ﬁnd whether two
dimensions of perception are related, by looking for either a city block or Euclidean distance
metric in the MDS solution (e.g. Gardenfors, 2000, p. 25). However, Melara et al. (1992) found
that suchmetrics were entirely down to optional processes employed by test subjects, and could
be straightforwardly manipulated by altering the wording of test instructions. Such optional
cognitive processes are a serious and diﬃcult problem to deal with.
Krumhansl (1989) looks beyond methodology in suggesting that the very notion of univer-
sal dimensions of timbre is ﬂawed. Although there may be one or two dimensions with general
salience, diﬀerent sound sources have particular characteristics resulting in their own dimen-
sions. Instead, timbre should be understood not just as frequency analysis, but also relative
to the dynamics of a real, simulated or imagined physical source behind the sound. It is clear
that MDS studies have focused on the former (Hajda et al., 1997), but we join Krumhansl in
arguing that the strong role of physical movement in the perception of timbre has too oen
been overlooked.
3.3.2 Grounding Timbre in Movement
Many of the words used to describe instrumental sounds are metaphors for the physical mani-
festations of movement, shape and the body; we have already seen that Wessel (1979) used bite
to describe sound onset quality, an oral metaphor indicative of the close perceptual relation-
ship between sound and bodily movement. is theme is explored by Traube and D’Alessandro
(2005), who ﬁnds that vocal articulation has a strong role in guitarists’ timbre perception.
Traube and D’Alessandro investigate both the lexical words and non-lexical vocables that gui-
tarists use to describe guitar sounds. In the former case, ey asked guitarists to choose words
to describe guitar notes. Amongst other words, sounds obtained by plucking the string close to
its middle were ascribed words such as closed and damped whereas plucking close to the bridge
were described as thin and nasal, and plucking midway, over the sound hole was described as
large, open and round. is is in apparent subconscious reference to mouth shapes for the vow-
els that have similar formant structure to the resulting guitar sounds. Traube suggests that this
shows use of mental imagery to communicate timbre, relating it to the use of vocable words by
tabla players. Indeed through experiment Traube demonstrates that when guitar players im-
provise vocables, there are positive correlations both between plosive consonant and plucking
angle, and between vowel and plucking position.
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3.3.3 Music of Timbre
InWestern culture, the primary basis of music is widely considered to be that of pitch contrasts
over time. is is evident in the clinical deﬁnition of those with deﬁcits in music perception;
amusia is generally considered primarily as a deﬁcit in pitch perception popularly known as
‘tone-deafness’ (Pearce, 2005). ere are musics however where contrasts of discrete tones is
unimportant, which we describe asmusic of timbre. While we argue that perceived movement
is of universal importance to music, to some musics, it would seem that this is almost all there
is. e question is, can music achieve the same levels of complexity without tonality, or does
the focus onmovement involve a trade oﬀ, a shi frommusical contemplation, perhaps towards
something with a broader ‘non-musical’ function in culture?
In his book “Music, Language and the Brain”, Aniruddh Patel notes that despite much mu-
sical experimentation, music based on timbral rather than tonal contrasts is rare (Patel, 2007,
pp. 30–37). is is explained twofold; ﬁrstly, timbral changes oen require instrumental ma-
nipulations that are physically diﬃcult to perform in quick succession. e second, cognitive
reason he gives is that timbral contrasts cannot be perceived in terms of intervals, so the higher
order relationships associated with tonal music are not supported by timbre. A given counter-
example is music of the tabla drums in Indian classical music, which Patel (2007, pp. 62–67)
explains by looking at the music culture around the tabla. In particular, he notes the extensive
use of Bol syllables, a jelled system of vocable words (x3.2). Patel concludes that these vocables
allow perception of complex timbral contrasts to be aided by cognitive resources developed for
linguistic structure.
We propose an alternative hypothesis to Patel (2007), that it is not speciﬁcally linguistic
sound categories which support timbre perception in Tabla music, but more generally cate-
gories of articulation, which just happen to be of the vocal tract in this case. e human ability
to perceive and categorise movement is used in the transmission of language, both in vocal and
sign languages (Suon-Spence and Woll, 1999), but we contend that this is a more general cog-
nitive rather than linguistic resource; speech is not ‘special’ (x3.1) as Patel implies. Audiences
can perceive tabla music because when performers speak the drums, listeners are able to relate
the sounds to the movements of their own vocal tracts. In the case of electronic dance music,
it is not the movement of the vocal tract, but of the whole body dancing that opens the door to
broad appeal found within large audiences.
e strong implication made by Patel (2007) is that without co-opting linguistic resources,
music of timbre would be impossible, or at least rare. Together with the lack of clarity found in
MDS study, it would be too easy to conclude from this that timbre is therefore unimportant in
music cognition, being either too complex or too formless to provide structure for music. Elec-
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troacoustic music has not found popular audiences beyond its academic base. However Patel
overlooks the existence and popularity of electronic dance music, which oen centres around
manipulation of synthetic timbre with apparently no supporting use of vocable words. An ex-
ample of this is the acid line, a musical style exempliﬁed by the 1995 recording of “Higher state
of consciousness” by Josh Wink. is piece revolves around slow manipulation of the timbral
parameters of a repeating motif on the Roland MC-202, a monophonic, analogue subtractive
bass line synthesiser. Synthesis ﬁlters are manipulated on this machine during the piece, with
low-pass cutoﬀ slowly increasing tension until releasing into a single, ﬁnal crescendo. e
timbral changes of this example are slow, but one does not have to look far to ﬁnd timbral
manipulation at a speed and complexity comparable with that of tabla virtuosos. For exam-
ple Autechre’s Gantz Graf (2002) has lile in the way of discernible melody, but manipulates
sound events at a speed on the boundary between percussion andmetallic drone. Autechre reg-
ularly aract audiences of thousands across Europe and the USA, who dance to fast-changing,
complex rhythms in the dark, with no visual accompaniment.
e role of movement is unsurprisingly central to dance music, but to the extent that as-
pects of music cannot be understood without dancing, or at least imagining oneself dancing.
e Clave rhythm is a case in point, where the main beats are emphasised not through musi-
cal accents, but in the associated dance steps (Agawu, 2003, p. 73). Indeed in many cultures
the concept of music encompasses both the sounds and the dance, and one is not understood
without the other (Agawu, 2003, p. 264). In the case of Autechre, the musicians provide rich
and complex timbral structures, for which audience members create their own reference points
through their own bodily movements.
Some musicians aempt to produce acousmatic music free from physical manifestation
and constraints. Sounds may include those recorded from recognisable sources, but are used
for their sonic properties. is music is not performed, only existing in recorded form, and in a
concert seing is played over loudspeakers. It is of course possible to enjoy this music through
physically static, deep listening, but we contend that it is diﬃcult to do so, and that general
audiences ﬁnd it troublesome to relate ungrounded timbre to their own bodily experience. is
diﬃculty is expressed well by Smalley (1994, p. 39); “In electroacoustic music where source-
cause links are severed, access to any deeper, primal, tensile level is not mediated by source-
cause texture. at is what makes such types of acousmatic music diﬃcult for many to grasp.
In a certain physical sense there is nothing to grasp - source-cause texture has evaporated.”
Smalley concludes that to free timbre from source-cause, the composermust confront and enjoy
the dissolution of timbre.
Emmerson (2007a) describes a dichotomy between dance and art music in electronic music
55
C 3: W
as being between either a focus or freedom from repetition. Emmerson relates repetitive music
to a grounding in the movements of the human body, and amorphous music to movements in
the environment. It should be noted however that while the celebrated electroacoustic com-
poser Stockhausen disliked the “repetitive language” in electronic dance music (Emmerson,
2007a, p. 62), he also compelled students of music to “go dancing at least once a week. And
dance. Please, really dance: three or four hours a week.” (Stockhausen and Maconie, 2000,
p. 170). We share the conclusion with Emmerson (2007a), that musicians who work on the
boundary between these dance and art musics are reconciling the dual themes of body and
environment. at these two groups are in many cases already using the same tools and lan-
guages oﬀers such musicians a unique opportunity.
3.3.4 Deﬁning Timbre
We have focused on the role of movement in timbre perception, but until now have avoided
explicitly deﬁning timbre. In contrast to the approaches of trying to deﬁne timbre in terms of
spectral features, or the ASA approach of deﬁning timbre by what it is not, we deﬁne timbre
more broadly in terms of mental imagery:
Deﬁnition: Timbre is sound as it is perceived, as mental imagery of positions, re-
gions and their variance in action spaces.
We need to be careful in interpreting this deﬁnition. Musical events are by deﬁnition dis-
crete, not only notes but also vocable words such as tabla Bols. However we characterise such
discrete symbols as signposts in continuous timbre space. We may notate timbre using discrete
symbols, but the timbre we notate is understood in terms of points, areas or movements in per-
ceptual spaces. us brightness names an analogue dimension, bright names a range within it,
and brighter a direction along it.
Our deﬁnition of timbre does not exclude pitch, and we contend that it is not possible to
do so – for example pitch and brightness are so interdependent as to be inseparable. When
pitch scales are used, aention is shied away from the continuous timbral quality of pitch
and towards discrete relationships between notes. is does not mean that mental imagery
of pitch height is ignored, but rather that the balance shis in some measure from analogue,
timbral movement to structures in a discrete domain. e development of staﬀ notation in
the Western tradition has de-emphasised the older oral tradition of vocable words, distancing
music from the body (x3.2). is distance can be considered a freedom, allowing us to explore
and contemplate the multi-dimensional complexity of discrete tonality. However we contend
that what makes amelody aﬀecting is its integration of both discrete notes and analogue timbral
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experience. e same can of course be said for integration between discrete paern and timbral
movement in Tabla playing.
Integration between the continuous and discrete in music is the normal case, but it is pos-
sible to perceive timbre without associated discrete coding. For example an elongated drone,
with smoothly ﬂuctuating timbre, does not have discontinuities that would evoke discrete seg-
mentation. Likewise, if an event is repeated in performance with lile variation, such as a
repetitive kick drum, then it may be aended to primarily as a discrete paern, but still, its
pulse is likely to be perceived and understood relative to sounds around it in spatial terms, in
relation to its low position on the pitch dimension.
3.3.5 Timbral analogies
If timbre is a product of movement in mental imagery, then we might expect orientational
metaphor (x2.2.6) to play a large part in its structure. is is what the notion of timbral analogy
amounts to, the idea that timbral diﬀerences are perceived as distances, and related to one
another as such in perception. Wessel (1979) applied a perceptual space identiﬁed throughMDS
(discussed in x3.3.2) to test the existence of timbral analogy and found encouraging results;
subjects would tend to choose the D in the form A is to B as C is to D that results in the
distance AB being closest to CD. A similar experiment is given by McAdams (1999), which
also showed some support for the timbral analogy hypothesis, however also showed strong
individual diﬀerences and irregularities. As Patel (2007, pp. 30-34) points out, this indicates that
unlike tonality, music of timbre does not easily support intervals as a shared category system.
However while McAdams (1999) does ﬁnd individual diﬀerences, electroacoustic musicians
made judgements more consistent with one another, suggesting that this could just be a maer
of cultural exposure. It would be interesting therefore to apply similar experimental design to
the perception of timbral analogies between the parameters of bass line synthesisers (such as
the Roland MC-202, x3.3.2), and compare the results between those of varying exposure to acid
house music.
On another level, we may question whether shared category systems are necessarily im-
portant to music. As we have argued, music can be grounded and creatively interpreted in
the dance of the listener, and so the job of the composer or improviser is in such cases not to
encode a musical ‘message’ to be unambiguously decoded. Rather, it is to sculpt music with
structures of interest, that may be interpreted according to analogies dynamically constructed
by the listener; music that sounds diﬀerent on each listen, being framed by the particular state
of the listener’s mind and body.
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3.3.6 Sound source modelling
In relating mental imagery to action spaces, our deﬁnition of timbre implies that sound source
modelling is the basis of sound perception. An expanded form of this assertion is that through
listening to a series of sounds we build a model of aspects of a physical object and its excitation,
and how it reacts to actions to produce sounds. is model is then used to structure perception
of the sounds which gave rise to it.
e idea that we perceive a sequence of events relative to a model built from those events
may seem far-fetched, but such dynamic relationships are far from alien to music psychology.
For example it is widely accepted that underlying metre is inferred from rhythm, and that the
rhythm is then perceived relative to the metre (London, 2004). is is particularly explicit in
Indian classical music, where the metric tal is a clapping paern inferred from the rhythm that
is based around it (Clayton, 2008). is can happen within the time frame of the psychological
present, so that the perception of metre and rhythm are uniﬁed, appearing to inﬂuence one
another simultaneously. It would seem that the same is true of timbre; humans are able to
identify instruments within a mixed auditory scene eﬀortlessly (Bregman, 1994), and so at least
some source modelling is at play. e questions are, to what extent does this ability contribute
to timbre perception, and to what extent are neural motor circuits involved?
Some studies have found correlations between deﬁcits in music perception and of spatial
ability, with Douglas and Bilkey (2007) making the argument that amusia is part of a general
deﬁcit in spatial ability, supporting the assumption that music perception is a form of spatial
perception. Such ﬁndings are controversial, and diﬃcult to interpret; among other issues it
is unclear whether spatial ability improves music perception, or listening to music improves
spatial ability (Stewart and Walsh, 2007), although we would suggest a third option that both
cases are true. at there is some relation seems clear, for example Cupchik (2001) ﬁnds that
mental rotation of ﬁgural drawings (aer the classic mental imagery work discussed in x2.2.1)
predict ability to discern analogous musical permutations. It is interesting however that this
debate in the literature is made solely on the basis of pitch perception. If, as we suggest, music
is perceived simultaneously in terms of discrete events and analogue movements, and pitch
tends towards the former use, then perhaps more conclusive results would be found if wider
timbral aspects of music were examined with these experimental designs.
3.3.7 Universality of Timbre
Music is popularly described as a universal language, the implication being that music is not
culturally speciﬁc, and does not need to be learned. ere is support for some interpretations
of this in the literature, Fritz et al. (2009) found that listeners in Mafa, Cameroon judge the
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emotion of Western pieces of music in agreement with Western listeners, at above chance
levels. We may imagine how the Mafa achieved this feat, despite lacking prior exposure to
Western culture. Emotion is deﬁned by Fritz et al. somewhat coarsely as being either happy,
sad or scary, to which they report clear correlations with basic musical features; for example
‘happy’ music has a faster tempo and ‘sad’ a slower tempo. However these universals are
not necessarily musical in nature. It is universal human behaviour for happy people to move
faster than sad people, due to physical eﬀects on motor control. While it is unsurprising that
Western musicians choose to take advantage of this in their work, it is quite a stretch to make
the broad claim that music is a universal language on this basis, or even that music has universal
components. It is equivalent to observing that when people are sad, they speak slower, and
arguing on this basis that speech is a universal language. While humans are universally driven
to make music, as they are driven to speak, the result is many musics, not one.
So, naive listeners may be able to pick up references to mood in Western music, through
certain coarse universals of an analogue code. Overall though, music is deﬁned within a partic-
ular human culture. Traditional dance is a visible aspect of this, not just accompanying music
but an intrinsic part of the musical experience (x3.3.2). Indeed we agree with the analysis of
Western musiing by Small (1998), that music is an activity that encompasses not only play-
ing instruments and dancing, but also concert ticket sales, dressing up, the hubbub in concert
hall atria prior to the concert, the clearing of throats, and the striding on stage of the conduc-
tor. Music is a cultural activity in the deepest sense, and by taking an external perspective on
an otherwise familiar Western activity, Small shows what strange creatures we are. It is no
surprise then that Western ethnomusicologists in Africa have found music grounded in move-
ment, embedded in culture, and not focused on sound; this is the general case across cultures
(Agawu, 2003, Ch. 5), including in Western music.
3.4 Articulation
Having deﬁned timbre primarily as perceived articulation, we examine the articulation of
words as discrete symbol sequences. is will complete the context required for the practi-
cal connection between timbre and computation that concludes this chapter.
We have already examined the use of symbols to notate positions of articulators in the vo-
cal tract, as well as the related issues of embodiment and mental imagery through chapter 2.
Articulation of words is in theory a simple case of moving from one position to another, but the
timing and phrasing of articulation forms an additional, analogue channel of prosodic commu-
nication. Furthermore physical constraints lead to interactions between points of articulation
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known as co-articulation, a challenge for computational speech recognition.
3.4.1 Rhythm in Spee
We saw Patel (2007) draw a structural connection between music of the tabla and speech in
x3.2. Patel goes further in the same volume with research comparing timing in speech with
music performance. In speech research, a dichotomy was long accepted dividing languages
into stress-timed and syllable-timed languages. It was generally accepted that stress-timed lan-
guages tend towards equal duration between stressed syllables, and syllable-timed languages
tend towards equal duration between every syllable (isochrony). However, cracks appeared in
this theory when agreement could not be met on which languages were which. When comput-
ers allowed measurements unaﬀected by hidden bias, it became clear that the stress/syllable
timing dichotomy had no basis in the cold reality of the sound signal – no languages have
isochronous timing.
e distinction between stress- and syllable-timing was however saved, or perhaps re-
placed, by Ling et al. (2000), through introduction of the normalised Pairwise Variability Index
(nPVI). is provided a measure for quantifying something that was intuitively felt, but falsely
aributed to stress/syllable timing. As the name suggests, nPVI measures the “degree of con-
trast between successive durations in an uerance” (Patel, 2007, p. 131), with a higher nPVI
indicating greater contrast between neighbouring durations, and a perception of stress rather
than syllable timing. In his search for correspondences between music and language, Patel
applied the nPVI to music. Unlike speech, much music is isochronous, but by applying nPVI
to both speech and music, Patel found that relationships could be found in the non-periodic
structures of both. In particular, that cultures with spoken languages with a higher nPVI had
a style of playing music that also had a higher nPVI. Because notes are normally played much
faster than syllables are spoken, this is an inconclusive result, but does support a universal
link between musical and prosodic expression. Furthermore, in certain cases this link is made
explicit and undeniable, as we will see in the following section.
3.4.2 Sound poetry
Sound poetry is an artform closely related to the use of vocable words, in that speech is used
for its timbral quality rather than as a linguistic medium. ere is no reference to another
instrument, instead aention is turned solely on the expressive abilities of the vocal tract itself.
Among the most celebrated sound poems is the Ursonate by Schwiers (1932), with themes
introduced, explored and expounded upon through four movements over twenty nine pages.
Only non-lexical words are used, although the work includes instructions to recite the poem
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with German intonation.
e practice of sound poetry has related forms in music. For example the Italian composer
Luciano Berio’s Sequenza III is a vocal piece featuring muerings, clicks and shouts of the
female voice, notated with a unique system of symbols including vocables. emanipulation of
the voice is taken to diﬀerent extremes in human beatboxing, which emerged from the Hip Hop
genre. Beatboxers employ extended vocal techniques to produce convincing impersonations
of drum machines and bass lines (Stowell, 2008). Beatbox rhythms may be notated with a
system of jelled vocables called standard beatbox notation (Tyte, 2008), where wrien syllables
represent the diﬀerent sounds. Although the notation is vocable, beatboxers generally intend
to produce sounds that do not suggest a vocal source. Beatboxers anecdotally report that their
hand gestures help them do this, imagining instruments in a spatial arrangement in front of
them, and moving their hand to ﬁnd the diﬀerent timbres of their voice; a mapping from space
to articulation.
3.4.3 Words in Music Tenology
We have seen that vocable words are used across diverse music cultures. However at certain
points, music culture has embraced technological advance changing how music is conceived.
is includes the development of staﬀ notation, a form of musical literacy, changing the way
music is composed, taught and distributed. More recently, electronic and computational tech-
nology has provided radically newways of describing musical sounds, particularly through un-
derstanding of the frequency domain and the development of new analogue and digital sound
synthesis methods. In all these cases the result has been new music activity signalling a move
away from oral tradition. In the case of staﬀ notation vocable words have been replaced with
notation focused on pitches, and in the case of synthesis the transmission of music has moved
to tape, disc and computer networks. In the case of electronic dance music, human movements
are oen factored out through quantisation, normalising input data so that events fall into a
precise, coarse grid. If the composer feels that the result is too robotic, human-like articula-
tions are then synthesised, adding subtle time phrasing to events to give ‘human feel’ through
performance rules (e.g. Friberg et al., 2006). We can say that for some popular computer music
interfaces, control over the kind of expression that we have compared to prosody is abstracted
away.
Although in some cases technology has replaced use cases for vocables, in others it has
blurred the distinction between vocable words and the instrumental sounds they evoke. Indeed
it has ever been thus; the Jew’s harp, one of the world’s oldest instruments, locates a reed
inside the mouth, which is twanged while the mouth is articulated, allowing the musician to
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create timbral expressions based on vowel formants. A more recent technological counterpart
to the Jew’s harp is the vocoder, which when applied to speech imposes articulations of the
vocal tract upon another sound source, thus allowing any instrument to ‘speak’. We may also
consider Microphone (x2.8) in this light. In such cases a spoken vocable word is not a symbolic
representation signifying another sound, but is the sound itself.
Computer music technology has employed a wide range of human articulations in the spec-
iﬁcation of sound. Many alternate means of articulating a sound to a computer system have
been developed, with many hundreds of examples in the annals of the New Interfaces for Music
Expression conference. Gestures of the hands are soniﬁed to shape timbre, equivalent to the
vocal articulation of words, especially when we consider sign languages of the Deaf (x2.7).
e voice is a recurrent theme in the control of new music interfaces, hardly surprising as
the vocal tract evolved to support articulations of great complexity, for the purpose of com-
munication (Boer, 2010). We discussed the bistability of auditory and speech perception in
x3.1 in relation to sine-wave speech, and this bistability has itself been treated as a musical
medium. Jones (1990) describes how he leads the listener to perceiving non-speech as speech,
and vice-versa, through timbral manipulation with the CHANT soware (Rodet et al., 1984).
Speech synthesis has also featured as a source of musical timbre in electronic dance music, for
example the largely unintelligible singing synthesis soware wrien by Chris Jeﬀs for use in
his compositions under the “Cylob” moniker (Jeﬀs, 2007).
Perhaps a central problem underlying new music interface research is that composers need
to describe sounds in ways which have some connection to the outside world. Reﬂecting on the
above, we propose that one answer is to build models of human perception into soware, so
that the soware may plausibly relate sounds to experience, as Wessel (1979) aempted with
some success using MDS (x3.3.1). An alternative approach of building physical models, and
controlling them with discrete symbol systems analogous to phonetics, is introduced in the
following section.
3.5 Vocable synthesis
Vocables are words which musicians use to represent instrumental articulations (x3.2). Vocable
synthesis then is the use of physical modelling sound synthesis in this process, to automatically
render words into timbre.
Pioneering research into voice-control of synthesisers with vocable words is introduced by
Janer (2008), where syllables are sung into a microphone and the resulting sound signal ana-
lysed and mapped to instrumental parameters. is work is inspired by the tradition of scat
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singing vocables in Jazz culture. Scat syllables are not jelled but improvisatory (x3.2), and per-
haps as a result Janer is interested not in whi syllables are sung, but how they are sung. As
such he uses a digital computer to translate from one analogue form to another, a similar ap-
proach to the Acid Sketching and Microphone projects introduced in chapter 2; the underlying
process is digital, but in terms of inputs and outputs it is perceived as a continuous mapping.
Janer’s approach allows realtime use, where a singer’s syllables are detected, analysed and re-
synthesised on-line. e result is a system which is very easy for singers to learn hands-on,
through use.
e approach to vocable synthesis introduced here diﬀers from that of Janer, in that we
consider words in wrien rather than spoken form. at is, we use words for their discrete
phonetics rather than analogue prosody, so that we may translate from a discrete form to a
continuous one. e motivation for taking this approach is to provide a representation of
timbre for live coders (x6.8), computer musicians who notate music in the digital domain under
tight time constraints. Such musicians are oen driven to specify large synthesis graphs to
describe synthetic timbre, and so the promise of instead describing complex timbres with short
words should be very aractive.
For vocable synthesis to be usable, it should include a coherent mapping, with a perceivable
connection between symbols and sound categories. is is facilitated through the articulation
of a computer model of an analogue sound source. e use of physical modelling synthesis
promises that even a naive listener can perceive time variance of perceived audio features as
physical movement. e musician then describes articulation with symbols, which the listener
experiences through the music of timbre. e aim is that for the musician, the experience of
using vocable synthesis should feel as natural as using onomatopoeia in spoken words.
3.5.1 Babble - vocable Karplus-Strong synthesis
An early implementation of vocable synthesis was introduced by the present author (McLean,
2007), and since adapted into the artwork Babble, commissioned in 2008 by the Arnolﬁni gallery
in Bristol, accessible at http://project.arnolfini.org.uk/babble/. is artwork was
inspired by sound poetry (x3.4.2), in which speech is used as structured sound within a poetic
composition, rather than as a linguistic medium. e aim for this was to bring the aention of
participants to the paralinguistic connection between symbols and sound.
In Babble, the consonants and vowels map to diﬀerent aspects of a physical model. is is
analogous to a system of phonetics, but is not intended as an approximation of the phonetics of
a natural language. In particular, this is not intended to be a system for speech synthesis, but
rather a system for speech-like composition of sounds. Similar results could have been found
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by taking a speech synthesiser and ‘breaking’ it, by adjusting the parameters just outside the
point where the sound could be perceived as speech. e advantage of the Babble however is
that it uses a computationally simple model, and is therefore able to run in a web browser.
e physical model used in Babble is Karplus-Strong synthesis, a trivial model which pro-
duces surprisingly realistic synthesis of strings, by simulating wave propagation using a circu-
lar sample buﬀer (Karplus and Strong, 1983). Each vowel corresponds to a size of sample buﬀer,
analogous to the length of a physical string. A second parameter to the model is the probability
of sample values being inverted, controlling how aperiodic, or percussive the results are. Each
consonant corresponds to a diﬀerent value of this parameter. at vowels and consonants con-
trol diﬀerent aspects of the model is analogous to the organisation of the International Phonetic
Alphabet (Ladefoged, 1990), where vowels relate to mouth shape and pulmonic consonants to
the place and manner of articulation (x2.7). In addition, to give the sound a speech-like quality,
a formant ﬁlter is applied to the synthesis, which is also controlled by the vowels.
ewords typed into the online interface were recorded, although participants were able to
opt-out with a privacy mode. From the resulting logs over three years of use it would seem that
the work has been successful in bringing participants to aend to musical rather than lexical
features of their words. Sessions oen begun with meaningful passages, but quickly turned to
‘nonsense’ syllables, such as the following short excerpt, shown with time-stamps from the log
ﬁle:
[2009-12-05 07:20:29] this really makes some interesting noises
[2009-12-05 07:20:55] ko doo ko doo - ko doo ko doooiiiT!
[2009-12-05 07:21:07] ko doo doo - ko doo ko doooiiiT!
[2009-12-05 07:25:14] ntdedvoxi hso - - lbpxuerohzyi - - jolkui
While Babble is successful as an artwork, and shows promise as an approach of timbral
control, the range of expression by the two parameters of the Karplus-Strong model is too
limited to meet the needs of a musician. For this purpose, vocable synthesis was re-applied to
a more complex physical model.
3.5.2 Mesh - vocable waveguide synthesis
eMesh vocable synthesis system is an extension of Babble, towards a greater range of timbre.
It uses waveguide synthesis (Van Duyne and Smith, 1993) which is inspired by Karplus-Strong
synthesis, but uses bi-directional delay lines. ese waveguides are connected together to sim-
ulate strings, tubes, surfaces and volumes of arbitrary complexity, within whatever the current
limits of on-line computation are. Mesh models a drum head as a two dimensional mesh of
waveguides, using a triangular geometry for maximal accuracy (Fontana and Rocchesso, 1995).
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e drum head is excited through interaction with a simulated drumstick, using a mass-spring
model developed by Laird (2001). e drum head has parameters to control the tension and
dampening of the surface, and the drumstick has parameters to control its stiﬀness and mass.
e drumstick is thrown against the drum head with parameters controlling the downward
velocity, starting x/y position and the angle and velocity of travel across the drum skin.
Table 3.1: Mapping of consonants to mallet property (columns) and movement relative to drum head (rows).
heavy stiﬀ heavy so light stiﬀ light so
across q r y s
inward c m f w
outward k n v z
edge x d t b
middle j g p h/l
Table 3.2: Mapping of vowels to drum head tension (columns) and dampening (rows).
tense loose
wet i u
a
dry e o
As with Babble, vocable words for Mesh are composed from the 26 leers of the modern
English alphabet. e consonants map to the drumstick and movement parameters, and vowels
to the drum head parameters, shown in Tables 3.1 and 3.2.
As an example, consider the following articulation:
Hit a loose, dampened drum outwards with a heavy stiﬀ mallet, then hit the
middle of the drum with a lighter mallet while tightening the skin slightly and
ﬁnally hit the edge of the skin with the same light mallet while loosening and
releasing the dampening.
is above may be expressed with the single vocable word:
kopatu
Polymetric vocable rhythms may be described using syntax inspired by the Bol Processor
soware (Bel, 2001). is was later rewrien for use in the string parser of the Tidal paern
DSL (Domain Speciﬁc Language), described in detail in x4.5.4.
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3.5.3 Vocable manipulation and analysis
Our system is a discrete representation, but is deﬁned in relation to simulated continuousmove-
ment. is means that we may musically manipulate vocable words as either sequences of
discrete symbols or as continuous movements.
In the discrete domain, we have a wide range of techniques from computer science available
to us. For example we may analyse sequences of vocables using statistical techniques such as
Markov models. Such an approach to modelling structures of vocable rhythms in order to
generate rhythmic continuations was introduced in earlier work (McLean, 2007). We may also
use standard text manipulation techniques such as regular expressions (regexes). Regexes are
wrien in concise and ﬂexible language allowing general purpose rule-based string matching
(Friedl, 2006). A regex parser is embedded in Mesh, allowing operations such as the following:
~%3=0 /[aeiou]/to/ fe be
is replaces the vowels of every third vocable with the string “to”, resulting in the follow-
ing sequence:
fto be fe bto fe be
Mesh vocables are direct mappings to the simulated physical space of a drum and its ar-
ticulation. It is therefore straightforward to operate in a simulated analogue domain, in order
to perform geometrical analyses and manipulations. For example combining vocables in poly-
phonic synthesis is straightforward, and implemented in our current system as follows. As
consonants control the movement and mallet material, we allow two consonants to be synthe-
sised concurrently simply by using multiple mallets in our model. Currently we allow up to
ﬁve active mallets per drum, allowing ﬁve consonants to be articulated at the same time. As
vowels control the properties of a single drum head, we combine them simply by taking the
mean average of the values they map to.
Wemay exploit both symbolic and geometric vocable representations in one operation. For
example we could estimate the perceptual similarity of two vocable words of diﬀerent lengths
with an approach similar to the symbolic Levenshtein edit distance (Levenshtein, 1966), with
edits weighted by phonemic similarity in the simulated analogue domain.
3.6 Discussion
In this chapter we have studied words as sequences of symbols which notate discrete points of
articulation, and therefore analogue movements between them, in writing, speech and song.
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For humans, words evoke movement, a bridge between discrete and analogue modes that lies at
the heart of our experience. We have deﬁned musical timbre in terms of imagined movement,
and noted the use of vocable words in describing movements within musical tradition. While
noting that words are generally treated as shapeless tokens in computer programming, we have
proposed a use of words in notating timbre within computer programs, allowing treatment of
timbre through both digital and (simulated) analogue manipulations.
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Language
us far we have been occupied with issues of symbolism and movement, taking an embodied
view of discrete computation integrated with analogue experience. In the present chapter we
will examine the higher order concerns of the design of programming languages for computer
music. Firstly, we will tackle the issue of what we mean by the word language in this context,
by relating natural and computer languages. We will then approach the meaning of mean-
ing in computer music, this time by relating natural language with music. We then examine
notions of abstraction in programming language design, by contrasting imperative and declar-
ative approaches. is will lead into the introduction of Tidal, a language designed for the live
improvisation of musical paern.
4.1 Natural and Computer Language
Comparing natural and computer language brings up thorny issues. How does writing a pro-
gram compare to writing a poem: does it even make sense to speak of these activities in the
same terms? ey can at least in an arts context; computer language poetics has been a running
theme in soware arts discourse (Cox et al., 2000, 2004). Indeed computer programs were ﬁrst
conceived in terms of weaving (x1.1), and perhaps the same is true of writing, as the word text
is a dead metaphor for cloth:
An ancient metaphor: thought is a thread, and the raconteur is a spinner of
yarns – but the true storyteller, the poet, is a weaver. e scribes made this old
and audible abstraction into a new and visible fact. Aer long practice, their work
took on such an even, ﬂexible texture that they called the wrien page a textus,
which means cloth. (Bringhurst, 2004, p. 25)
We can also relate natural and computer languages in a more scientiﬁc context. ere is
a great deal of family resemblance between programming and natural languages, in syntax
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rules, semantics, words, punctuation, and so on. eir similarity is also reﬂected in statistical
measures, for example the words of natural and programming languages both conform to a
Zipﬁan distribution, and comparable long range power law correlation (Kokol and Kokol, 1996).
e Chomsky hierarchy organises language grammars according to their expressive power,
in terms of recursion in production rules (Chomsky, 1956). e grammars for programming lan-
guages are context-free, where production rules specify a single symbol with a corresponding
string of symbols which may recursively include nonterminal symbols with their own produc-
tion rules. e grammar rules for natural languages remain an active area of research, but are
also considered to be almost entirely context free (Pullum and Gazdar, 1982). In these syntac-
tical terms then, both programming and natural languages have the same expressive power.
However language is not deﬁned by its syntax alone, but also its semantics and pragmatics.
In x4.2 we will examine this issue from the viewpoint of cognitive semantics, which strongly
de-emphasises the role of syntax in language.
Another test of expressive equivalence between languages is translatability, however this
is somewhat problematic as natural languages have close ties with their modes of expression.
For example, a joke may be told in British Sign Language (BSL) that is untranslatable to English,
if the joke included reference to similarities between signs. Despite the existence of untrans-
latable phrases both BSL and English are natural languages with equivalent expressive power
(Suon-Spence andWoll, 1999). Furthermore the same diﬃculty of translationmay occur when
taking a spoken joke and trying to write it down using the same language – oen jokes are all
in timing, intonation or sound symbolism that is lost on the page. e question then is not
whether it is possible to ﬁnd phrases which are not translatable, but to what extent phrases
generally are translatable.
Leaving natural languages aside for the moment, translating between computer languages
is certainly possible, and may be done either literally or idiomatically. We may translate a
program from C to Perl literally, by translating each control ﬂow and data structure, preserving
the structure of the original program. Alternatively we may adapt a C program to the idioms of
Perl, by using Perl’s syntax for data structures and string handling. However because Perl is a
higher level language the inverse of translating Perl code to C is more diﬃcult, as C lacks many
of Perl’s language features. Likewise, it is fairly straightforward to translate from programming
languages to natural languages, and indeed this is whatwe dowhen explaining how source code
operates to another programmer. Translating from natural languages to computer languages
is however much more challenging.
“When Joana Carda scratched the ground with the elm branch all the dogs of
Cerbère began to bark, throwing the inhabitants into panic and terror, because
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from time immemorial it was believed that, when these canine animals that had
always been silent started barking, the entire universe was nearing its end.” (Sara-
mago, 2000, p. 1)
e above quote stands as the ﬁrst sentence of the novele Stone Ra by José Saramago,
Nobel Laureate for Literature. It was originally wrien in Portuguese; the above is taken from
the authorised English translation. In all his novels, Saramago limited his punctuation only
to the comma and full stop, which allowed him to compose long sentences constructed as
paerns of sound, with distinctive rhythm (Saramago, 2000, translator’s note). He constructed
his sentences as a continuous ﬂow, experimenting with timbre and resonance, treating words
as sounds. e translator’s great challenge then is to translate the music of this text as well as
the linguistic content. In this case it seems that this diﬃcult task has been achieved to a large
degree, as Saramago approved this translation.
We ﬁnd Peter Naur, the Turing Award winning computer scientist, to be in agreement with
Saramago in considering language a primarily spoken form. He makes this point by transcrib-
ing one of his talks as it was spoken, and without punctuation, this time using only em dashes
to indicate pauses. e following is an excerpt:
“e other notion – well – language – that is when one talks – and if one says
this one will immediately be taken to task – he has not gone to school – doesn’t he
know – language cannot be a when – shame – it must be a thing surely – and we
are thus tangled up into the claim that there are concepts denoted by the words”
(Naur, 1992a, p. 524).
e similarity between this and Saramago’s writing style is striking, although Naur’s tran-
scription is at times rather harder to read, with repetitions and transgressions included.1 But
this diﬃculty is Naur’s point, to demonstrate the diﬀerence between spoken language and writ-
ten text. As he tries to get across in the above quote, words do not denote precise, external
concepts, which are rather held by individuals as mental imagery. In this he is in agreement
with the point of view of cognitive linguists such as Barsalou, Gärdenfors, Lakoﬀ and Paivio
related in chapter 2. Language is not a thing that is wrien down, but rather a habit or activity
that is done; meaning is personal, and not containable within grammar rules. Naur asserts that
in order to really understand a speaker’s words, you must absorb their language on a number of
topics, so that you may begin to understand their frames of reference, and pick up the paerns
behind what they are trying to say.
Naur (1992b) applies all this to our understanding of programming languages in his paper
“Programming Languages are not Languages – Why ‘Programming Language’ is a Misleading
1As an added complication, Naur’s original talk was in Danish, although he asserts his translation is useful in
representing a talk that might have happened.
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Designation.”, this time in conventionally wrien English. His conclusion is that Programming
Language is a “special, limited part of the linguistic possibilities, deliberately designed to cater
for certain limited situations and purposes.” From this we understand that while Naur ﬁnds that
the term programming language is misleading, he still believes that programming language is a
certain, specialised area of language. is has echoes of Wigenstein on formalised language:
“Don’t let it bother you that languages (2) and (8) consist only of orders. If
you want to say that they are therefore incomplete, ask yourself whether our own
language is complete – whether it was so before the symbolism of chemistry and
the notation of the inﬁnitesimal calculus were incorporated in to it; for these are,
so to speak, suburbs of our language. (And howmany houses or streets does it take
before a town begins to be a town?) Our language can be regarded as an ancient
city: a maze of lile streets and squares, of old and new houses, of houses with
extensions from various periods, and all this surrounded by a multitude of new
suburbs with straight and regular streets and uniform houses.” Wigenstein (2009,
18)
It seems that even though there are ways in which programming languages are not lan-
guages, they at least operate within the landscape of language. How then, could Saramago’s
text, in its speech-like form, be translated into the language suburb of source code? Translit-
eration is hardly possible, and so we must look to translate particular aspects of the situation
represented in the text. One approach would be to model discrete entities and relationships in
the text, of the town, its dogs, and the dependency of the existence of the town on the dogs’
behaviour. A human reader would then get some sense of what is wrien in this programming
language either by reading it, or perhaps by using it within a larger computer program. Alter-
natively we could try to capture a sense of expectation and dread within a temporal structure,
and output it as sound, thereby creating a musical theme. is kind of translation is analogous
to the live coding of sound tracks relating the narrative structure of silent ﬁlms, practised by
Rohrhuber et al. (2005).
We argue then that translation from natural language to programming language is possible,
as long as one accepts that languages with strengths designed for particular purposes also have
particular limitations. For example, programming languages are designed to be typed and not
spoken, and so bringing the spoken prosody of language (x3.4) directly to computer language
seems impossible (although see vocable synthesis, x3.5). However, the same is true of some
natural languages. Nicaraguan Sign Language is a particularly interesting case, emerging nat-
urally from a Deaf community of young school children over two decades – a span comparable
with the overall development of computer language. It has no spoken or indeed wrien form,
but does already have complex, spatial grammar, and of course prosodic rhythm, being based
on movements of the body.
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Despite the lack of spoken form, code does have its own spatial features, as we will see
in later discussion of secondary notation (x5.1). A programmer also has choice about how to
express an algorithm, to a degree depending on the language in hand. A strong example is Perl,
which has the rather unwieldy moo ere is More an One Way To Do It (TMTOWTDI).
Indeed LarryWall, the creator of Perl, has a background in linguistics, and lists several features
that Perl borrows from natural language in his 1995 on-line essay “Natural Language Principles
in Perl”. As well as the freedom of TMTOWTDI, it includes Perl’s manner of learning, its
ambiguity, import of features from other languages, topicalisation and pronominalisation.
Perhaps the key diﬀerence between programming and natural language is that the former
is formalised and abstract, whereas the laer has developed with a closer relationship to its
speakers. Words in a natural lexicon are grounded in human experience of movement and re-
lationships of the body in its environment. Computer languages are not based around these
naturally developed words, but we may still maintain the same semantic references for human
readers, by using those words in the secondary notation of function and variable names, or
even by working with an encoded lexicon as data (such as WordNet; Fellbaum, 1998). In do-
ing so we borrow from the lexicon of a natural language, but we could just have easily used
an invented lexicon such as that of Esperanto. Regardless, a computer program is ultimately
grounded in the outside world when it is executed, through whatever modalities its actuators
allow, usually images, sound and/or movement. At the point which a program is executed, it
becomes clear that the its source code is full of a particular kind of linguistic reference known
as performative uerances. Due to the power that humans wield over computers to do their
bidding, by describing an action in a computer language, we cause it to be performed.
Natural and computer languages are developed under diﬀerent pressures with very dif-
ferent results. However they have suﬃcient family resemblance to both be considered to be
aspects of human language activity. By appraising the diﬀerences between natural and com-
puter languages, we may look for ways in which features of natural languages could be ap-
propriated for use in programming languages for the arts, an approach we have demonstrated
with Vocable Synthesis (x3.5).
4.2 Music, Language and Cognitive Semantics
We have already seen some of the complex relationship between music and language, while
examining integration between the dual codes of language andmental imagery in chapter 2, and
arguing in chapter 3 that timbral and prosodic articulation share a grounding inmovement. e
Chomskian linguistic notion of semantics as it is generally understood excludes any notion of
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musical meaning. e hierarchical structure of music holds some similarity to linguistic syntax,
but the lack of reference to a real or imagined world makes a semantics of music untenable
(Wiggins, 1998). As a result, discussion of meaning in music oen lacks a formal underpinning,
resulting in a broad spectrum of parallel discussions in the literature, each under its own terms
(for a broad review see Cross and Tolbert, 2008). However the alternative view of conceptual
semantics provided by the theory of Conceptual Spaces (x2.2.5) puts things in a rather diﬀerent
light. In the following we show that unlike Chomskian semantics, Gardenforsian conceptual
semantics is applicable to music as well as language, by summarising its main tenets in relation
to music.
“Semantic elements are constructed from geometrical or topological structures (not sym-
bols that can be composed according to some system of rules).” In other words, semantic
meaning is primary to the conceptual, analogue level, and not the discrete level as with Chom-
skian semantics. e common view in music theory characterises musical structure as being
discrete and syntactic (Lerdahl and Jackendoﬀ, 1983), however conceptual semantics allow us
to consider music structure as spatial and geometric in addition. In the case of music of timbre
(x3.3.3), we claim that conceptual semantics is the primary structure.
“Semantic meaning is a conceptual structure in a cognitive system.” Meaning does not ex-
ist through links to the world (or a possible world), but in the body (and in particular, the brain),
of an individual. However the conceptual structures of a group of individuals may reach ac-
cordance through communication. We can consider a musical improvisation in terms of such
a process of communication, where two or more improvisers begin with individual concep-
tual structures at the beginning of a piece, which are manipulated towards accordance and
discordance during a performance. Of course while situated in an individual, the conceptual
structures are informed by previous performances and higher cultural eﬀects such as musi-
cal genre. It is also possible, through aberration or inference, that new conceptual structure
is created during an improvisation that did not exist at the beginning (Wiggins, 2006b). Such
conceptual structure could be deemed valuable and kept for reuse in future improvisations. In
such a case we can say that an improvisation created new meaning, and was therefore a par-
ticularly creative performance. is manner of creative search is discussed in greater detail in
x6.3.
“Conceptual structures are embodied (meaning is not independent of perception or of bodily
experience).” is tenet connects cognitive semantics to its roots in theories of embodied
cognition. Instruments and the voice require movements of the body in order to make sound,
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and the constraints and vagaries of motor action within the tight feedback loop of action and
reaction are an important component of musical improvisation (Pressing, 1984, 1987). However
the inﬂuence of bodily experience goes beyond actual motor action to suggest that semantic
meaning is dependent on motor and perceptual circuits in the brain.
“Cognitive models are primarily image-sematic (not propositional). Image-semas are
transformed by metaphoric and metonymic operations (whi are treated as exceptional
features on the traditional view).” Image schemata are abstract diagrams of spatial re-
lationships and actions, representing notions such as ‘over’, ‘containment’ and ‘araction’
(Lakoﬀ, 1997). A metaphorical operation is where two concepts are related via common image
schemata, most commonly relative to orientations such as ‘UP’ (x2.2.6). It is through metaphor-
ical structure that a conceptual system can be grounded in perception and action, yet represent
meaning abstract from it.
“Semantics is primary to syntax and partly determines it (syntax cannot be described in-
dependently of semantics).” is is another tenet in opposition to the widely held view of
Chomskian linguistics, where syntax is primary and independent of semantics. It implies that
when composing a piece of music, the cognitive semantic structure is more important than
grammatical rules. at is, any grammatical rules underlying a piece of music are placed in
support of the geometry of the semantic structure, rather than a precursor for it (Forth et al.,
2010).
“Concepts show prototype eﬀects (instead of following the Aristotelian paradigm based on
necessary and suﬃcient conditions).” e Aristotelian paradigm has not been taken seri-
ously for several decades and current theories of concepts do not depend upon it (Murphy,
2002, p.16). e subscript to this tenet therefore is weakened by not showing consideration for
theories competing with the prototype view such as those of the exemplar view and knowl-
edge approach (Murphy, 2002, pp. 41–71). However prototype eﬀects, such as a robin being
judged a more typical bird than a penguin, are indeed easily accounted for within the theory of
conceptual spaces. Gardenfors does so using the Voronoi diagram (Okabe et al., 2000), where a
conceptual prototype is a Voronoi generator for the geometrical regions of conceptual proper-
ties. Prototype eﬀects are observed in music, for example where pieces are judged as greater
or less typical examples of a musical genre. In the Voronoi diagram of genres, a typical piece
would be near to the region’s generator, and a diﬃcult to deﬁne or ‘crossover’ piece would be
near a boundary between two or more genres. In practice, musical genres are impossible to
deﬁne universally, which points again to the relativist position stated in the ﬁrst tenet.
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In summary, in Chomskian terms music cannot be understood in terms of semantics, only
syntax. However if one is prepared to take a Gardenforsian view, a discussion of musical
meaning can proceed with a formal underpinning, where meaning exists within individuals’
conceptual structures of music, within the structures shared by the members of a music culture,
and within the grounding relationships between musical structure and universals of human
perception and movement.
4.3 Declarative vs Imperative
Declarative and imperative programming are competing paradigms, an opposition that raises
interesting issues for the time-based computer arts. Declarative programming is the coding
of what should happen, and imperative programming is the coding of how something should
occur. is distinction is frequently used, and gives a sense of what is meant, but lacks practical
detail. is situation is reminiscent of that of the deﬁnition of timbre inmusic x3.3; an important
distinguishing featurewithin a domain, that is oen deﬁned in vague and sometimes conﬂicting
terms.
e use of computer language can be broadly divided into the description of algorithmic
control, and of problem logic (Kowalski, 1979). Imperative programming languages support the
former, where programmers describe a method for solving a problem, rather that the problem
itself. Declarative programming languages support the laer, allowing programmers to focus
on the description of problems, by leaving the interpreter to ﬁnd the algorithmic solution. Well-
known examples of declarative programming languages include the logic language Prolog, the
database query language SQL, and the string matching language Regular Expressions (ch. 2).
ese are as close as we get to the declarative promise, of programmers concerning themselves
only with what they want to do, and not how it should be done. is promise holds for simple
examples, but unfortunately hardly at all in practice. SQL database query optimisers are in
constant development, and programmers must keep abreast of exact implementation details,
structuring their queries and indexing their datasets in a way that allows their SQL queries to
operate eﬃciently. Upgrading to a new version of an SQL engine is then a serious maer, as
optimisations for general cases may have led to serious regressions in edge cases. Likewise, reg-
ular expressions must be carefully craed for a particular interpreter, where implementation
details such as backtracking or determinism can impact computational complexity by several
orders of magnitude (Friedl, 2006). Prolog programmers have much the same problem, classi-
cally requiring manual search space reduction by inhibiting backtracking, a technique known
as the cut (Sterling and Shapiro, 1994).
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While the imperative frequently intrudes, declarative programming styles nonetheless
maintain a certain clarity of expression, giving high level descriptions largely separate from
implementation details. is is related to the idea of purity in pure functional languages such
as ML (Milner et al., 1990), where functions have no side-eﬀects. is means a pure functional
program cannot interact with the outside world while it is executing, beyond the singular, or-
derly ﬂow of input and output. Haskell is a pure functional programming language from the
ML family, but gets around this limitation through modelling side-eﬀects by chaining together
pure functions. e result is a declarative description of an imperative program, which the
interpreter then takes care of executing.
Another distinction made between declarative and imperative programming (e.g. Dijkstra,
1985) is concerned with the passing of time. In declarative programming, time is a concern of
optimisation, to be separated as much as possible from the problem description. In imperative
programming one statement follows another, describing a sequence of operations, each with
its own time ‘cost’. In the general case this makes a great deal of sense; the imperative ‘how’
approach is concerned with algorithms as programmes of work over time, and the declarative
‘what’ approach with logical relationships abstract from time. However within our theme of
the design of programming languages for artists, the focus on time is problematic. In particular,
when we consider the time-based arts, the unfolding of an algorithm over time is both the
imperative how and the declarative what. In this case, the distinction between declarative and
imperative programming appears to not apply, as the particular operation of how an algorithm
works has strong inﬂuence over what we experience. If the distinction is to make any sense in
this context, it must be deﬁned carefully.
We argue that a declarative approach to programming is indeed desirable for artists. We
deﬁne it however not in general terms, or even relative to algorithms, but as the closeness
of mapping (x5.1) of the programming notation to the target domain. If a programmer is only
interested in logic, then a declarative approach is to choose a programming language that takes
care of how a program is solved over time. However if our programmer is interested in the
problem of how to complete a piece of music, then they are concerned with how the solution
is arrived at as well as the problem; the how is the what. A declarative approach in this case
would then be concerned with how events are ordered to reach a musical resolution. is
does not however mean precisely specifying an algorithm, certain aspects of operation may be
musically inconsequential, and so may be speciﬁed in an ambiguous manner.
Our characterisation of declarative programming is closely related to the concept of Do-
main Speciﬁc Language (DSL) (van Deursen et al., 2000). To a limited extent, a straightforward
programming library is DSL, in that it provides functions particular to a domain. However in
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a fuller sense, DSL goes further to provide higher order means of abstraction and combina-
tion tailored to the target domain, allowing programmers to ﬁnd the level of abstraction that
best mirrors the structure of their problem. For example, a computer musician working with
paerns may create language for combining functions which represent generation and trans-
formation of paern. We will approach this subject in depth in the following section, before
introducing Tidal, DSL for live coding of paern.
4.4 Domain Speciﬁc Language for Paern
When we view the composed sequence “abcabcabc. . . ” we quickly infer the paern “repeat
abc”. is inference of hierarchy is known in the psychological literature as ‘chunking’ (Miller,
1956), and aids memory of long sequences, prediction of future values and recognition of ob-
jects. Paern pervades the arts; as Alfred Whitehead (2001) eloquently puts it, “Art is the
imposing of a paern on experience, and our aesthetic enjoyment is recognition of the pat-
tern.”2 is communicates a role of paern supported here; one individual encodes a paern
and another decodes it, both actively engaged with the work while creating their own expe-
rience. In the present section we examine the encoding of paern in particular, introducing
Tidal, a computer language for encoding musical paerns during improvised live coding (x6.8)
performances.
Paern has been of great interest throughout the history of art. e paerned walls and
ﬂoors of the Alhambra in Spain are an extraordinary example, where Moorish artists have cap-
tured all seventeen types of symmetry, centuries before their formalisation by group theorists
(du Sautoy, 2008). e technological exploration of musical paern also has a long history,
extending back to well before electronic computers. For example, Leonardo da Vinci invented
a hurdy gurdy with movable pegs to encode a sequence, played back using multiple reeds at
adjustable positions, transforming the sequence into a canon (Spiegel, 1987). Hierarchies of
repeating structure run throughout much of music theory; computational approaches to music
analysis, indexing and composition all have focus on discrete musical events and the rules to
which they conform (Rowe, 2001, x4.2). From this we infer that the encoding and decoding of
paern is fundamental to music making. We review support given to musical paern making
by computer language in this light.
e literature on paern DSLs (Domain Speciﬁc Languages) is mainly concerned with
analysis of composed works relative to a particular theory of music. For example Simon and
Sumner (1992) propose a formal language for music analysis, consisting of a minimal grammar
2To our shame, these words were background to Whitehead lambasting those taking quotes out of context.
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for describing phrase structure within periodic paerns. eir language allows for multidi-
mensional paerns, where diﬀerent aspects such as note value, onset and duration may be
expressed together. e grammar is based on a language used for description of aptitude tests
which treat paern induction as a correlate with intelligence. Deutsch and Feroe (1981) in-
troduced a similar paern DSL to that of Simon and Sumners, for the analysis of hierarchical
relationships in tonal music with reference to gestalt theory of perception (Kohler, 1930).
e analytical perspective shown in the paern DSLs discussed thus far puts focus on sim-
ple paerns with unambiguous interpretation. We assert that music composition demands
complex paerns with many possible interpretations, leading to challenged, engaged listeners
in a state of ﬂow (see analytic listening; Csikszentmihalyi, 2008, p. 111, and our discussion
on timbre, x3.3.3). erefore paern DSL for synthesis of music requires an approach diﬀerent
from formal analysis. Motivation for the design of paern DSL for music composition is identi-
ﬁed by Laurie Spiegel in her paper “Manipulations of Musical Paerns” (Spiegel, 1981). Twelve
classes of paern transformation, taken from Spiegel’s own introspection as a composer are
detailed: transposition (translation by value), reversal (value inversion or time reversal), rota-
tion (cycle time phase), phase oﬀset (relative rotation, e.g. a canon), rescaling (of time or value),
interpolation (adding midpoints and ornamentation), extrapolation (continuation), fragmenta-
tion (breaking up of an established paern), substitution (against expectation), combination (by
value – mixing/counterpoint/harmony), sequencing (by time – editing) and repetition. Spiegel
felt these to be ‘tried and true’ basic operations, which should be included in computer music
editors alongside insert, delete and search-and-replace. Further, Spiegel proposed that study-
ing these transformations could aid our understanding of the temporal forms shared by music
and experimental ﬁlm, including human perception of them.
Paern transformations are evident in Spiegel’s own Music Mouse soware, and can also
be seen in music soware based on the traditional studio recording paradigm such as Stein-
berg Cubase and Apple Logic Studio. However Spiegel is a strong advocate for the role of
the musician-programmer, and expresses hope that these paern transformations would be
formalised into programming libraries. Such libraries have indeed since emerged. Hierar-
chical Music Speciﬁcation Language (HMSL) developed in the 1980s, and includes an exten-
sible framework for algorithmic composition, with some inbuilt paern transformations. e
Scheme based Common Music environment, developed from 1989, contains an object oriented
paern library (Taube, 2004); classes are provided for paern transformations such as permu-
tation, rotation and random selection, and for paern generation such as Markov models, state
transition and rewrite rules. e SuperCollider computer music language (McCartney, 2002)
also includes an extensive paern library, beneﬁting from an active free soware development
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community, and with advanced support for live coding (x6.8). What all these systems have in
common is a desire to represent the structure of music in the structure of code. As such, they
adhere closely to our deﬁnition of declarative language (x4.3), working at the same level of ab-
straction of the target domain of musical paern. Inspired by this, we now move to introduce
our own paern DSL, Tidal.
4.5 Tidal
Tidal is a paern DSL embedded in the Haskell programming language, consisting of paern
representation, a library of paern generators and combinators, an event scheduler and pro-
grammer’s live coding interface. is is an extensive re-write of earlier work introduced under
the working title of Petrol (McLean and Wiggins, 2010). Extensions include improved paern
representation and fully conﬁgurable integration with the Open Sound Control (OSC; Freed
and Schmeder, 2009) protocol.
4.5.1 Features
Before examining Tidal in detail we ﬁrst characterise it in terms of features expected of a paern
DSL.
Host language Tidal is a Domain Speciﬁc Language embedded in the Haskell programming
language. e choice of Haskell allows us to use its powerful type system, but also forces us to
work within strict constraints brought by its static types and pure functions. We can however
turn this strictness to our advantage, through use of Haskell’s pioneering type-level constructs
such as applicative functors and monads. Once the notion of a paern is deﬁned in terms of
these constructs the expressive power of Haskell’s syntax becomes available, which can then
be explored for application in describing musical paern. Haskell’s syntax is very terse, thanks
in part to its declarative approach (x4.3) and notational conveniences. For example in Haskell
all functions are implicitly curried, that is all Haskell functions only take a single argument,
but may return another function that takes a further argument and so on. is allows par-
tial application to be very tersely expressed, for example we may specialise the function +
to + 1 , and map the resulting function over a list of values without explicit use of lambda;
map (+1) [1, 2, 3] . Such tersity removes barriers from the expression of ideas, and there-
fore allows a tighter creative feedback loop (x6.3).
Pattern composition In Tidal, paerns may be composed of numerous sub-paerns in a vari-
ety of ways and to arbitrary hierarchical depth, to produce complex wholes from simple parts.
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is could include concatenating paerns time-wise, merging them so that they co-occur, or
performing pairwise operations across paerns, for example combining two numerical paerns
by multiplying their values together. Composition may be heterarchical, where sub-paern
transformations are applied at more than one level of depth within a larger paern.
Time representation Time can be conceptualised either as linear ange with forward order
of succession, or as a repeating cycle where the end is also the beginning of the next repetition
(Buzsaki, 2006). We can relate the former to the laer by noting that the phase plane of a sine
wave is a circle; a sine wave progresses over linear time, but its oscillation is a repeating cycle
as shown in Figure 7.1. Music exhibits this temporal duality too, having repeating rhythmic
structures that nonetheless progress linearly. Tidal allows both periodic and linear paerns to
be represented.
Another important distinction is between discrete and continuous time. In music tradi-
tion, time may be notated within discrete symbols, such as Western staﬀ notation or Indian
Bol syllables, but performed with subtle phrasing over continuous time. Tidal maintains this
duality, where paerns are events at discrete time steps. However phrasing may be speciﬁed
as paerns of ﬂoating point onset time deltas (x4.6.1).
Random access Both Common Music and SuperCollider represent paerns using lazily eval-
uated lists, where values are calculated one at a time as needed, rather than all together when
the list is deﬁned. is allows long, perhaps inﬁnitely long lists to be represented eﬃciently in
memory as generator functions, useful for representing fractal paerns for example. In some
languages, including Haskell, lists are lazily evaluated by default, without need for special syn-
tax. is is not how paerns are represented in Tidal however. Lazy lists are practical for
linear evaluation, but you cannot evaluate the 100th value without ﬁrst evaluating the ﬁrst 99.
is is a particular problem for live coding (x6.8); if you were to change the deﬁnition of a lazy
list, in order to continue where you le oﬀ you must regenerate the entire performance up
to the current time position.3 Further, it is much more computationally expensive to perform
operations over a whole paern without random access, even in the case of straightforward
reversal.
Tidal allows for random access by representing a paern not as a list of events but as a
function from time values to events. A full description is given in x4.5.2.
3SuperCollider supports live coding of paerns using PaernProxies (Rohrhuber et al., 2005). ese act as place-
holders within a paern, allowing a programmer to deﬁne sub-paerns which may be modiﬁed later.
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Ready-made generators and transforms A paern library should contain a range of basic
paern generators and transforms, which may be straightforwardly composed into complex
structures. It may also contain more complex transforms, or else have a community repository
where such paerns may be shared. Tidal contains a range of these, some of which are inspired
by other paern languages, and others from Haskell’s standard library of functions, including
its general support for manipulating collections.
Community
“Computers’re bringing about a situation that’s like the invention of harmony.
Sub-routines are like chords. No one would think of keeping a chord to himself.
You’d give it to anyone who wanted it. You’d welcome alterations of it. Sub-
routines are altered by a single punch. We’re geing music made by man himself:
not just one man.” John Cage (1969)
John Cage’s vision has not universally met with reality; muchmusic soware is proprietary,
and in the United States sound synthesis algorithms are impeded by soware patents. However
computer music languages are judged by their communities, sharing code and ideas freely,
particularly around languages released as free soware themselves. A paern DSL then should
make sharing abstract musical ideas straightforward, so short snippets of code may be easily
used, modiﬁed and passed on. is is certainly possible with Tidal, although this is a young
language which has not yet had a community grow around it.
4.5.2 Representation
In Tidal, paerns are represented by the Pattern a data type, which is deﬁned as follows:
data Pattern a =
Pattern {at :: Behaviour a, period :: Period}
type Behaviour a = Int ! [Maybe a]
type Period = Maybe Int
is Pattern a data type is composed of two further types; Behaviour a which is a type
synonym for Int ![Maybe a] , and Period which is a type synonym for Maybe Int . ey
are accessible via their ﬁeld names at and period respectively. e behaviour represents the
structure of the paern, and the period how oen it repeats, if at all.
e name of the Behaviour a type is taken from functional reactive programming nomen-
clature (Ellio, 2009; Hudak, 2000), a behaviour being the term for a time-varying value. Its
form Int ![Maybe a] is a function from Int (integer), to a list of values of type Maybe a .
81
C 4: L
e integer function parameter represents discrete time steps, and the result of the function,
[Maybe a] represents a list of events. In other words, a behaviour represents a paern as a
time-varying list of events.
Pattern and Behaviour share the polymorphic type parameter a , which is encapsulated
within Int ![Maybe a] . e type parameter a is specialised to whatever the event type of a
particular paern is, for example a paern of musical notes could be of type Pattern String ,
where pitch labels are represented as character strings, or alternatively of type Pattern Int
for a paern of MIDI numbered note events.
We have not yet explained the purpose of the Maybe type which encapsulates a . e
Maybe type is a standard feature of Haskell, and has two constructors, namely Just a and
Nothing . e reason for using it here is to allow events which do not have a value in terms
of a to be represented as Nothing . is is particularly useful for representing musical rests.
Further motivation is shown in x4.6, where Nothing is shown to have diﬀerent meaning in
diﬀerent situations.
As we see in the above deﬁnition, the period of a paern – the duration at which it repeats
– is represented as an Int . It is also encapsulated within the Maybe type, used for spec-
ifying aperiodic paerns. e periodic paern “abcdefgh, repeated” would have a Period
of Just 8 , and the aperiodic paern “a followed by repeating bs” would have a Period of
Nothing .
e following example shows how a paern may be constructed, in this case the integer
paern of the repeating sequence “0, 2, 4, 6”:
p = Pattern {at = n ! [Just ((n `mod` 4)  2)],
period = Just 4}
To map from the time parameter to this trivial sequence, the Behaviour simply takes the
modulo of four, and multiplies it by two.
We access events in a paern by evaluating its Behaviour function with a time value.
Continuing with the paern deﬁned above, at p 1 evaluates to [Just 2] . As this is a cyclic
paern of period 4, at p 5 would give the same result, as would at p (-3) .
e above paern is expressed as a function over time. An alternative, recursive deﬁnition
would be more idiomatic to Haskell, in this case deﬁning at p 0 to return Just [0] and
subsequent at p n to return the value at n - 1 plus two. However great care must be taken
when introducing such dependencies between time steps; it is easy to produce incomputable
paerns, or as in this case, paerns which may require whole paerns to be computed to ﬁnd
values at a single time point.
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4.5.3 Pattern generators
A paern would not normally be described by directly invoking the constructor in the rather
long-windedmanner shown in the previous section, but by calling one of the paern generating
functions provided by Tidal. ese consist of generators of basic repeating forms analogous
to sine, square and triangle waves, and a parser of complex sequences. e following is the
deﬁnition of Tidal’s sine function, which produces a sine cycle of ﬂoating point numbers in
the range  1 to 1, with a given period:
sine :: Int ! Pattern Double
sine l = Pattern f (Just l)
where f n = [Just ( sin (
fromIntegral n  (pi / fromIntegral l  2)
))
]
e sine1 function does the same as sine but in the range from 0 to 1. It is deﬁned
relative to sine , by using the functor map operator <$> . e values of a paern are mapped
over a scaling function in the following deﬁnition:
sine1 :: Int ! Pattern Double
sine1 l = ((/ 2.0)  (+ 1.0)) <$> sine l
We can use this functor mapping because Pattern is an instance of Haskell’s Functor
class, with the following deﬁnition:
instance Functor Pattern where
fmap f (Pattern xs p) =
Pattern (fmap (fmap (fmap f)) xs) p
is deﬁnition simply maps over each of Behaviour ’s enclosing types. is is all that
needs to be done, because Haskell already deﬁnes the function application, Maybe and list
types as instances of the Functor class.
e following is an example of the sine1 function in use, here rendered as a sequence of
grey values by the drawGray function:
drawGray $ sine1 16
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Tidal is designed for use in live music improvisation, but is also applicable to oﬀ-line com-
position, or for non musical domains. We take this opportunity to illustrate the following
examples with visual paerns, in sympathy with the present medium. For space eﬃciency the
above cyclic paern is rendered as a row of blocks, but ideally would be rendered as a circle,
as the end of one cycle is also the beginning of the next.
Linear interpolation between values, somewhat related to musical glissandi, is provided by
the tween function:
drawGray $ tween 0.0 1.0 16
4.5.4 Parsing strings into polymetric patterns
A paern may also be speciﬁed as a string, which is parsed according to the context, as deﬁned
by Haskell’s type inference. In the previous two examples we have used the drawGray function
which requires a paern of ﬂoating numbers, in particular one of type Pattern Double . In
the following example the draw function requires a colour paern, and so a parser of colour
names is automatically employed by the function p .
draw (p "black blue lightgrey")
anks to the string overloading extension to Haskell provided by the Glasgow Haskell
Compiler, a string is automatically coerced into a Paern using the function p . is is so that
p does not need to be explicitly speciﬁed:
draw "black blue lightgrey"
e parser allows terse description of polymetric rhythms, inspired by the syntax of the Bol
Processor (Bel, 2001). We will ﬁrst describe the parser in detail before moving on to examples,
which the reader may wish to refer to in advance.
e parser rules are implemented using Haskell’s Parsec library, but are illustrated in the
following using Extended Backus-Naur Form (EBNF). We diverge from standard EBNF to pa-
rameterise rules, in order to show that the four diﬀerent parsers operate in the same manner,
but with diﬀering rules to parse atomic events within rhythms.
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Four diﬀerent parsers are created by parameterising general parser rules with a rule to
match an atom, i.e. a rhythmic event at the lowest level of granularity:
colourRhythm = rhythm(colourname) ;
doubleRhythm = rhythm(double) ;
stringRhythm = rhythm(string) ;
intRhythm = rhythm(int) ;
boolRhythm = rhythm(bool) ;
colourname = "blue" | "red" | "green" | ... ;
bool = "t" | "1" | "f" | "0" ;
ese parsers allow Tidal to parse Pattern s of the basic types String , Bool , Int and
Double , as well as Colour . It is straightforward to deﬁne more as needed.
A rhythm consists of a sequence of rhythmic parts:
rhythm(atom) = whitespace, sequence(atom) ;
sequence(atom) = { part(atom) } ;
whitespace = { " " } ;
A rhythmic part may consist of a single atom, a rest (denoted by ), a polymeter, or a
sequence of atoms:
part(atom) = atom | "~" | poly(atom) | polypad(atom)
| sequenceParens(atom) ;
sequenceParens(atom) = "(", sequence(atom) , ")" ;
Two diﬀerent methods are provided for combining rhythms into polymeters, denoted with
either square or curly brackets.
poly(atom) = "[", rhythm(atom), {",", rhythm(atom)}, "]" ;
polypad(atom) = "{", rhythm(atom), {",", rhythm(atom)}, "}" ;
e poly rule indicates combination of rhythms by a method of repetition and polypad
by padding. In both cases the result is a paern with the same period, being the lowest common
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multiple of the constituent paern periods. We illustrate their operation by example. Firstly,
in combination by repetition, the ﬁrst rhythm is repeated twice and the second thrice:4
draw "[black blue green, orange red]"
Combining by padding interleaves the internal structure of a rhythm with rests. In the
following example the ﬁrst part is padded with one rest every time step, and the second with
two rests every step:
draw "{black blue green, orange red}"
In the above there are time steps where two events co-occur and the block is split in two,
steps where one event takes up the whole block, and steps where no events occur, shown by a
blank block.
Polymeters may be embedded to any depth (note the use of a tilde to denote a rest):
draw "[{black  grey, orange}, red green]"
4.5.5 Pattern combinators
Once we have a basic paern, using either a generator such as sine or the above parser, we
can transform it with functions, each one adding a layer of rhythmic structure.
If our underlying paern representation were a list, a paern transformer would operate
directly on sequences of events. For example, we might rotate a paern one step forward by
popping from the end of the list, and unshiing/consing the result to the head of the list. In
Tidal, because a paern is a function from time to events, a transformermaymanipulate time as
well as events. Accordingly the Tidal function < for rotating a paern to the le is deﬁned
as:
(< ) :: Int ! Pattern a ! Pattern a
(< ) p n =
Pattern (t ! at p (t + n)) (period p)
4Note that co-occurring events are visualised by the draw function as vertically stacked colour blocks.
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Rotating to the right is simply deﬁned as the inverse:
( >) :: Int ! Pattern a ! Pattern a
( >) p n = p < (0 - n)
e append function appends one paern to another timewise. If the ﬁrst paern is ape-
riodic, then the second paern is never reached, so the result is the ﬁrst paern unchanged.
append :: Pattern a ! Pattern a ! Pattern a
append a@(Pattern f Nothing) _ = a
If the ﬁrst paern is periodic, and the second is aperiodic, then the second is appended to
a single cycle of the ﬁrst, and the resulting paern is aperiodic.
append a@(Pattern _ (Just l)) b@(Pattern _ Nothing) =
Pattern newF Nothing
where newF n j n < l = at a n
j otherwise = at b (n - l)
If both paerns are periodic, then the resulting paern alternates between them, with a
period that is the sum of those of the constituent paerns.
append a@(Pattern f (Just l)) b@(Pattern f' (Just l')) =
Pattern newF (Just newL)
where
newL = l + l'
newF n j cycleP < l = f ((loopN  l) + cycleP)
j otherwise = f' ((loopN  l') + (cycleP - l))
where cycleP = n `mod` newL
loopN = n `div` newL
e following illustrates append in use:
drawGray $ append (tween 0 1 8) (tween 1 0 8)
e cat function for joining together a list of paerns is trivial to deﬁne as a fold over
append :
cat :: [Pattern a] ! Pattern a
cat = foldr append nullPattern
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Further combinators are deﬁned for reversing a paern with rev :
drawGray $ rev (sine1 8)
Or alternatively playing a paern forwards and then in reverse with palindrome :
drawGray $ palindrome (sine1 8)
e every function allows transformations to be applied to periodic paerns every n
cycles. Its deﬁnition simply multiplies the period of the given paern by n - 1 , then appends
the transformed paern to it:
every :: Int ! (Pattern a ! Pattern a) ! Pattern a
! Pattern a
every 0 _ p = p
every n f p = (p   (n - 1)) `append` f p
(  ) :: Pattern a ! Int ! Pattern a
(  ) p n = Pattern (at p) (fmap ( n) (period p))
e following demonstrates how the every combinator may be used to rotate a paern
by a single step every third repetition:
draw $ every 3 (1 >) "black grey red"
Because the Paern type is deﬁned as a functor, we may apply a function to every element
of a paern using the fmap , or its operator form <$> . For example, we may add some blue
to a whole paern by mapping the blend function (from the Haskell Colour library) over its
elements:
p = every 3 (1 >) "black grey red"
draw $ blend 0.5 blue <$> p
We can also apply the functor map conditionally, for example to lighten the paern every
third cycle:
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drawGray $
every 3 ((+ 0.6) <$>) "0.2 0.3 0 0.4"
If we were doing something similar to a sound rather than colour event, we might under-
stand it as a musical transposition.
As Haskell is a functional language, it is possible to have higher order paerns, that
is paerns of functions. For example, the following would result in a paern of type
Pattern (Colour !Colour) , a paern of color blends alternating between red and blue:
(blend 0.5) <$> "red blue"
We can hardly visualise a paern of functions, but such paerns are of use, as we shall see
shortly.
Haskell has a superclass of functor called the applicative functor, which deﬁnes the <>
operator, allowing us to apply functions ‘inside’ Paerns to other values.5 Tidal paerns have
the following instance deﬁnition:
instance Applicative Pattern where
pure x = Pattern (pure (pure (pure x))) (Just 1)
Pattern fs pf <> Pattern xs px =
Pattern (liftA2 (zipCycleA2 (<>)) fs xs) (lcd pf px)
-- lowest common duration
lcd :: Period ! Period ! Period
lcd Nothing _ = Nothing
lcd _ Nothing = Nothing
lcd (Just n) (Just n') = Just (lcm n n')
e deﬁnition of <> allows a new paern to be composed by taking a function with
multiple parameters, and mapping it over combinations of values from more than one paern.
e <> operator is deﬁned for Paerns so that all events are used at least once, and no
more than necessary to fulﬁl this constraint. For example, the following gives a polyrhythmic
lightening and darkening eﬀect, by blending colours from two paerns:
draw $ (blend 0.5) <$> "red blue" <> "white white black"
5I am grateful to Ryan Ingram for his help with this applicative functor deﬁnition.
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e Tidal onsets function ﬁlters events, only allowing through those which begin a
phrase. Here we manipulate the onsets of a paern (blending them with red), before com-
bining them back with the original paern.
draw $ combine [blend 0.5 red <$> onsets p, p]
where p = "blue orange   [green, pink] red  "
e onsets function is particularly useful in cross-domain paerning, for example tak-
ing a paern of notes and accentuating phrase onsets by making a time onset and/or velocity
paern from it.
4.6 Open Sound Control paerns
Tidal has no capability for sound synthesis itself, but instead represents and schedules paerns
of Open Sound Control (OSC; Freed and Schmeder, 2009) messages to be sent to a synthesiser.
Below we see how the ‘shape’ of an OSC message is described in Tidal:
synth = OscShape {path = "/trigger",
params =
[ F "note" Nothing,
F "velocity" (Just 1),
S "wave" (Just "triangle")
],
timestamp = True
}
is is a trivial "/trigger" message consisting of two ﬂoating point parameters and one
string parameter. Each parameter may be given a default value in the OscShape ; in this case
velocity has a default of 1 , wave has a default of "triangle" and note has no default. is
means that if an OSC paern contains a message without a note value set, there will be no
value to default to, and so the message will be discarded. Paern accessors for each parameter
are deﬁned using names given in the OscShape :
note = makeF synth "note"
velocity = makeF synth "velocity"
wave = makeS synth "wave"
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4.6.1 Seduling
As timestamp is set to True in our OscShape example, one extra paern accessor is available
to us, for onset deltas:
onset = makeT synth
is allows us to make time paerns, applying subtle (or if you prefer, unsubtle) expres-
sion. is is implemented by wrapping each message in a timestamped OSC bundle. A simple
example is to vary onset times by up to 0.02 seconds using a sine function:
onset $ ( 0.02) <$> sine 16
e $ operator does nothing except apply the right hand side to the function on the le.
However it has very low precedence, and so is useful for removing the need for parenthesis in
cases such as this.
Instances of Tidal can synchronise with each other (and indeed other systems) via the Net-
Clock protocol (http://netclock.slab.org/). NetClock is based upon time synchronisa-
tion in SuperCollider (McCartney, 2002). is means that time paerns can notionally schedule
events to occur in the past, up to the SuperCollider control latency, which has a default of 0.2
seconds.
It is also possible to create tempo paerns to globally aﬀect all NetClock clients, for example
to double the tempo over 32 time steps:
tempo $ tween 120 240 32
4.6.2 Sending messages
We connect our OSC paern to a synthesiser using a stream , passing the network address
and port of the synthesiser, along with the OscShape we deﬁned earlier:
s  stream "127.0.0.1" 7770 synth
is starts a scheduling thread for sending the messages, and returns a function for replac-
ing the current paern in shared memory. Paerns are composed into an OSCmessage Paern
and streamed to the synthesiser as follows:
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s $ note ("50  62 60   ")
  velocity foo
  wave "square"
  onset (( 0.01) <$> foo)
where foo = sine1 16
e  operator merges the three parameter paerns and the onset paern together, into
a single OSC message paern. is is then passed to the stream s , replacing the currently
scheduled paern. Note that both velocity and onset are deﬁned in terms of the separately
deﬁned paern foo .
4.6.3 Use in improvisation
Music improvisation is made possible in Tidal using the dynamic Glasgow Haskell Compiler
Interpreter (http://www.haskell.org/ghc/). is allows the musician to develop a paern
over successive calls, perhaps modifying the preceding listing to transpose the note values
every third period, make a polyrhythmic paern of wave shapes, or combine multiple onset
paerns into a chorus eﬀect. Tidal provides a mode for the iconic emacs programmer’s editor
(http://www.gnu.org/software/emacs/) as a GHCI interface, allowing paerns to be live
coded within an advanced developers’ environment.6
As well as to music, Tidal has also been applied to the domain of live video animation, in
support of the musician Kirk Degiorgio in Antwerp, May 2010. is was inspired by the art of
colour play developed by Mary Hallock-Greenewalt (x2.5), and focused on colour transitions
and juxtapositions between colours. Paerns of colour transitions are speciﬁed in a manner
analogous to musical events, with something like chords of colour provided by spliing the
display into vertical bars. For example in order to move from three colours to two, four transi-
tions are performed, as the central colour is split in two. Paerns may be applied to the three
parameters of hue, transition type (either linear or sinusoidal) and transition speed. For the
performance, beat tracking was employed so that the colours changed in time with the regular
pulse of the music. e performance was not recorded or formally evaluated, but serves as an
example of the applicability of Tidal to the visual domain.
4.6.4 Future directions
We have introduced Tidal, a language designed for live coding of musical paern. Tidal has
already been ﬁeld tested through several performances, including to large audiences at interna-
tional music festivals, informing ongoing development of the system. Although it is designed
6Projecting the emacs interface as part of a live coding performance has its own aesthetic, having a particularly
strong eﬀect on many developers in the audience, either of elation or revulsion.
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for direct use, Tidal provides an ideal base on which to build experimental user interfaces. For
example in x5.6, we will introduce a visual programming interface, with Tidal providing the
underlying paern DSL.
As noted in x4.3 time is in general not well supported in programming languages. In Tidal
we have represented time in a function from discrete time to events, which works well within
electronic dance music genres with minimal deviation from a steady pulse. While Tidal does
allow expression through paerns of time, in a broader context however its sole focus on sound
event onsets is a huge constraint on music expression. Following the Functional Reactive Pro-
gramming literature to representing time with real or rational numbers is compelling. is
would be towards supporting representations of time based not just on ﬁing events on to
grids, but also arranging sounds relative to each other. at is, supporting smooth as well as
striated time (x2.1). is would draw upon extensive work by Bel (2001) on constraint-based
time seing.
4.7 Discussion
Language is a central issue in programming languages for the arts, and has taken a central
position in the structure of the present thesis. It is of course a broad subject, within which we
have visited a number of sub-themes. We have compared programming languages with natural
languages, taking a view from Wigenstein of both existing on the same landscape. We have
taken a cognitive view of semantics and related it to spatial relationships in music, allowing us
to take an unconventional position of relating meaning in music with that of natural language.
We have made a distinction between declarative and imperative approaches to programming
that focuses on levels of abstraction, where a declarative approach is one that matches the level
of abstraction of the target domain. is has ﬁnally led us into the subject of linguistic descrip-
tions of paerns of experience, and the introduction of Tidal, a paern DSL for improvising
music. Tidal provides a system allowing artists to potentially work at a level which is abstract
from the surface of the target medium, in this case sound. is does not necessarily distance
them from their work, but rather allows them to work directly with the structure of a piece, at
a higher level of composition.
We draw these strands together to make the point that programming languages are human
languages, for communicating with computers but also other programmers and with ourselves.
is will be developed further in the following chapters, in focusing on the notation of com-
puter programs (ch. 5) and their use in creative processes (ch. 6). Already though the part that
the design of programming languages can have in human expression is clear, in allowing the
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development of languages that accord with the structure of our target medium. is promise
has led many artists to be hooked by programming, and the wider public perception of pro-
gramming as a technical endeavour may at last be liing as communities of artist-programmers
grow. From here we look for how programming languages, their notation and use may be re-
framed in response.
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Notation
Building upon our discussion of the syntax and semantics of language, we now examine pro-
gramming language environments as designed user interfaces. Study of the notation of com-
puter programs brings Applied Psychology toHuman-Computer Interaction (Blackwell, 2006b),
allowing us to take a human-centric view of the activity of programming. Formally speaking,
all mainstream programming languages are Turing-complete, and so have equivalent expres-
sive power (x2.2). However, in practice the design of programming notation makes certain
ways of working easy and others diﬃcult, or practically impossible. We argue that as the re-
sult of design processes over the last ﬁy years, computer languages have become specialised
towards use in industry to the detriment of more freeform use. ese constraints have become
so embedded in languages and their use that it has become diﬃcult to see beyond them. is is
reﬂected in the way we describe mainstream languages as general purpose, assumed to be suit-
able for any purpose, or in other words, none in particular. However we contend that these
languages are unsuitable for smaller scale, human-level domain of the artist-programmer.
In the present chapter we will examine and compare existent notations using the Cognitive
Dimensions of Notation framework, brieﬂy reviewed below. We will focus in particular on the
use of time and space in notations, which we will assert is of particular concern to the arts. is
will lead into the introduction of Texture, a visual programming language with novel use of
Euclidean distance in the syntax of a pure functional language. is will provide foundations
for the following chapter, in which will examine how the use of programming notations impact
upon creative processes.
5.1 Cognitive Dimensions of Notation
eCognitive Dimensions of Notation framework is designed to aid discussion of programming
language design (Blackwell and Green, 2002). Rather than a checklist of good or bad design,
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it describes a set of features which may be desirable or not, and which interact with each
other depending on the context. Further more they are known as dimensions because they
are not absolutes but scales. An example of a common trade-oﬀ is one between the viscosity1
dimension, how diﬃcult it is to modify a program, and the provision for secondary notation. If
we change a notation to extend the role of secondary notation, then viscositywill also increase,
as the secondary notation must be changed to match any syntax change. A list of cognitive
dimensions with short descriptions is shown in Figure 5.1.
Table 5.1: Cognitive Dimensions of Notation, adapted from Chur and Green (2008)
Abstraction Availability of abstraction mechanisms.
Hidden dependencies Invisibility of important links between entities.
Premature commitment Constraints on the order of doing things.
Secondary notation Notation other than formal syntax.
Viscosity Resistance to change.
Visibility Visibility of components.
Closeness of mapping Closeness of representation to target domain.
Consistency Similar semantics are expressed in similar syntactic forms.
Diﬀuseness Verbosity of language.
Error-proneness Likelihood of mistakes.
Hard mental operations Demand on cognitive resources.
Progressive evaluation Temporal relationship between edits and their
evaluation.
Provisionality Degree of commitment to actions or marks.
Role-expressiveness Extent to which the purpose of a component may be
inferred.
e cognitive dimensions exhibit many inter-dependencies. ese trade-oﬀs are not fully
formalised, and it is presumed that they diﬀer depending on the task at hand. Indeed a di-
mension may be desirable in one context, but undesirable in another. For example an increase
in viscosity, making programs more diﬃcult to change, is generally seen as having negative
impact. However Beckwith and Burne (2004) report that increasing viscosity of certain no-
tational aspects improved the performance of a class of subjects using their language.
1To clarify discussion, we will use a particular typeface to indicate where we refer to a particular dimension, for
example as with hidden dependencies.
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e Cognitive Dimensions of Notation are particularly useful in considering the design of
Domain Speciﬁc Languages (DSLs), by providing standard terms for describing the particular
demands of a task domain. In the following we apply it to the notation of time in the domain
of live music improvisation.
5.2 Notation in Time
We have already seen problems that the march of time presents to computer language in the
previous chapter (x4.3). It can be useful to separate the declarative what from the imperative
how, but when the behaviour of an algorithm over time is important to the aesthetics of a digital
artwork, the how is the what. We introduced Tidal, which illustrates this point well, being a
paern DSL solely concerned with the notation of events in time (x4.5).
Designers of conventional programming languages consider time in terms of eﬃciency, and
as something to be saved or spent. For those designing languages for the time based arts, time
is rather part of the structure of the experience that is being represented, a stratum of both
digital paern and analogue movement.
ere is however an awkwardness about the relationship between thewhat of notation and
how of the passage of time. On one level they seem separate: a declarative description of a time
structure is one thing, and an imperative algorithm for accurately and eﬃciently producing
that structure may be quite another. But in practice they rarely are completely separate, the
algorithm leaves its imprint, paerning its output. On recognising the ‘glitches’ arising from
the operation of a particular algorithm, artists bring them into the music itself (Cascone, 2000).
Timemay always be relied upon to pass, and it passes not only during a program’s interpre-
tation but during the activity of notation itself. is is of concern to programming languages
designed for the arts, where the separate timelines of development and execution eﬀectively
separates an artist from their target medium. Figure 5.1 shows the Processing programming
environment, which is an adaptation of the general purpose Java programming language, and
is designed for artists who are learning programming. To this end the interface has few distrac-
tions, and makes running a program very straightforward: the programmer simply presses the
‘play’ buon marked with an icon familiar from music equipment. Nonetheless, the program-
mer must stop writing code, press the buon and wait a lile while before seeing the results
of their work. is is not wholly bad, and may be thought in terms of an artist taking a step
back from their work to pause in consideration. However, such periods of reﬂection should be
taken on an artist’s own terms, and not forced upon them by an external process.
Live coding is a movement that has emerged to investigate the removal of the compilation
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Figure 5.1: e Processing programming environment. Every time the ‘play’ buon is pressed, the program
is compiled and executed, with no state preserved between successive runs (unless explicitly deﬁned).
Figure 5.2: e Fluxus programming environment. e editor containing the source code of a program is
embedded in the same 3D scene as its output. e source is dynamically interpreted, so that the program
may be anged during a live coding performance (x6.8).
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step in an arts context. We will investigate the creative processes of live coding more broadly
in x6.8, and so for now focus on notational aspects, in particular, how the removal of the com-
pilation step results in the intertwining of active notation with interpretation. Figure 5.2 shows
the Fluxus interface, where the code editor is placed in the same scene as the process output.
ere is no ‘play’ buon in Fluxus as such, instead the code is continuously playing. Incremen-
tal changes to the source code are reﬂected in the output whenever the programmer presses
the F5 buon. e visual form of the code is more literally part of its own output; the visual
output is a 3D scene, of which the text editor is part. It is therefore possible to write a program
that modiﬁes the display of its own code.
How is live coding technically possible? Using the programming environments that have
become conventional, artists cannot generally experience what they make at the same time as
they are making it. is problemmay seem insurmountable; while it runs, a programmaintains
state, its ‘working memory’, the data generated and collected during its execution. Such data
may come with no description apart from its declaration in program code. If one then changes
the program code, there may be no mechanism in which the new version of the program may
continue where the old version le oﬀ, as the old state may be of no use to the new version of
the program. e cognitive dimension of progressive evaluation therefore seems diﬃcult to
achieve. ere are however a number of ways in which it can be done, although each case has
signiﬁcant impacts on other cognitive dimensions.
External grounding. For certain task domains, the internal state of a program has lile or no
signiﬁcance. is is the case in Tidal (x4.5), where just about the only ‘state’ is the measurement
of time kept by a separate process, the system clock. It is also the case in languages known as
UNIX system shells. ese developed from research into conversational programming (Kupka
and Wilsing, 1980), where programmers interact with a language interpreter one statement at
a time, able to consider systems feedback at each step. Conversational programming lives on
in shell languages such as Bash, where the state is global to the whole computer system, with
access control for security. In particular, state is almost exclusively held within the ﬁlesystem,
a tree structure able to hold not only permanent ﬁles on disks, but processes, their environment
variables and working ‘core’ memory (Filesystem Hierarchy Standard Group, 2003). As such a
shell programmer tends to work with live data, making irreversible and at times drastic actions,
an impact along the cognitive dimension of premature commitment. However some systems,
including some ﬁle systems and relational databases, implement transactions, allowing a series
of successive actions to be iteratively applied, but not commied. When live coders work
before an audience, turning back performance time is impossible, but being able to roll back
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development to a previous version, for example for musical reprise, is certainly useful.
Internal grounding. is approach to progressive evaluation deﬁnes state in such a way
that it may be passed from one version of a program to the next. is is conceptually similar to
external grounding above, except the state is not shared with other processes. e programmer
is le with the hard mental operation of being aware of certain conﬂicts that may arise, for
example if a variable with the same name is used for diﬀerent purposes in a successive ver-
sion of the code, state will be carried across to unintended eﬀect. In a strictly typed language
such as Haskell, state is handled in a highly formalised manner, and so it is possible to arrange
for a program to return its entire state for coercion into a form suitable for its successive ver-
sion (Stewart and Chakravarty, 2005). Alternatively, dynamic scripting languages such as Perl
make it straightforward to evaluate code that replaces existing functions, where state may be
preserved using global variables.
Self-modiﬁcation. A rather unusual approach, developed in the Feedba.pl live coding en-
vironment by the present author, is to store state in the source code itself (McLean, 2004). e
programmer is put in the position of writing code that stores, reads and modiﬁes values in its
own description. is is done either by programmatically updating assignment statements, or
storing values as program comments, so that secondary notation is parsed and modiﬁed by
its own program. is creates an interaction where the source code is used to modify both the
instructions and state of a process, and also to show output from its execution.
Temporal recursion. is term was coined by Sorensen (2005) in describing the operation of
the music live coding system Impromptu, based around the Lisp derivative Scheme. A recursive
function is one that calls itself, and a temporal recursive one is one that calls itself but with
a scheduled delay. Progressive evaluation is then simply a case of swapping one function for
another between self-calls.
Hybrid. A hybrid approach is certainly possible, exempliﬁed by SuperCollider, a music pro-
gramming language with two concurrent processes. One process maintains a pure functional
graph for sound synthesis, while the other acts as a dynamic language interpreter. e lan-
guage process manages such tasks as scheduling events and signalling graph changes of the
synthesis process. e synthesis process is largely stateless, and care must be taken to avoid
discontinuities when the graph is changed, audible as clicks. JITLib has been developed to aid
this, providing a means to transition audio between successive versions of code (Rohrhuber
et al., 2005).
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e above methods all act to embed program development in a timeline shared with its
execution, with practical applications being explored in the arts. We now move from the role
of time in notation, to examine the role of space.
5.3 Visual notation
Visual Programming Languages is an active research ﬁeld, looking at how to design program-
ming notations that go beyond conventional linear text. To head oﬀ confusion, note that the
use of visual here is not the same as popular use, such as in “Visual Basic”, to describe language
environments based on GUI forms and event-driven programming. Instead, visual program-
ming languages are those making heavy use of visual elements in the code itself, for example
where a program is notated as a graphical diagram.
Research into visual languages is hampered by a deﬁnitional problem. In a well-cited tax-
onomy of visual programming, Myers (1990, p. 2) deﬁnes visual languages as “any system that
allows the user to specify a program in a two (or more) dimensional fashion.” Myers speciﬁ-
cally excludes conventional textual languages, because “compilers or interpreters process them
as long, one-dimensional streams.” is exclusion is highly problematic however, as at base all
a computer can do is process one-dimensional streams. Further, some textual languages such
as Haskell and Python do indeed have two dimensional syntax, where vertical alignment as
well as horizontal adjacency is signiﬁcant; however no-one would call either language ‘visual’.
Worse still, for the majority of visual languages, 2D arrangement has no syntactical signiﬁ-
cance whatsoever, and is purely secondary notation. Oen graphical icons are described as
visual, but they too are discrete symbols, in other words textual.
is confusion stems from two misunderstandings, ﬁrstly that text is non-visual, and sec-
ondly that visual interfaces are necessarily a technological advance beyond textual interfaces.
e former point is in denial of the heavy use of spatial layout in structuring text, and the lat-
ter point makes the same mistake as those assuming analogue expressions are more advanced
than digital ones (x2.9). As a species we navigated spaces before we marked them out with
sequences of symbols, and made marks on surfaces before we used those marks to transcribe
words. Indeed it runs against implicit hierarchy in their representations; wrien words (ch. 3)
are comprised of symbols (ch. 2), notated with images. From this perspective, textual interfaces
are the more advanced, as they are developments of visual interfaces. However it does not fol-
low that text is superior to visual interfaces, but rather that the whole dichotomy of visual and
textual language is false. Language by nature involves discrete symbols, but may be integrated
with analogue symbols towards a richer, dual code of expression.
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Figure 5.3: e Pure Data visual programming environment. e locations of the boxes have no signiﬁcance,
but allow the programmer free rein in arranging their program in a manner meaningful to themselves.
Image c Miller Puee, used here under the terms of the BSD License.
5.3.1 Pater Languages
Research into visual programming languages has held much promise, but has so far had lile in
the way of broad industry take up. An intention of many visual language researchers has been
to ﬁnd ways of using visual notation that result in new, broadly superior general programming
languages (Blackwell, 2006c). However this panacea has not been reached, and instead research
around the cognitive dimensions of notations (x5.1), has identiﬁed inherent, inescapable trade-
oﬀs. ere are however two domains where visual programming has been highly successful,
one being engineering, exempliﬁed by the LabVIEW visual programming language. e other,
of special relevance to our theme, is computer music. In particular, Pater languages have
become a dominant force in computer music and interactive art since their introduction by
Puckee (1988). Using a data ﬂow model inspired by analogue modular synthesis, users of
Patcher languages such as Pure Data orMax/MSP are able to build programs known as ‘patches’
using a visual notation of boxes and wires. Patches may be manipulated while they are active, a
form of live coding predating the movement examined in x6.8 by well over a decade. e long-
lived popularity of Patcher languages, the continued innovation within communities around
them, and the artistic success of their use is undeniable.
Patcher languages allow programmers freedom in arranging their programs, to great ad-
vantage, a point we will come to later. However ﬁrst we raise a point of contention; as with
many visual programming languages, in terms of syntax, they are hardly visual at all. In the
Pure Data patch shown in Figure 5.3, you could move the boxes wherever you like, or even
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place them all on top of one another, it would make no diﬀerence to the interpreter. ose
familiar with Max/MSP may counter this line of argument by pointing out that right-le or-
dering signiﬁes evaluation order in Max. is falls on two counts; ﬁrst, Max programmers are
discouraged from branching that relies on this, in favour of the trigger object. Second, having
right-le execution order does not distinguish Max from any mainstream textual language. In-
deed to say that Patcher languages are not themselves signiﬁcantly textual is in blind denial of
the large number of operators and keywords shown as editable text in a patch.
An advantage of Patcher languages is that they are unconstrained by visible dimensions,
in that you can place objects anywhere with lile or no syntactical signiﬁcance. In conven-
tional languages, to relate two words together, you must put them adjacent to one another,
in a particular order. In Patcher languages, you instead connect them with lines, eﬀectively
deﬁning syntax graphs of arbitrary dimension, hypercubes and up. As opposed to the deﬁni-
tion related earlier, from this perspective it is actually ‘textual’ rather than ‘visual’ languages
that are constrained by the two dimensions of the visual canvas.
e above is not an aack on Patcher languages – syntax is not everything. Well, to the
interpreter syntax is everything, but to the programmer, who is our focus, it is only half the
story. Because Patcher languages have such remarkably free secondary notation, they allow
us to lay programs out however we like, and we may embrace this visual freedom in making
beautiful patches that through shape and form relate structure to a human at a glance, in ways
that linguistic syntax alone cannot do. at is why we call these visual languages; while the
language syntax is not visual, the notation is very much so.
5.4 Notation and Mental Imagery
All programming languages can be considered in visual terms, we do aer all normally use
our eyes to read source code. Programming languages have context-free grammars, allowing
recursive forms oen encapsulated within round brackets, resulting in a kind of visual Euler
diagram. We can also say that adjacency is a visual aribute of grammar; as we know from
Gestalt theory, adjacency has an important role in perceptual grouping (Kohler, 1930). ese
visual features are used to support reading of code, where our eyes saccade across the screen,
recognising discrete symbols in parallel, chunked into words (Rayner and Pollatsek, 1994). Cru-
cially however, we are able to aend to both visuospatial and linguistic aspects of a scene si-
multaneously, and integrate them (x2.2.1). Discrete symbols are expressed within a language
grammar, supplemented by visuospatial arrangement expressing paralinguistic structure. e
computer generally only deals with the former, but the human is able to aend to both.
103
C 5: N
Magnusson (2009) describes a fundamental diﬀerence between acoustic and digital music
instruments in the way we play them. He rightly points out that code does not vibrate, and so
we cannot explore and interact with a computer music language with our bodies, in the same
way as an acoustic instrument. However, programmers still have bodies which contain and
shape their thoughts, and in turn, through secondary notation, shape their code. Programmers
do not physically resonate with code, but cognitive resources grounded in perceptual acuity
enables them to take advantage of visuospatial cognition in their work.
We have seen that visuospatial arrangement is of importance to the notation of Patcher
languages, despite not being part of syntax. Our argument follows that if shape, geometry
and perceptual cues are so important to human understanding, then we should look for ways
of taking these aspects out of secondary notation and make them part of primary syntax.
Indeed, some languages, including recent music programming languages already have.
5.5 Geometry in Syntax
In x2.2.3, we examined the role of analogue representation in computer language against the
background of Dual Coding theory. Computer languages allow programmers to communicate
their ideas through abstraction, but in general do not at base include visuospatial syntax to
support this. Do programmers then simply switch oﬀ a whole channel of perception, to fo-
cus only on the discrete representation of code? It would appear not, we have seen that not
only do programmers report mental imagery in programming tasks (x2.2.2), but that the use of
spatial layout is an important feature of secondary notation in mainstream programming lan-
guages, which tend to allow programmers to add whitespace to their code freely with lile or
no syntactical meaning (x5.4). Programmers use this freedom to arrange their code so that its
shape relates important structure at a glance. at programmers need to use spatial layout as a
crutch while composing discrete symbolic sequences is telling; to the interpreter, a block may
be a subsequence between braces, but to an experienced programmer it is a perceptual gestalt
grouped by indentation. From this we conclude that concordant with Dual Coding theory, the
linguistic work of programming is supported by spatial reasoning, with secondary notation
helping bridge the divide.
e question is whether spatial reasoning can be successfully employed to work with pri-
mary syntax, where visuospatial layout is relevant to the computer as well as the human.
We can ﬁnd interesting perspectives on this question in the realm of esoteric programming
languages.2 Esoteric programming languages are those which demonstrate strange and ex-
2See http://www.esolangs.org/ for a comprehensive catalogue of esoteric programming languages.
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perimental ideas, for fun rather than practical use, and we approach them here in search for
inspiration for practical applications in the arts. e use of spatial arrangement in primary
syntax has become a popular game in the esoteric language community. Befunge, illustrated in
Figure 5.4, is a particularly interesting example, a textual language with a highly two dimen-
sional syntax. Control ﬂow may proceed up, down, le or right, directed by single character
instructions.
e instruction set of the Piet language is inspired by Befunge, but rather than the contents
of individual cells, the Piet instruction set is given by colour relationships between neighbour-
ing cells. For example, a multiply operation is symbolised by the colour hue changing a lile
and darkening considerably. e programmer is given a great deal of freedom to choose partic-
ular colours within these constraints. Much like Befunge, Piet instructions include directional
modiﬁers, and control ﬂow travels in two dimensions. Figure 5.5 contains an example program,
showing its resemblance to the modernist paintings of Piet Mondrian which inspired the Piet
language.
Musicians oen lead the way in technology, and programming language design is no ex-
ception, as there are a number of examples of computermusic languages which include geomet-
rical measures of spatial arrangement in their primary syntax. Firstly, Nodal is a commercial
environment for programming agent-based music (Mcilwain et al., 2005). Nodal has several in-
teresting features, but is notable here for its spatial syntax, where distance symbolises elapsed
time. As the graph is read by the interpreter, musical events at graph nodes are triggered,
where the ﬂow of execution is slowed by distance between nodes. Colour also has syntactic
value, where paths are identiﬁed by one of a number of hues.
Al-Jazari is one of a series of playful languages created by Dave Griﬃths, based on a com-
puter game engine and controlled by a gamepad (McLean et al., 2010). In Al-Jazari, cartoon
depictions of robots are placed on a grid and given short programs for navigating it, in the
form of sequences of movements including interactions with other robots. As with Nodal,
space maps to time, but there is also a mechanism where robots take action based on the prox-
imity and orientation of a another robot. In programming Al-Jazari you are therefore put in
the position of viewing a two dimensional space from the point of view of an agent’s ﬂow of
execution. Indeed it is possible to make this literally so, as you may switch from the crow’s
nest view shown in Figure 6.1 to the ﬁrst-person view of a robot.
Our last example is the ReacTable (Jorda et al., 2007), a celebrated tangible interface aimed
towards live music. Its creators do not describe the ReacTable as a programming language, and
claim its tangible interface overcomes inherent problems in visual programming languages
such as Pure Data. But truly, the ReacTable is itself a visual programming language, if an
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Figure 5.4: A pseudo-random number generator wrien in the two-dimensional
language Befunge.
Figure 5.5: Source code wrien in the Piet language with two dimensional, colour
syntax. Prints out the text “Hello, world!”. Image comas So 2006. Used
under the Creative Commons BY-SA 2.5 license.
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Figure 5.6: eReacTablemusic language, where relative distance and orientation is part of primary syntax.
Image c Daniel Williams, used here under the terms of the Creative Commons BY-SA 2.0 License.
extraordinary one. It has a visual syntax, where physical blocks placed on the ReacTable are
identiﬁed as symbols, and connected according to a nearest neighbour algorithm, the results of
which can be seen in Figure 5.6. Not only that, but relative distance and orientation between
connected symbols are parsed as values, and used as parameters to the functions represented
by the symbols. Video is back-projected onto the ReacTable surface to give feedback to the
musician, for example by visualising the sound signal between nodes. e ReacTable has also
been repurposed as an experimental interface for making graphics (Gallardo et al., 2008), which
suggests that the ReacTable is not as far from a general purpose programming language as it
may ﬁrst appear.
5.6 Visual Programming with Texture
We now introduce Texture, a visual programming language, based upon the Tidal language for
the live coding of paern introduced in x4.5. e name Texture is intended to accentuate the
role of text in programming, as a structure woven into a two dimensional surface. is reﬂects
Texture’s novel use of spatial arrangement in the notation of a pure functional programming
language. An important design aim for Texture is to create a programming notation suitable
for short, improvised scripts, allowing fast manipulation by an improviser, where lay audience
members may appreciate more of the structure behind the code, made explicit through cues
that are both visual and syntactical. Here we describe Texture as an early prototype system
with novel features, describing the thinking behind it and issues raised through its development
and early use.
e Texture environment and parser is implemented in C, using the free/open source Clut-
ter graphics library (http://clutter-project.org/) for its user interface. It compiles its
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programs into an intermediate form of Haskell (Jones, 2002) code, which is piped straight to a
Haskell dynamic interpreter whenever a Texture program is modiﬁed. Haskell then takes care
of the task of evaluating the code and scheduling sound events accordingly, using Tidal. Much
of Haskell’s type system is re-implemented in Texture, its contribution not being to provide a
whole new language, but rather a complementary and novel visual syntax.
5.6.1 Geometric relationships
A programwrien in Texture is composed of strongly typed values and higher order functions.
For example the function + takes two numbers as arguments (either integers or reals, but not
a mixture without explicit conversion), and returns their sum. Here is how + 1 2 looks in
Texture:
Two green lines emerge from the boom right hand side of the function + , both travelling
to the upper le hand side of its ﬁrst argument 1 , and then one travelling on to the second
argument 2 . is visualises Haskell’s automatic currying of functions (x4.5.1), whereby each
time a parameter is applied, a function is returned with arity reduced by one. is visualisation
of arity makes it easy to perceive where functions are partially applied, which we will show
later in our example of fmap .
e programmer types in functions and values, but does not manually add the lines con-
necting them, as they would with a Patcher language. e lines are instead inferred and drawn
automatically by the language environment, according to a simple rule: the closest two type-
compatible function-value pairs connect, followed by the next two closest, and so on. Values
may be moved freely with the mouse, which may change the topology of the graph, which
updates automatically.
Texture has preﬁx notation (also known as Polish notation) where the function comes ﬁrst,
followed by its arguments. ere is no distinction between functions and operators. e values
can be placed and moved around the screen, with a line drawn linking the function to each of
its arguments in turn. For example + 2 1 may be expressed as either of the following:
In both cases, two parallel lines travel from the boom right hand corner of the function
+ to the top le of 2 , being the closest compatible value. As already mentioned, these lines
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represent the arity of the function. e line representing the parameter terminates at its argu-
ment 2 , and the remaining line continues to the top le of 1 . Again, these symbols connect
automatically, closest ﬁrst, where ‘closest’ is deﬁned as Euclidean distance in two dimensional
space. If a symbol is moved, the whole program is re-interpreted, with connections re-routed
accordingly.
e functions may be composed together as you might expect. Here is
+ (+ 1 2) (+ 3 4) in Texture:
e use of green in the above examples is signiﬁcant, representing the integer types. e
following example shows all the types currently supported by Texture at play:
Of the basic types, strings are golden yellow, integers are green and ﬂoating point numbers
are blue. In general, Tidal Pattern s (x4.5.2) are pink, or the similar hues of red for paerns of
OSC parameters or dark pink for paerns of OSC messages (x4.6). Functions assume the colour
of their return value, or if they are not fully applied (i.e. return another function) then they
are white. Lines connecting functions to their parameters are coloured in the same way, for
example in the above example every takes an integer, a function and a paern to apply the
function to, so its lines are coloured green, white and pink respectively.
e following shows the output (re-formaed here to aid reading) from Texture given the
above example.
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sampler ((   )
(sound (every (3)
(< 2)
(lToP [Just "bd", Nothing, Nothing,
Just "sn", Nothing, Nothing])
)
)
(delay (fmap ( 0.500000) (sine1 16)))
)
e lToP function is of type [Maybe a] !Pattern a , and simply turns a list of events
into a Pattern . e other functions are explained in x4.5.
e strong typing in Haskell places great restrictions on which arguments may be applied
to which Tidal functions. is “bondage and discipline” works out well for Texture, as it limits
the number of possible connections, making it easier for the programmer to predict what will
connect where, supported by the colour highlighting. Furthermore, because Texture enforces
type correctness, there is no possibility of syntactically incorrect code.
5.6.2 User Interface
e Texture user interface is centred around typing, editing and moving words. In fact that is
all you can do – there are no menus or key combinations. A newword is created by moving the
cursor to an empty part of the screen using the mouse, and then typing. e word is completed
by pressing the space bar, at which point the cursor moves a lile to the right where the next
word can be begun, mimicking a conventional text editor. A word is edited by being given
focus with a click of the mouse, or moved by holding down the shi key while being dragged
with the mouse. A whole function tree (the function and its connected arguments) is moved
by holding down control while dragging, although the arguments may connect diﬀerently in
the new location according to the new context.
5.6.3 Texture in Practice
Having seen much of the technical detail of Texture, we turn to its musical context. By way of
illustration, a video showing Texture in use is available on the enclosed DVD.
Texture is a prototype language that has not yet undergone full examination through HCI
study, however preliminary observations have been conducted. In particular a small workshop
for six participants was arranged with the Access Space free media lab in Sheﬃeld, and led by
the present author. A limit of six people was agreed as a good balance for a guided workshop,
and the places were ﬁlled on ﬁrst-come-ﬁrst-served basis. e participants were found by the
arts programme manager at Access Space, who advertised through their own website, through
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public, arts related mailing lists, as well as approaching regular Access Space participants di-
rectly. All participants were male, aged 23, 26, 28, 30, 42 and 42 years of age. Four lived locally
to Sheﬃeld, and two travelled from Liverpool. All identiﬁed as musicians, four using com-
puters in their music, and ﬁve playing traditional instruments. Two had prior experience of
programming, only one of which had experience of a functional programming language. e
workshop was free of charge, being part of an arts programme funded by the Arts Council,
England. Participants were free to leave at any time with no penalty, but all stayed to the end.
e workshop was in the form of an hour long presentation surveying live coding practice
and other inﬂuences of Texture, followed by a three hour hands-on workshop. e ﬁrst half of
the hands-on section introduced techniques on a projected display, which participants, while
listening on headphones, copied and adapted in exploration of their use. e second half was
more freeform, where each participant had their own set of stereo speakers at their computers.
e participants were playing to a globally set tempo, with accurate time synchronisation.3
ismeant that they were able to respond to each other’s paerns, improvising music together;
because of the layout of the room, it was only possible to clearly hear the music of immediate
neighbours. Recorded video taken from this part of the workshop is available on the enclosed
DVD.
e participants were the ﬁrst people to use Texture besides the present author, and so
there was some risk that the participants would be unable to engage with it due to unforeseen
technical problems or task diﬃculty. However all showed enthusiasm, were keen to explore
the language, and joined in with playing together over speakers.
e participants were surveyed for opinions through a questionnaire answered via the sur-
veymonkeywebsite, using computers at Access Space. is was done in two parts, immediately
before and then immediately aer the workshop. e participants were told that the survey
was designed to “help in the development of the soware used in the workshop” and were
asked to “answer the questions honestly”. To encourage honest responses further, the survey
was conducted anonymously.
Participants were asked to rate their agreement with three statements both before and aer
the workshop, on a Likert scale from Disagree Strongly (1) to Agree Strongly (5). Although
there is lile statistical power for such a small group, feedback from these individuals was
encouraging for a system at such an early stage of development. e results are visualised
in Figure 5.7. Overall, participants tended to agree with “I am interested in live coding” and
“I would like to be a live coder” both before and aer the workshop. ey largely disagreed
with “I am a live coder” at the beginning but were less sure by the end, indicating they had
3Accurate time synchronisation was made possible by the netclock protocol.
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Figure 5.7: Responses on a Likert scale from participants (n=6) in a workshop for the Texture visual live
coding language. e graph visualises a straightforward response count for ea question centered on the
neutral responses. Responses to the ﬁrst three statements were collected both before and aer the workshop.
achieved some insights and begun to identify with the practice. At the end, four out of the six
participants agreed with a ﬁnal statement “I would like to use Text[ure]4 again”.
Participants were also given freeform questions asking what they liked and disliked about
Texture, howmuch they felt they understood the connection between the visual representation
and the sound, and soliciting suggestions for improvements. Dislikes and suggestions focused
on technical interface issues such as the lack of ‘undo’, and three found the automatic linking
diﬃcult to work with. On the other hand, three participants reported liking how quick and
easy it was to make changes.
5.6.4 Cognitive Dimensions of Texture
Texture is designed for the improvisation of musical paern, as a visual programming inter-
face to the Tidal paern DSL. e result is a more tightly constrained system than many pro-
gramming languages for music, which generally include extensive facilities for low level sound
synthesis. While the ability to compose right from the micro-level of the sound signal oﬀers
great possibilities, it comes with trade-oﬀs, in particular along the hard mental operations and
diﬀuseness (verbosity) cognitive dimensions.
e visibility of Texture is high, where a complex rhythm can be notated on a single screen.
We also argue that Texture has high closeness of mapping, as the visual representation of
trees within trees corresponds well with the hierarchical structure of the paern that is being
composed. is echoes the tree structures common in music analysis, and indeed we would
expect signiﬁcant correspondence between the Texture structure and the listener’s perception
of it. e extent to which an untrained listener may relate the structure they hear with the
4At the time of the workshop, Texture had the working name of Text.
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Texture program they see is an empirical question, but we suspect that further development is
needed to support this.
Creative use of Texture is aided not only by high visibility but also aspects of provision-
ality. What is meant by “creative use” will be outlined in relation to bricolage programming
in x6.3.1. A programmer may work on a section of code and drag it into the main body of the
program when it is ready. ey may also drag part of the code out of the main body and reuse
it elsewhere later. e code must always be syntactically correct, but unless it connects to a
function representing OSC messages sent to a synthesiser, it will have no eﬀect.
e error-proneness of Texture is well positioned. It is impossible to make syntax errors
in Texture, and while the automatic connection can at times have unexpected results, the result
is at times musically interesting, but otherwise straightforward to reverse.
5.6.5 Future directions
Texture is a working prototype, in that it is fully functional as a live music interface, but is a
proof of concept of an approach to programming that brings many further ideas to mind.
In terms of visual arrangement, Texture treats words as square objects, but perhaps the
individual marks of the symbols could be brought into the visual notation, through experiments
in typography. For example, a cursive font could be usedwhere the trajectory of the ﬁnal stroke
in a word is continued with a curve to ﬂow into the leading stroke of the word it connects to.
is suggestion may turn the stomach of hardened programmers, although Texture is already
unusual in using a proportional font, complete with ligatures.
Currently there is no provision in Texture for making named abstractions, so a piece of
code cannot be used more than once without being repeated verbatim. Visual syntax for single
assignment could symbolise a section of code with a shape derived from the arrangement of
its components. at shape would become an ideographic symbol for the code, and then be
duplicated and reused elsewhere in the program using the mouse.
Texture is inspired by the ReacTable, but does not feature any of the ReacTable’s tangible
interaction. Such tabletop interfaces oﬀer a number of advantages over keyboard-and-mouse
interfaces, in particular multitouch, allowing movement of more than one component at once.
Multi-touch tablet computers share this advantage while avoiding some of the tradeoﬀs of tan-
gible interfaces. Much of the ReacTable technology is available as an open research platform,
and could be highly useful in this area of experimentation.
Currently the only output of Texture is music rendered as sound, with no visual feedback.
ere is great scope for experimentation in visualising the paerns in the code, making it easier
for live coders and audience members to connect musical events and transformations with
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particular sections of the code. One approach would be to visualise paern ﬂowing between
nodes, again inspired by the ReacTable, however as Texture is based upon pure functions rather
than dataﬂow graphs, it presents a rather diﬀerent design challenge. Texture could be adapted
to allow any Haskell program to be wrien, and so could be applied to other domains, such as
digital signal processing and visual animation. is would again place diﬀerent challenges on
the visualisation of results.
Most generally, and perhaps most importantly, we look towards proper analysis of lay
audience code comprehension, grounding further development with beer understanding of
what the design challenges are.
5.7 Discussion
We have considered programming languages as rich notations with both visual and linguis-
tic aspects. Many computer musicians write words to describe their music, for computers to
translate to sound. e computer musicians have become comfortable with this rather odd
process in private, but perhaps found it diﬃcult to explain to their parents. Simply by project-
ing their interfaces, live coders have brought this oddity out in public, and must deal with the
consequences of bringing many issues underlying computer music to the surface.
Live coding may be understood as a dual activity of language and spatial perception. We
have seen how humans have the capacity to integrate both simultaneously, showing that the act
of live coding, and perhaps the audience reception of it, can be realised and felt simultaneously
as both musical language and musical movement.
By placing the design of live coding languages in a psychological and analytical context,
we have aimed to support future directions in live coding design. e introduction of Texture
takes a step in this direction, and we hope demonstrates the exciting ground waiting for future
language designers to explore.
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Creativity
From symbols up, each of the preceding three chapters has built a layer of abstraction on top of
the previous one. e next layer takes us above the activity of notation, to the broader context
of creative artistic activity. How can programming ﬁt into a creative process?
6.1 Programmer culture
From early beginnings programmers have pulled themselves up by their bootstraps, creating
languages within languages in which great hierarchies of interacting systems are expressed.
Much of this activity has been towards military, business or scientiﬁc goals. However there
are numerous examples of alternative programmer subcultures forming around fringe activity
without obvious practical application. e Hacker culture at MIT was an early example (Levy,
2002), a group of male model-railway enthusiasts and phone network hackers who dedicated
their lives to exploring the possibilities brought by the new, digital computers. Many other pro-
gramming cultures have since ﬂourished. Particularly strong and long-lived is the demoscene,
a youth culture engaged in pushing computer video animation to the limits of available hard-
ware, using novel algorithmic techniques to dazzling ends. e demoscene spans much of the
globe but is particularly strong in Nordic countries, where annual meetings aract thousands
of participants (Polgar, 2005). Another, perhaps looser programmer culture is that of Esoteric
Programming Languages discussed in x5.5. e authors of these languages push against the
boundaries of programming, providing insight into the constraints of mainstream program-
ming languages.
Members of the demoscene and esoteric language cultures do not necessarily self-identify
as artists, despite their relentless search for novel approaches. However there are cultures
of programmers who do call themselves artists, now extending into their second and third
generations. Early on, communities of experimental artists looking for new means of expres-
115
C 6: C
Figure 6.1: e robots of the Al-Jazari language by Dave Griﬃths (McLean et al., 2010). Ea robot has a
thought bubble containing a small program, edited through a game pad.
sion grew around computers as soon as access could be gained. In Great Britain interest dur-
ing the 1960s grew into the formation of the Computer Arts Society (CAS; Brown et al., 2009,
www.computer-arts-society.org). However aer a creative boom CAS entered a period
of dormancy in the mid 1980s, perhaps drowned out by extreme commercial growth in the
computer industry at that time. CAS has however been revived in more recent years, encour-
aged by a major resurgence of soware as a medium for the arts. is resurgence has seen
a wealth of new programming environments designed for artists and musicians, such as Pro-
cessing (Reas and Fry, 2007), SuperCollider (McCartney, 2002), ChucK (Wang and Cook, 2004),
VVVV (http://vvvv.org) and OpenFrameworks (http://openframeworks.cc), joining
more established environments such as the Patcher languages PureData and Max (x5.3.1).
e creators of programming languages for the arts are oen artist-programmers them-
selves, motivated to support their own work. is results in experimental features which re-
semble those of esoteric languages, for example unique representations of time are central
features of ChucK and SuperCollider (x5.2). Languages created by artist-programmers have
themselves been exhibited as interactive works of art, such as the Al-Jazari music program-
ming environment shown in Figure 6.1 (McLean et al., 2010).
e design of programming languages for the arts is an active research domain, with new
approaches still emerging, bringing important psychological issues to the fore. As computers
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enter almost every aspect of our lives, few would now deny that people can be creative using
computer tools. Against all this context it is clear to see the activity of programming as poten-
tially being highly creative. Before we discuss the creative processes of programming in depth
however, we should describe what we mean by creative behaviour.
6.2 Concepts in creative behaviour
Creativity is assumed to be a mark of the human species, and something that we all do as part
of a healthy approach to life. e alternative to a creative life is a mechanistic one, lacking in
introspection and control over the self-imposed rules we live by. However, the word creative
is used to deﬁne a wide range of behaviour, for example a creative person in the advertising
industry is something rather more speciﬁc than a creative person in the arts. So what exactly
do we mean by creativity? We might try to deﬁne it in terms of qualities of the artefacts that
creativity produces. However we judge the creativity of an artefact not only by its intrinsic
value, but also its novelty in a culture, and perhaps how much it surprises us. at is, we judge
an artefact not just by any physical manifestation, but primarily the concepts behind it. To
understand creativity then, we should focus on the conceptual activity behind creative works.
In x2.2.5, we took the deﬁnition of a concept as “a mental representation of a class of things”
(Murphy, 2002, p.5). By asserting that creativity is a conceptual process, we therefore imply
that creativity is not in the production of things, but rather in the organisation of things into
novel classes. If we recognise creativity in an artefact, it is because its properties allow us to
infer a novel conceptual class of which it is a member.
If concepts are the primary output of the creative process, we should deﬁne how and where
we think they are represented. In our review of conceptual representation (x2.2) we shared
the view that concepts are structured in relation to perception; that basic concepts arise from
recurrent states in sensorimotor systems, which in turn form the building blocks of higher level
abstract thought. When we creatively generate novel, valued concepts, we are literally altering
our perception of the world and of ourselves.
Exactly how a concept is represented in the human mind is an open question. Here we
take the view that a conceptual property is represented by a single best possible example, or
prototype. In accordancewith the theories reviewed in chapter 2, these prototypes arise through
perceptual states, within the geometry of quality dimensions. To ground the discussion in
music, consider a piece of jazz, where jazz is the concept and the particular composition is
an instance of that concept. e musician, in exploring the boundaries of jazz, then ﬁnds a
piece beyond the usual rules of jazz. rough this process, the boundaries of a music genre
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may be redeﬁned to some degree, or if the piece is in particularly fertile new ground, a new
sub-genre of jazz may emerge. Indeed a piece of music which does not break boundaries in
some way could be considered uncreative. ese changes in conceptual structure ﬁrst happen
in an individual, which in the case of music is the composer or improviser. Another individual’s
conceptual structures may be modiﬁed to accord with a composer’s new concept by listening
to the instance of the new musical concept, although success is only likely if the individual
already shares some of the music cultural norms of the creator.
Wiggins (2006a,b) formalises the Creative Systems Framework (CSF) based on the work of
Boden (2003), in order to provide a framework for discussing creativity and comparing creative
systems. e CSF characterises creativity as a search in a conceptual space, according to a mu-
table set of rules. Treating creativity as a search is much the same as treating it as construction,
but implies that creativity takes place within deﬁned boundaries. Creativity is oen discussed
using the metaphor of exploration, around where boundaries are deﬁned and broken, and the
CSF allows us to talk about such behaviour within its well deﬁned terms.
As a comparative framework, the CSF is agnostic to issues of representation, and so may be
applied to both analogue and discrete conceptual representations. In taking the Gardenforsian
approach to conceptual representation (x2.2.5), we argue that creativity involves employing
visuospatial cognitive resources to navigate an analogue search space with geometric structure.
We will discuss creative processes of programming in terms of the mechanisms of the CSF later
in x6.5.
e subject of creativity within the computer arts ﬁeld is mired in confusion and miscon-
ception. e perennial question of authorship is always with us: if a computer program outputs
art, who has made it, the human or the machine? Positions on creativity through computer
programming tend towards opposite poles, with outright denials of creativity at one end and
outlandish claims of unbound creativity in generative art at the other. Here we look for clarity
through our anthropocentric view, with focus on programming as the key activity behind com-
puter art. We view the artist-programmer as engaged in inner human relationships between
perception, cognition and computation, and relate this to the notation and operation of their
algorithms, particularly in the context of live coding.
6.3 Creative Processes
Creative processes are rather more mysterious than computer processes, which we like to
think of as well deﬁned, predictable and subservient to human control. For artist-programmers
though, the computer process is a component of their creative process. What then is the rela-
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tionship between an artist, their creative process, their program, and their artistic works? We
will look for answers against the backgrounds of psychology, cognitive linguistics, computer
science and computational creativity, but ﬁrst from the perspective of an artist.
e painter Paul Klee describes a creative process as a feedback loop:
“Already at the very beginning of the productive act, shortly aer the initial
motion to create, occurs the ﬁrst counter motion, the initial movement of recep-
tivity. is means: the creator controls whether what he has produced so far is
good. e work as human action (genesis) is productive as well as receptive. It is
continuity.” (Klee, 1953, p. 33, original emphasis)
is is creativity without planning, a feedback loop of making a mark on canvas, perceiving
the eﬀect, and reacting with a further mark. Being engaged in a tight creative feedback loop
places the artist close to their work, guiding an idea to unforeseeable conclusion through a ﬂow
of creative perception and action. Klee writes as a painter, working directly with his medium.
Artist-programmers instead work using computer language as text representing their medium,
and it might seem that this extra level of abstraction could hinder creative feedback. Wewill see
however that this is not necessarily the case, beginning with the account of Turkle and Papert
(1992), describing a bricolage approach (aer Levi-Strauss, 1968) to programming by analogy
with painting:
e bricoleur resembles the painter who stands back between brushstrokes,
looks at the canvas, and only aer this contemplation, decides what to do next.
Bricoleurs use a mastery of associations and interactions. For planners, mistakes
are missteps; bricoleurs use a navigation of mid-course corrections. For planners,
a program is an instrument for premeditated control; bricoleurs have goals but set
out to realize them in the spirit of a collaborative venture with the machine. For
planners, geing a program to work is like “saying one’s piece”; for bricoleurs, it
is more like a conversation than a monologue.
(Turkle and Papert, 1990, p. 136)
Turkle and Papert describe the bricolage programmer as forming ideas while working in
the text editor, making edits in reaction to edits, rather than planning their work in advance.
is accords with Klee’s account, and may also be related to that of Reﬂective Practice from
professional studies (Schon, 1984). Reﬂective practice distinguishes the normal conception of
knowledge, as gained through study of theory, from that which is learnt, applied and reﬂected
upon while ‘in the work’. As such, practice is not ruled by theory, but embedded in activity.
Reﬂective practice has strong inﬂuences in professional training, particularly in the educational
and medical ﬁelds. is suggests that the present discussion could have relevance beyond our
focus on the arts.
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Although Turkle and Papert address gender issues in computer education, this quote should
not be misread as dividing all programmers into two types; while associating bricolage with
feminine and planning with male traits (although for critique of their method see Blackwell,
2006a), they are careful to state that these are extremes of a behavioural continuum. Indeed,
programming style is clearly task speciﬁc: for example a project requiring a large team needs
more planning than a short script wrien by the end user.
Bricolage programming is particularly applicable to our theme of the artist-programmer,
writing soware to work with media such as music and video animation. To ground the fol-
lowing discussion, we bring an image of a visual artist to mind, programming their work using
the Processing language environment (x5.2). Our artist begins with an urge to draw superim-
posed curved lines, having been inspired by something they saw from the train the previous
day. ey quickly come up with the following program, shown with its output below:
float rx() { return(random(width)); }
float ry() { return(random(height)); }
void draw() {
background(255);
for (int i = 0; i < 20; ++i) {
bezier(rx(), ry(), rx(), ry(),
rx(), ry(), rx(), ry());
}
}
On seeing the output of the ﬁrst run, our artist is immediately struck by how hairy it looks.
anks to arbitrary placement of the curves through use of pseudo-random numbers, each time
the artist runs the program it comes up with a diﬀerent form. Over a few runs, the artist notices
the occasional suggestion of a handwrien scribble. Intrigued, they change their program to
join the curves together, in order to remove the hairiness and accentuate the scribble:
void draw() {
background(255);
float x = rx(); float y = ry();
for (int i = 0; i < 5; ++i) {
float x1 = rx(); float y1 = ry();
bezier(x, y, rx(), ry(),
rx(), ry(), x1, y1);
x = x1; y = y1;
}
}
e end-points of the curves are still placed arbitrarily, but they now begin at the point
where the previous curve ended, resulting in a continuous line. Aer a few more runs, our
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artist begins to perceive a leer-like quality in the scribble. ey decide to try writing them
across the page, grouped into word-like forms:
float letterSpace = 30;
float rx() { return(random(letterSpace + 10)); }
float ry() { return(random(height - 10)); }
int rWordlen() { return(3 + int(random(4))); }
void draw() {
background(255);
int letters = (int) (width / letterSpace) - 4;
int wordLen = rWordlen();
int word = 0;
float x = rx(); float y = ry();
for (int letter = 0; letter < letters; ++letter) {
float ox = letter  letterSpace + word 
letterSpace;
if (wordLen-- == 0) {
wordLen = rWordlen();
word++;
}
for (int i = 0; i < 3; ++i) {
float x1 = rx() + ox; float y1 = ry();
bezier(x, y, rx() + ox, ry(),
rx() + ox, ry(), x1, y1);
x = x1; y = y1;
}
}
}
e output has a handwrien quality, appearing almost readable, a quality of ‘automatic
writing’ used by mystics to supposedly channel the spirit world. is may bring further con-
ceptual development to our artist’s mind, but at this point we will leave them pondering.
Our case study is somewhat simplistic, and is not intended to illustrate either great art or
great code. However it does trace a creative process of sorts, as carried out by the present
author. We are not suggesting that the algorithms themselves are creative, any more than we
would suggest that paint is creative. Multiple executions helped our artist perceive qualities
in the output, but it was the artist’s perception, and not the algorithm that discovered value.
It is clear that our programmer, like a painter, could not understand their code until they had
perceived its output, that the act of perception was itself creative, and that the concept they
were trying to encode was continually changing in response to their perception of the results.
We seek to understand this process in greater depth in the following sections.
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Figure 6.2: e process of action and reaction in bricolage programming
6.3.1 Creative Process of Bricolage
“e source of the exhilaration associated with computer programming is the
continual unfolding within the mind and on the computer of mechanisms ex-
pressed as programs and the explosion of perception they generate.” Alan Perlis
(foreword to Abelson and Sussman, 1996)
Figure 6.2 characterises bricolage programming as a creative feedback loop encompassing
the wrien algorithm, its interpretation, and the programmer’s perception and reaction to its
output or behaviour. Creative feedback loops are far from unique to programming, but the
addition of the algorithmic component makes an additional inner loop explicit between the
programmer and their text. At the beginning, the programmer may have a half-formed con-
cept, which only reaches internal consistency through the process of being expressed as an
algorithm. e inner loop is where the programmer elaborates upon their imagination of what
might be, and the outer where this trajectory is grounded in the pragmatics of what they have
actually made. rough this process both algorithm and concept are developed, until the pro-
grammer feels they accord with one another, or otherwise judges the creative process to be
ﬁnished.
e lack of forward planning in bricolage programming means the feedback loop in Figure
6.2 is self-guided, possibly leading the programmer away from their initial motivation. is
straying is likely, as the possibility for surprise is high, particularly when shiing from the
inner loop of implementation to the outer loop of perception. e output of a generative art
process is rarely exactly what we intended, and we will later argue in x6.5 that this possibility
of surprise is an important contribution to creativity.
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Representations in the computer and the mind are evidently distinct from one another.
Computer output evokes perception, but that percept will both exclude features that are ex-
plicit in the output and include features that are not, due to a range of eﬀects including aen-
tion, knowledge and illusion. Equally, a human concept is distinct from a computer algorithm.
Perhaps a programwrien in a declarative rather than imperative style is somewhat closer to a
concept (x4.3). But still, there is a clear line to be drawn between a string of discrete symbols in
code, and the morass of both discrete and continuous representations which underlie cognition
(x2.2).
ere is something curious about how the programmer’s creative process spawns a sec-
ond, computational process. In an apparent trade-oﬀ, the computational process is lacking in
the broad cognitive abilities of its author, but is nonetheless both faster and more accurate at
certain tasks by several orders of magnitude. It would seem that the programmer uses the pro-
gramming language and its interpreter as a cognitive resource, augmenting their own abilities
in line with the extended mind hypothesis (Clark, 2008).
6.4 Symbols and Space
We have seen argued throughout this thesis that human conceptual representation centres
around perception. Algorithms on the other hand are represented in discrete symbolic se-
quences, as is their output, which must go through some form of digital-to-analogue conver-
sion before being presented to our sensory apparatus, for example as light from a monitor
screen or sound pressure waves from speakers, triggering a process we call observation. Recall
the artist-programmer from our case study (x6.3), who saw something not represented in the
algorithm or even in its output, but only in their own perception of the output; observation is
itself a creative act.
e remaining component to be dealt with from Figure 6.2 is that of programmers’ concepts
(x2.2.5). Figure 6.2 shows concepts mediating between spatial perception and discrete algo-
rithms, leading us to ask; are concepts represented more like spatial geometry, like percepts, or
symbolic language, like algorithms? Our focus on metaphor leads us to take the former view,
that conceptual representation is grounded in perception and the body. is view is taken from
Conceptual Metaphor eory (x2.2.6), in particular that concepts are primarily structured by
metaphorical relations, the majority of which are orientational, understood relative to the hu-
man body in space or time. In other words, the conceptual system is grounded in the perceptual
system.
Gardenforsian conceptual spaces (x2.2.5) are compelling when applied to concepts related
123
C 6: C
to bodily perception, emotion andmovement. However, it is diﬃcult to imagine taking a similar
approach to computer programs. What would the quality dimensions of a geometrical space
containing all computer programs be? ere is no place to begin to answer this question;
computer programs are linguistic in nature, and cannot be coherently mapped to a geometrical
space grounded in perception. Again we return to the point that spatial representation is not
in opposition to linguistic representation; they are distinct but support one another. is is
clear in computing, hardware exists in our world of continuous space, but thanks to reliable
electronics, conjures up a linguistic world of discrete computation. Ourminds are able to do the
same, for example by computing calculations in our head, or encoding concepts into phonetic
movements of the vocal tract or alphabetic symbols on the page. We can think of ourselves as
spatial beings able to simulate a linguistic environment to conduct abstract thought and open
channels of communication. On the other hand, a piece of computer soware is a linguistic
being able to simulate spatial environments, perhaps to create a game world or guide robotic
movements, both of which may include some kind of model of human perception.
6.5 Components of creativity
We now have grounds to characterise how the creative process operates in bricolage program-
ming. For this we employ the Creative Systems Framework (CSF; x6.2), introducing its terms
as we go.
Within the CSF, a creative search has three key aspects: the conceptual sear space it-
self, traversal of the space and evaluation of concepts found in the space. In other words,
creativity requires somewhere to search, a manner of searching, and a means to judge what
is found. However, creative behaviour may make use of introspection, self-modiﬁcation and
need boundaries to be broken. at is, the constraints of search space, traversal and evaluation
are not ﬁxed, but are examined, challenged and modiﬁed by the creative agent following (and
deﬁned by) them. e CSF characterises particular kinds of aberration from a conceptual space,
and approaches to addressing them.
Using the terminology of Gardenfors (2000), the search spaces of the CSF are themselves
concepts, deﬁning regions in a universal space deﬁned by quality dimensions. Transforma-
tional creativity then is a geometrical transformation of these regions, motivated by a process
of searching through and beyond them. is means that a creative agent may creatively push
beyond the boundaries of the search as we will see. While acknowledging that creative search
may operate over linguistic search spaces, we focus on geometric spaces grounded in percep-
tion. is follows our focus on artistic bricolage described in x6.3, but for an approach unifying
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linguistic and geometric spaces see Forth et al. (2010).
We may now clarify the bricolage programming process introduced in x6.3.1 within the
CSF. As shown in Figure 6.3, the search space deﬁnes the programmer’s concept, being their
current artistic focus structured by learnt techniques and conventions. e traversal strategy is
the process of aempting to generate part of the concept by encoding it as an algorithm, which
is then interpreted by the computer. Finally, evaluation is a perceptual process in reaction to
the output.
Algorithm
Interpret
Percept
Elaborate
EncodeConcept
Observe
React
Output
Evaluation Traversal
Searspace
Figure 6.3: e process of action and reaction in bricolage programming from Figure 6.2, showing the three
components of the Creative Systems Framework, namely sear space, traversal strategy and evaluation.
In x6.3, we alluded to the extended mind hypothesis (Clark, 2008), claiming that bricolage
programming takes part of the human creative process outside of the mind and into the com-
puter. e above makes clear what we claim is being externalised: part of the traversal strat-
egy. e programmer’s concept motivates a development of the traversal strategy, encoded
as a computer program, but the programmer does not necessarily have the cognitive ability
to fully evaluate it. at task is taken on by the interpreter running on a computer system,
meaning that traversal encompasses both encoding by the human and interpretation by the
computer.
e traversal strategy is structured by the techniques and conventions employed to convert
concepts into operational algorithms. ese may include design paerns, a standardised set
of ways of building that have become established around imperative programming languages.
Each design paern identiﬁes a kind of problem, and describes a generalised structure towards
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a solution.1
e creative process is constrained by the programmer’s concept of what is a valid end
result. is is shaped by the programmer’s current artistic focus, being the perceptual qualities
they are currently interested in, perhaps congruent with a cultural theme such as a musical
genre or artistic movement. Artists oen speak of self-imposed constraints as providing cre-
atively fertile ground. In terms of a creative search such constraints form the boundary of a
search space. It is possible for a search to traverse beyond that boundary, thus ﬁnding invalid
concept instances, a scenario called aberration (Wiggins, 2006a, x5.2.2). In such instances trans-
formational creativity can be triggered. For example, if an invalid yet (according to evaluation
rules) valued instance is found, then the concept should be enlarged to include the instance.
An invalid concept instance which is not valued indicates that our traversal strategy is ﬂawed
and should be modiﬁed to avoid such instances in the future. A single traversal operation may
result in both valid and invalid instances being found, indicating that both the traversal rules
and the deﬁnition of the concept should be modiﬁed.
e artist in our earlier case study was working within the concept of bezier curves, but
when curve endpoints happened to join, they perceived some things outside that concept – a
squiggle and some hair. ey made a value judgement, and decided to change their concept
in response, which we consider as a case of transformational creativity. ey then made edits
to their source code (the traversal strategy), in order to try to generate output which evoked
perceptual experiences closer to their concept. is may seem a minor case of transformational
creativity, but indeed we contend that much creativity is quite ordinary human behaviour;
humans apply creativity at all levels of life.
Our case study shows where a programmer may set themselves up for being surprised by
the results. is is not only due to the use of pseudo-random numbers, aer all noise is rarely
a source of surprise; in information theoretic terms noise has maximal information content,
but in practice the lack of form quickly results in fatigue or aention shi. It is rather due
to the linguistic abstraction of an idea that consists of fragments of perceptual symbols. In
other words, because the traversal strategy of a programmer includes external notation and
computation, they are likely to be less successful in writing soware that meets their precon-
ceptions, or in other words more successful in being surprised by the results. A creative process
that includes external computation will follow a less predictable path as a result. Nonetheless
the process as a whole has the focus of a concept, and is guided by value in relation to a rich
perceptual framework, and so while unpredictable, this inﬂuence is far from random, being
meaningful interplay between language and perceptual experience. e human concepts and
1is structural heuristic approach to problem solving is inspired bywork in the ﬁeld of urban design (Alexander
et al., 1977).
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algorithm are continually transformed in respect to one another, and to perceptual aﬀect, in
creative feedback.
According to our embodied view, not only is perception crucial in evaluating output within
bricolage programming, but also in structuring the space inwhich programs are conceptualised.
Indeed if the embodied view of conceptual metaphor theory (x2.2.6) holds in general, the same
would apply to all creative endeavour. From this we ﬁnd a message for the ﬁeld of compu-
tational creativity: a prerequisite for an artiﬁcial creative agent is in acquiring computational
models of perception suﬃcient to both evaluate its own works and structure its conceptual sys-
tem. Only then will the agent have a basis for guiding changes to its own conceptual system
and generative traversal strategy, able to modify itself to ﬁnd artefacts that it was not pro-
grammed to ﬁnd, and place value judgements on them. Such an agent would need to adapt to
human culture in order to interact with shiing cultural norms, keeping its conceptual system
and resultant creative process coherent within that culture. For now however this is wishful
thinking, and we must accept generative computer programs which extend human creativity,
but are not creative agents in their own right.
6.6 Programming in Time
“She is not manipulating the machine by turning knobs or pressing buons.
She is writing messages to it by spelling out instructions leer by leer. Her
painfully slow typing seems laborious to adults, but she carries on with an ab-
sorption that makes it clear that time has lost its meaning for her.” Sherry Turkle
(2005, p. 92), on Robin, aged 4, programming a computer.
Having investigated the representation and operation of bricolage programming we now
examine how the creative process operates in time. Dijkstra might argue that considering com-
puter programs as operating in time at all, rather than as entirely abstract logic, is itself a form
of the anthropomorphism examined in x2.3. However from the above quotation it seems that
Robin stepped out of any notion of physical time, and into the algorithm she was composing,
entering a timeless state. is could be a state of optimum experience, the ﬂow investigated
by Csikszentmihalyi where “duration of time is altered; hours pass by in minutes, and minutes
can stretch out to seem like hours” (Csikszentmihalyi, 2008, p. 49). Perhaps in this state a pro-
grammer is thinking in algorithmic time, aending to control ﬂow as it replays over and over
in their imagination, and not to the world around them. Or perhaps they are not aending
to the passage of time at all, thinking entirely of abstract logic, in a timeless state of building.
In either case, it would seem that the human is entering time relationships of their soware,
rather than the opposite, anthropocentric direction of soware entering human time. While
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programmers can appear detached from physical time, there are ways in which the time-lines
of program development and operation may be united, as we saw in our discussion of notation
in time (x5.2).
Temporal relationships are generally not represented in source code. When a programmer
needs to do so, for example as an experimental psychologist requiring accurate time mea-
surements, or a musician needing accurate synchronisation between processes, they run into
problems of accuracy and latency. With the wide proliferation of interacting embedded sys-
tems, this is becoming a broad concern (Lee, 2009). In commodity systems time has been de-
centralised, abstracted away through layers of caching, where exact temporal dependencies
and intervals between events are not deemed worthy of general interest. Programmers talk
of “processing cycles” as a valuable resource which their processes should conserve, but they
generally no longer have programmatic access to the high frequency oscillations of the central
processing units (now, frequently plural) in their computer. e allocation of time to processes
is organised top-down by an overseeing scheduler, and programmers must work to achieve
what timing guarantees are available. All is not lost however, realtime kernels are now avail-
able for commodity systems, allowing psychologists (Finney, 2001) and musicians (e.g. via
http://jackaudio.org/) to get closer to ‘physical’ time. Further, the representation of time
semantics in programming is undergoing active research in a sub-ﬁeld of computer science
known as reactive programming (Ellio, 2009), ideas from which have inspired representation
of time in the Tidal language (x4.5).
6.7 Embodied programmers
What we have seen provides strong motivation for addressing the particular needs of artist-
programmers. ese include concerns of workﬂow, where elapsed time between source code
edits and program output slows the creative process. Concerns of programming environment
are also important, which should be optimised for the presentation of shorter programs in their
entirety to support bricolage programming, rather than hierarchical views of larger codebases.
Perhaps most importantly, we have seen motivation for the development of new programming
languages, pushing the boundaries to greater support artistic expression.
From the embodied view we have taken, it would seem useful to integrate time and space
further into programming languages. In practice integrating time can mean on one hand in-
cluding temporal representations in core language semantics, and on the other uniting devel-
opment time with execution time, as we have seen with interactive programming. Temporal
semantics and live coding both already feature strongly in some programming languages for
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the arts, as we saw in x6.6, but how about analogous developments in integrating geometric
relationships into the semantics and activity of programming? It would seem the approaches
shown in Nodal, the ReacTable and Texture described in chapter 5 are showing theway towards
greater integration of computational geometry and perceptual models into programming lan-
guage. is is already serving artists well, and provides new ground for visual programming
language research to explore.
Earlier we quoted Paul Klee (x6.3), a painter whose production was limited by his two
hands. e artist-programmer has diﬀerent limitations, but shares what Klee called his limita-
tion of reception, by the “limitations of the perceiving eye”. is is perhaps a limitation to be
expanded but not overcome, rather celebrated and fully explored using all we have, including
our new computer languages. We have characterised a bricolage approach to artistic program-
ming as an embodied, creative feedback loop. is places the programmer close to their work,
grounding discrete computation in orientational and temporal metaphors of their human ex-
perience. However the computer interpreter extends the programmer’s abilities beyond their
own imagination, making unexpected results likely, leading the programmer to new creative
possibilities.
6.8 Live Coding in Practice
Two live coding systems have been introduced in this thesis, the Tidal paern DSL (x4.5) and
the related visual language Texture (x5.6). We have discussed technical aspects of live coding in
the process, but until now have not discussed the creative practice of live coding. e term live
coding emerged around 2003, to describe the activity of group of practitioners and researchers
who had begun developing new approaches to making computer music and video animation
(Collins et al., 2003; Ward et al., 2004; Blackwell and Collins, 2005; Rohrhuber et al., 2005). It
is deﬁned by Ward et al. (2004) as “the activity of writing a computer program while it runs”,
where changes to the source code are enacted by the running process without breaks in musical
or visual output. e archetypal live coding performance involves programmers writing code
on stage, with their screens projected for an audience, their code dynamically interpreted to
generate music or video.
Closely related terms are interactive, on-the-ﬂy (Wang and Cook, 2004), conversational
(Kupka and Wilsing, 1980), just-in-time (Rohrhuber et al., 2005) and with-time (Sorensen and
Gardner, 2010) programming. Many of these terms are interchangeable, although there are dif-
ferences of technique and emphasis, for example live coding is most oen used in the context
of improvised performance of music or video animation. is context of improvised computer
129
C 6: C
music is adopted here, and although much of the following could be related to work in live
video animation, focus on computer music is kept for brevity.
In live coding the performance is the process of soware development, rather than its out-
come. ework is not generated by a ﬁnished program, but through its journey of development
from nothing to a complex algorithm, generating continuously changingmusical or visual form
along theway. is is by contrast to generative art, popularised by the generativemusic of Brian
Eno (1996). Generative art may be understood by a gardening analogy, where processes are
composed as ‘seeds’, planted in a computer and le to ‘grow’. e random number generators
oen used to provide variation in generative processes have led to their being likened to the
construction of wind chimes, in that they are structures that are ‘played’ by sources of noise.
Like wind chimes, while generative art may constantly vary, generative systems which pro-
duce qualitative changes are rare. Output more or less follows the same style, with only a few
permutations giving an idea of the qualities of the piece. is is well illustrated by our case
study of an artist-programmer (x6.3), who ran their program a few times not to produce new
works, but to get diﬀerent perspectives on the same work.
With live coding, hands-on human involvement is essential to the development of a piece.
Metaphorically speaking, rather than sowing seeds, live coders metaphorically construct plants
from scratch by splicing diﬀerent plants together, modifying their DNA while they grow, and
experimenting with diﬀerent ways of destroying them for artistic eﬀect. With generative art,
onlookers are oen le to question whether the programmer or computer is the creative agent
in the artistic process. However with live coding there is no question, the programmer very
visibly provides all the rules, the human act of programming providing all creative impetus,
and the computer process extending the human range of exploration.
Live coding allows a programmer to examine an algorithm while it is interpreted, taking
on live changes without restarts. is unites the time ﬂow of a program with that of its de-
velopment, using dynamic interpretation or compilation. Using techniques outlined in (x5.2),
live coding makes a dynamic creative process of test-while-implement possible, rather than the
conventional implement-compile-test cycle. e creative processes shown in Figures 6.2 and
6.3 still apply, but are freed from the constraints of time, with the arrows now representing
concurrent inﬂuences between components rather than time-ordered steps.
Live coding not only provides an eﬃcient creative feedback loop, but also allows a pro-
grammer to connect soware development with time based art. is is bricolage programming
(x6.3.1) taken to a logical and artistic conclusion, particularly with archetypal ‘blank slate’ live
coding. Here risk is embraced and pre-planning eschewed, the aim being to design a program
‘in the moment’ where it is implemented and executed in the expectant atmosphere created by
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an audience.
e primary research focus around live coding practice has been upon the integration of
performance time with development time, for example in the live coding papers already cited.
is is important work, as human perception of the progression of time during the evaluation
of an algorithm has oen been deliberately ignored in computer science (x6.6). is line of
research is certainly not complete, but there are now several working approaches to improvis-
ing music through live code development. Some research emphasis has therefore moved from
time to space, that is, to the consideration of visuospatial perception within the activity and
spectacle of live coding performance.
6.8.1 “Obscurantism is dangerous. Show us your screens.”
e present section title is taken from the manifesto draed by the Temporary Organisation for
the Promotion of Live Algorithm Programming (TOPLAP; Ward et al., 2004), a group set up by
live coders to discuss and promote live coding. It neatly encapsulates a problem at the heart of
live coding; live coders wish to show their interfaces so that the audience can see the movement
and structure behind their music, however in positioning themselves against the computer
music tradition of hiding behind laptop screens (Collins, 2003), they are at risk of a charge of
greater obscurantism. Most people do not know how to program computers, and many who
do will not know the particular language in use by a live coder. So, by projecting screens, do
audience members feel included by a gesture of openness, or excluded by a gibberish of code
in an obscure language? Do live coding performances foster melding of thoughts between
performer and audience, or do they cause audience members to feel stupid? Audiences have
not yet been formally surveyed on this issue, but anecdotal experience suggests both reactions
are possible. A non-programmer interviewee in a BBC news item (“Programming, meet music”,
28th August 2009) reported ignoring projected screens and just listening to the music, and less
ambiguous negative reactions have been rumoured. On the other hand, a popular live coding
tale has it that aer enjoying a live coding performance by Dave Griﬃths in Brussels (FoAM
studios, 17th December 2005), a non-programmer turned to their lover and was overheard to
exclaim “Now I understand! Now I understand why you spend so much time programming.”
Partly in reaction to the issue of inclusion, a new direction of research into visual program-
ming has emerged from live coding practice, evident in the systems reviewed and introduced
in the previous chapter. e challenge is to ﬁnd new ways of notating programs suitable not
only for containing the expressions of a well-practiced live coder, but for doing so in a way
meaningful to an audience.
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6.8.2 Cognitive Dimensions of Live Coding
Blackwell and Collins (2005) have examined live coding with respect to the Cognitive Dimen-
sions of Notation (CDN), using it to compare the ChucK language for programming on-the-ﬂy
computer music (Wang and Cook, 2004) with the commercial Ableton Live production so-
ware. ChucK, and by implication live coding in general, does not come oﬀ particularly well.
It has low on the dimensions of visibility, closeness of mapping and role-expressiveness, is
error-prone and requires hard mental operations in part to deal with its high level of ab-
straction. It would seem that the progressive evaluation and representational abstraction
oﬀered by ChucK come at a cost. Nonetheless, these are costs that many are willing to over-
come through rigorous practice regimes reminiscent of instrumental virtuosos (Collins, 2007).
ey are willing to do so because abstraction, while taking the improviser away from the direct
manipulation that instrumentalists enjoy, allows them to focus on the compositional structure
behind the piece. Being able to improvise music by manipulating compositional structure in
theoretically unbound ways is too aractive a prospect for some to ignore.
Established norms place the live coder in a stage area separate from their audience mem-
bers2, who depending on the situation, may listen and watch passively or interact enthusiasti-
cally, perhaps by dancing, shouting or screaming. We therefore have two groups to consider,
the performers needing towork ‘in themoment’ without technical interruptions thatmay break
creative ﬂow (Csikszentmihalyi, 2008), and the audience members needing to feel included in
the event, while engaged in their own creative process of musical interpretation (x4.4). ere
is a challenge then in reconsidering live coding interfaces, creating new languages positioned
at a place within the CDN well suited for a broader base of musicians and audiences who may
wish to engage with them. e question is not just how musicians can adapt to programming
environments, but also the inverse; how may programming environments, oen designed to
meet the needs of business and military institutions, be rethought to meet the particular needs
of artists? First, we should consider what those needs might be.
An interesting cognitive dimension with respect to live coding is error-proneness. ere
are diﬀerent ﬂavours of error, some of which are much celebrated in electronic music, for
example the glit genre grew from an interest in mistakes and broken equipment (Cascone,
2000). In improvisation, an unanticipated outcome can provide a creative spark that leads a
performance in a new direction. We would classify such desirable events as semantic errors,
in contrast with syntactic errors which lead to crashes and hasty bug-ﬁxing.
In terms of the CDN, bricolage programming requires high visibility of components, in
2Performance norms are of course extensively challenged both inside (Rohrhuber et al., 2007) and outside (Small,
1998) live coding practice.
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particular favouring shorter programs that ﬁt on a single screen, and avoiding unnecessary
abstraction. Here is a conﬂict – as noted above abstraction sets live coding apart from other
approaches to improvisation in computer music, but also acts as an obstacle to bricolage pro-
gramming. We are pulled in diﬀerent directions, and so look for the happiest medium, a com-
mon result from taking a CDN perspective. Some programmers, known in some quarters as
architecture astronauts, enjoy introducing many layers of abstraction that only serve to ob-
fuscate (Spolsky, 2004). Bricolage programmers are the opposite in wanting to be as close to
their work as possible. is is not however a case of removing all abstraction, but ﬁnding the
right abstraction for the work. Programming aer all is an activity that takes place somewhere
between electric transistors and lambda calculus – the trick is ﬁnding the right level of abstrac-
tion for the problem domain (x4.3). Accordingly a computer musician may ﬁnd having to deal
with individual notes a distraction, and that a layer of abstraction above them provides the
creative surface where they can feel closest to their composition.
6.9 Live coders on computational creativity
Creativity is oen touched upon in the study of music, but rarely approached in detail. Mu-
sicians may worry that analysing their creative processes may somehow spoil them, as if self
reﬂection can be destructive if approached in too formal a manner. e many points of view
as to the nature of creativity, with common disagreement, may lead a scholar to lose interest
and look for a beer deﬁned ﬁeld of research. However such an important subject deserves
aention, and light is being thrown by work within sub-ﬁelds of philosophy, psychology and
artiﬁcial intelligence, which each contribute to form the cross-disciplinary ﬁeld of computa-
tional creativity.
A survey was carried out with the broad aim of gathering ideas for study of computational
creativity from a live coding perspective. An on-line discussion group for live coders hosted
by the Temporary Organisation for the Promotion of Live Algorithm Programming (TOPLAP;
Ward et al., 2004) was asked to ﬁll out an on-line survey. To encourage honest responses the
survey was anonymous, and demographic information was not collected. Discussion of cre-
ativity can revolve around ill-deﬁned terms and invite prejudice. For this reason, the word
‘creativity’ was not used in the invitation or survey text, and questions addressing issues of
creativity were mixed with general questions about live coding. A total of 32 completed the
survey (although not all answered every question), and 30 of whom indicated at the end that
they were happy for their answers to be published under a creative commons aribution li-
cense. e survey and responses were in English as the language used by the discussion group,
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although for several this was a second language.
6.9.1 e subjects
e respondents were a broad cross-section of live coders, with users of the six pre-eminent
live coding environments represented, between ﬁve and fourteen for each system (many had
used more than one). A large proportion (22/32) had used one of the listed classes of traditional
musical instruments, with comments suggesting a higher percentage would have resulted if
electronic instruments were included. From this we can assume a group with a generally rich
musical background. Relatedly, almost all (30/32) of subjects live coded music, whereas only a
small proportion (6/32) live coded video animation; live coding would appear to currently be a
music led culture. ere were a diverse range of approaches to the question of how to deﬁne
live coding in one sentence, the results are rather unquantiﬁable but the reader is referred to
Appendix A.1 to enjoy the responses. While the responses show some diversity of approach
to live coding, because the subjects had all used at least one of the main languages it is safe to
assume that they are working to largely the same technical deﬁnition.
6.9.2 Creating language
Computer users oen discuss and understand computer programs as tools, helping them do
what they need eﬃciently and without geing in the way. For a programmer it would instead
seem that a computer language is an immersive environment to create work in. Indeed a suite
of source code editing soware is collectively known as an Interactive Development Environ-
ment (IDE). It is interesting then to consider to what extent live coders adapt their computer
languages, personalising their environments, perhaps in order to aid creativity. Over two thirds
(21/32) collected functions into a library or made an extensive suite of libraries. is is analo-
gous to adding words to a language, and shows the extent of language customisation. A smaller
proportion (6/32) had gone further to implement their own language interpreter and smaller
number still (5/32) had designed their own language. at these artists are so engaged with
making fundamental changes to the language in which they express their work is impressive.
6.9.3 Code and style
From the perspective of computational creativity, it is interesting to examine the relationship
that live coders have with their code. An aempt at quantifying this was made by asking,
“When you have ﬁnished live coding something you particularly like, how do you feel towards
the code you have made (as opposed to the end result)?” Over half (17/32) indicated that code
resulting from a successful live coding session was a description of some aspect of their style.
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is suggests that many feel they are not encoding a particular piece, but how to make pieces in
their own particular manner. Around the same number (15/32) agreed that the code describes
something they would probably do again, which is perhaps a rephrasing of the same question.
A large number, (24/32) answered yes to either or both questions. ere are many ways in
which these questions can be interpreted, but overall this suggests that many subjects feel they
have a stylistic approach to live coding that persists across live coding sessions, and that this
style is somehow represented in the code they make.
6.9.4 Live coding as a novel approa
e subjects were asked the open question “What is the diﬀerence between live coding a piece
of music and composing it in the sequencer (live coding an animation and drawing one)? In
other words, how does live coding aﬀect the way you produce your work, and how does it aﬀect
the end result?” e answers are diﬃcult to summarise, and so again the reader is directed to
Appendix A.2 to read the full responses. Some interesting points relevant to computational
creativity are selectively quoted for comment here.
“I have all but [abandoned] live coding as a regular performance practice, but
I use the skills and conﬁdence acquired to modify my soware live if I get a new
idea while on stage.”
is admission, that geing new ideas on stage is infrequent, makes an important as well
as humble point. In terms of the Creative Systems Framework, we can say that live coding
is useful in performance if you need to modify your conceptual space (the kind of work you
want to make), or your traversal strategy (the way you try to search for or make it). If you are
content with having both ﬁxed in advance, then live coding is not warranted. In other words,
live coding is useful for invoking transformational creativity, although as with this test subject,
transformational creativity is not always desirable in front of a paying, risk-averse audience.
“When I work on writing a piece … I can perfect each sound to be precisely as
I intend it to be, whereas [when] live coding I have to be more generalised as to
my intentions.”
is respondent is making the point that live coders work at least one level of abstraction
away from enacting individual sounds.
“Perhaps most importantly the higher pace of livecoding leads to more impul-
sive choices which keeps things more interesting to create. Not sure how oen
that also creates a more interesting end result but at least sometimes it does.”
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is is interesting with reference to the creative feedback loop of bricolage programming
(x6.3.1). Live coding allows a change in code to be heard or seen immediately in the output,
with no forced break between action and reception. is is in stark contrast to those whose
experience of soware development as slow and arduous.
“Live coding has far less perfection and the product is more immediate. It
allows for improvisation and spontaneity and discourages over-thinking.”
is come as a surprise, as live coding has a reputation for being cerebral and over technical.
In reality, at least when compared to other soware based approaches, the immediacy of results
fosters spontaneous thought.
“Live coding is riskier, and one has to live with [unﬁt decisions]. You can’t just
go one step back unless you do it with a nice pirouee. erefore the end result is
not as clean as an ”oﬄine-composition”, but it can lead you to places you [usually]
never would have ended.”
is comment is particularly incisive; the peculiar relationship that live coders have with
time does indeed give a certain element of risk. Riskier ways of making music are more likely
to produce aberrant output, not of the type you were looking for. However, where such out-
put turns out to be valuable, then you have the opportunity to redeﬁne what you are looking
for, transforming your conceptual space. If the output turns out to be poor, then you can at
least change the way you work to avoid similarly poor output in the future; mechanisms of
transformational creativity.
“… while live coding is a performance practice, it also oﬀers the tantalising
prospect of manipulating musical structure at a similar abstract level as ‘deferred
time’ composition. To do this eﬀectively in performance is I think an entirely dif-
ferent skill to the standard ‘one-acoustic-event-per-action’ physical instrumental
performance, but also quite diﬀerent to compositional methods which typically
allow for rework.”
is really gets to the nub of what live coding brings to the improvising artist – an altered
perspective of time, where a single edit can aﬀect all the events which follow it.
6.9.5 Computational creativity
In using programming languages to make music, live coders have a unique perspective on the
question of computational creativity. It is interesting then to measure the extent of optimism
for computers taking a greater role in the creative process than they already do. Towards this
the subjects were given a series of statements and asked to guess when each would become
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true, with the pertinent results in Figure 6.4. Regreably there was a conﬁguration error early
on in the surveyed period, requiring the answers of two subjects to be discarded.
Optimism for the statement “Live coding environments will include features designed to give
artistic inspiration to live coders” was very high, with just over half (14/27) claiming that was
already true, and almost all (25/27) agreeing it would become true within ﬁve years. is in-
dicates strong support for a weak form of computational creativity as a creative aid for live
coders.
Somewhat surprisingly, optimism for the stronger form of creativity suggested by “Live
code will be able to modify itself in an artistically valued manner” was also high, with two ﬁhs
(11/28) claiming that was already possible. If that is the case, it would be appreciated if the
live code in question could make itself known. Perhaps they are referring to feedba.pl, a live
coding editor for the Perl programming language. is editor does indeed allow self-modifying
code, but we are some way oﬀ from seeing an artistic computational agent emerge from it.
More pessimism is seen in response to “A computer agent will be developed that produces a
live coding performance indistinguishable from that of a human live coder”, with a third (9/27)
saying that this will never happen. is question is posed in reference to the imitation game
detailed by Turing (1950), however our version involving musical rather than language based
imitation seems rather easier to fulﬁl. As one subject commented, “the test indistinguishable
from a human is very loose and there can be some very bad human live coding music.” at
would perhaps explain why half (13/27) of respondents thought the statement was either al-
ready true or would become so within ﬁve years.
6.9.6 Discussion
What if a computational approach to the musicology of live coding were to develop, where re-
searchers deconstruct the code behind live coding improvisations as part of their work? Corre-
lations between expressions in formal languages and musical form in sound could be identiﬁed,
and the development of newways of expressing newmusical forms could be tracked. If success-
ful, the result need not be a new kind of music, but could be music understood in a novel way.
Perhaps this new computational approach to understanding music that could prove invaluable
in the search for a musically creative soware agent.
In looking at creativity through the eyes of live coders, we can see some promise for com-
putational creativity even at this early stage of development of both ﬁelds. Live coders feel
their musical style is encoded in the code they write, and that their language interfaces pro-
vide them with inspiration. ey are actively developing computer languages to beer express
the music they want to make, creating computer language environments that foster creativity.
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Figure 6.4: Responses to statements s4: “Live coding environments will include features designed to give
artistic inspiration to live coders”, s5: “Live code will be able tomodify itself in an artistically valuedmanner”
and s7 “A computer agent will be developed that produces a live coding performance indistinguishable from
that of a human live coder.”
From here it is easy to imagine that live coding environments could become more involved in
the creation of higher order conceptual representations of time-based art that live coders are
concerned with. Perhaps this will provide the language, environment and application in which
the creative processes of a computational agent will one day thrive.
6.10 Slub
e band Slub begun in the year 2000, as a collaboration between Adrian Ward (http:
//www.adeward.com/) and the present author. ey both shared a desire to make music and
enthusiasm for programming, and resolved to combine them.
So if you’ve got programming skills and enjoy making music, it makes sense
to combine them - just like combining poery and integral mathematics can be
stimulating. (Adrian Ward in interview with Shulgin, 2003)
Slub established a clear aim early on, to make people dance to their algorithms. ey ﬁrst
met this aim in the Paradiso club during the 2001 Sonic Acts festival in Amsterdam, the ﬁrst of
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many appearances at major European festivals.
Figure 6.5: A screenshot showing a typical performance desktop used by the present author circa 2003.
An early Slub system is described in detail by Collins et al. (2003). In brief it featured a
synthesiser and early live coding system wrien by Ward, and a number of beat and bass-
line generating programs wrien by McLean. Although their primary aim was musical, Slub
enjoyed being faced with the challenge of being accepted as programmers who make music.
To this end they began projecting their screens, confronting audiences with the conceptual
overlap between their hand-craed soware and the music they produced using it.
is whole network of soware was wrien by slub to fulﬁl their individual
needs, forming an environment ideal to their methods of working. is brings
us to an important point – that the code is not just running in the computer. To
explain; when programmers are watching a computer execute their own programs,
the code is also executing in their minds. ey have intimate knowledge of the
process, and so can imagine it running. In this way, the code is alive in slub and
in their computers, and hopefully also in their sound and the audience too. e
music is also alive in these four places. As far as slub are concerned, code is music.
(Collins et al., 2003, pp. 323–324)
Slub were not just challenging their audiences, but also the use of computers in the arts
in general. Ward was instrumental in challenging the concept of soware as a passive ‘tool’
with his soware Auto-Illustrator (Ward et al., 2002). By drawing a satire on the widely used
Adobe Illustrator soware, Auto-Illustrator confounded expectations, making it diﬃcult to for
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example draw a straight line. is brought aention to the aesthetic decisions built into all
soware, leading the Transmediale Soware Art jury to award it ﬁrst prize in 2001. is point
was further explored by McLean with forkbomb.pl, a simple program which produced paerns
while pushing a computer system to its limits; in eﬀect visualising low-level interactions com-
posed by human system programmers. is work was also awarded the Transmediale Soware
Art award, and both artworks were exhibited in the touring 2002/2003 Generator group show
alongside works by Sol Lewi and Yoko Ono.3
Following the formation of TOPLAP, Ward focused on live coding (creating Pure Events,
based on the Traer paradigm; Nash and Blackwell, 2011), and McLean created his own live
coding environment, the feedba.pl editor (McLean, 2004) for self-modifying code (x5.2). From
then on, Slub performed only using live coding interfaces. Having developed his own live
coding practice in parallel, Dave Griﬃths (http://pawfal.org/dave/) joined Slub follow-
ing a key joint performance at Sonar festival in 2005. Dave took the Slub aesthetic in a new,
audio/visual direction, by developing game-like live coding environments for music (McLean
et al., 2010).
6.10.1 Reﬂections following a Slub performance
Slub performed at the Maison Rouge, Paris on the 30th September 2011, invited by the Sony
Computer Laboratory in Paris as part of their 15th anniversary celebrations. Desk recordings of
the performance are included on the enclosed DVD, which includes a mix of all three perform-
ers, and separate recordings of each performer. e present author interviewed Griﬃths and
Ward in the days following the performance, to reﬂect upon the performance and the journey
that Slub had taken to their current practice.
Dave Griﬃths (DG): [Live coding] seems to deﬁne us at the moment, although
it wasn’t always that way. I think perhaps it will grow less important with time.
e code we base performances on seems very unstable in that it’s constantly be-
ing rewrien in diﬀerent languages, we individually switch between visual and
text based programming and back again - lots of lile experiments. Despite this
the music seems to grow in a independent manner, we somehow retain the knowl-
edge of where we are going during a live performance and what we are doing as
performers.
ere are two strands of development then, musical and technological. But in Slub perfor-
mances the code is displayed, and the two strands are intertwined. How important is this?
AdrianWard (AW): It’s important to display our screens. But I’m not convinced
projections are the best way to do this as they come with quite a bit of baggage –
3http://www.generative.net/generator/
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(a) Tidal (x4.5)
(b) Texture (x5.6)
Figure 6.6: Slub at the Maison Rouge, Paris, 2011. Dave Griﬃths and his SemeBris (McLean et al.,
2010) interface are on house le, Adrian Ward and his Pure Events soware are shown house right. e
present author’s screen is displayed in the centre, using soware named in the above captions.
they’re too passive, they reinforce the author/audience hierarchy, they’re boring.
However, technical and practical means make anything else unfeasible.
DG: For me the projection is more important than the sound. e passivity is
a problem, my favourite gigs are when people come up and me what I’m doing. I
like the breakdown of the hierarchy very much, and make a point to explain and
talk to them.
e role that projections play in live coding is problematic (x6.8.1), reﬂected here in Ward’s
unease, indicating that it is important to show screens, but that in doing so deep issues are
unearthed. In stark contrast Griﬃths, who has a background in ﬁne art and computer games
research, sees the projection of code as more important than the sound. is is a surprising
statement, but when asked to expand upon his point, Griﬃths showed fundamental agreement
with Ward; what is of prime importance is not the projection itself, but that performances
should centre around activity.
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DG: I would like to try being in the middle of the audience and projecting
on the ﬂoor around us. Or maybe in small performances, make use of more of a
physical material – electronics, tangible computing or some use of computer vision
could be a way to remove the role of the screen, and projection. I think workshop-
performances are something to follow up (thinking of your Textual workshop at
Access Space, Alex) if you have 20 or so people joining in the projection is not
important any more.
In more usual situations, perhaps we think about what the absolute minimum
we need to project would be - perhaps just the characters as we press the keys,
or the expression the interpreter is currently executing. I have a feeling if we
distill it down it could end up being more meaningful to an audience than seeing
everything, all the time.
Slub ensure they perform side-by-side, allowing inter-performer communication which
they deem important:
AW: Yes. And [we] use gestures, too - pointing, laughing, dancing etc.
DG: Agreed - I’m not sure what we talk about, it can be quite minimal like
“shall we stop soon” or “why am I the only one making sound?” but I like it a lot
and I think it’s really important to be able to do that.
In live coding culture, “from-scratch” coding is held as an ideal, however Slub describe a
more relaxed approach, with improvisation taking a starting point from pre-prepared or prac-
ticed elements:
AW: My preparation usually takes the form of preparing sound samples, and
re-learning what I’ve forgoen (awkward JavaScript syntax, mostly). e actual
performance is a lot of improvisation but I’m not strict enough with myself to deny
using previously wrien code, which I know is a bad habit.
DG: I generally will have a couple of diﬀerent starting points rehearsed, a set of
possible things I will build and a familiarity with the interface built up before a gig.
I think rehearsal in livecoding is really aboutmaking sure you can create a situation
where you have lots of branching points for improvising from. It’s important to
be comfortable enough that your code will provide some predictable results when
you need them, but ﬂexible enough that you can dive into the unknown and see
what happens.
is ﬁts with the well established view of improvisation as being an exploration of pre-
established musical schemata, which are not necessarily changed or deviated from during a
performance (Pressing, 1987).
6.11 Discussion
Live coders such as Slub are shiing the discourse around the use of computers in music per-
formance, for example taking the leading researcher in electronic music Simon Emmerson by
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surprise:
e most unexpected interface for live sound control to have reemerged in re-
cent years is the lexical; reading and writing. e increasing dominance of graphic
interfaces for music soware obscured the continuing presence of the command-
line tradition, the code writer, the hacker. (Emmerson, 2007b, p. 115)
In an on-line research statement “Live electronics and the acousmatic tradition” (2001),
Andrew Deakin reacted to a comment made by Emmerson during a radio discussion:
Emmerson suggested that now we have aﬀordable and ‘realtime’ computer-
based systems there is really only one remaining area needing development – in-
terface and/or instrument design. I could not agree more, a 400 year-old keyboard
layout is surely not the answer.
What was missing from this discussion is recognition of the importance of language, which
the computer allows us specialised access to. We must not allow the directness of embodied
interfaces to mask the importance that the development of language, including computer lan-
guage, has to the development of humanity. By nature, human culture continually re-creates
itself, and as computers play an increasing role in society, including in music culture, program-
mers have found themselves in an increasingly privileged position. Douglas Rushkoﬀ puts this
well:
Digital technology is programmed. is makes it biased toward those with the
capacity towrite the code. In a digital age, wemust learn how tomake the soware,
or risk becoming the soware. It is not too diﬃcult or too late to learn the code
behind the things we use – or at least to understand that there is code behind their
interfaces. Otherwise, we are at the mercy of those who do the programming, the
people paying them, or even the technology itself. (Rushkoﬀ, 2010, p. 128)
But even in 2011, the importance of programming languages are still not felt in music in-
teraction research. While delivering a paper on live coding at the New Interfaces for Musical
Expression conference (Aaron et al., 2011), Sam Aaron expressed shock that the word language
was not amongst the top 200 conference paper keywords.4 We are still developing program-
ming as a creative process, there is still more to be done, and much more to be gained.
4A video recording of Sam Aaron’s presentation is available at http://vimeo.com/26905683/.
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Future directions
e present research has been speculative and integrated with ongoing practice, and so as
endings are beginnings, conclusions also serve as introductions. In the following we take stock
of the present cycle of research, consider its impacts, and where the following cycle may take
us next.
7.1 e Freedom of Interpretation
Where computation is at times hidden and forgoen in computer art, we forget some of its
radical nature. rough programming, artists are able to create pure, linguistic abstractions,
then ground them in human senses through actuators in striking ways. We have seen how a
programming language interpreter can ﬁt into a human creative process, performing the lin-
guistic structures we give it, to generate output to evoke human perception. It seems however
that the freedom to interpret programs is under threat, where consumer computers designed
for entertainment are taking the place of general purpose machines. Just as underlying com-
puter languages are oen hidden in digitally-realised arts, they are being made increasingly
inaccessible in end-user computing in general.
Without interpreters, we would not have soware, but yet interpreters are also soware.
is is why we talk about bootstrapping, where soware pulls itself from the ﬂoor by its boot-
straps, a paradox seled by the existence of hardware microcode. is is also why Naur (1992a)
prefers the word ‘Dataology’ to the phrase ‘Computer Science’; programs are data, which op-
erate over data.
Any piece of soware exists as a combination of two parts, some instructions in a com-
puter language and an interpreter of that language. Alone they do nothing, put them together
and they can notionally do anything. Oen there are intermediary steps, commonly compi-
lation into bytecode, but these are just translations into another language, which still require
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interpreting as a sequence of instructions for the magic to happen.
Interpreters allow us to try out ideas beyond our imaginations, adding some instructions,
interpreting them to get output rendered as sound or light to our senses, perceiving otherwise
impossible worlds, and returning to the source code to twist the encoded structures into new
contortions inspired by the results so far. We expand the realms of perception through compu-
tation, not creating things but writing about ideas in order to try to invoke them. We are only
scratching the surface of what is possible, artistic and otherwise, from marrying high speed
computation with embodied human experience.
It is of concern then that the freedom of thought given by interpreters happens to threaten
business models of large companies, who are accordingly searching for the power to make free
access to them illegal on the computers they produce. Games consoles are computers where
the end user is not allowed access to an interpreter, unless they pay for an oen prohibitively
expensive license. You are not otherwise allowed to modify code, certainly not allowed to mod-
ify the interpreter, and so must be satisﬁed with using whatever programs the manufacturer
allows you to.
Furthermore these business models are spreading, from computer games, to handheld com-
puters and now to tablet computers. iOS, the operating system for the iPhone and iPad, was
a particular shock as a device coming from Apple Computer, Inc., a company producing hard-
ware traditionally marketed at the creative. However to develop and distribute soware for
these platforms you must pay an annual license. e iOS terms have now relaxed to the point
that Apple have allowed the distribution of Codea (http://twolivesleft.com/Codea/), a
tablet based programming environment for the Lua language. is is a welcome development,
but still only exists within the terms of Apple’s business model, and so the ability to share pro-
grams with others requires the purchase of Codea, and cumbersome transfer of source code
listings.
is issue is related to the notion of generativity introduced by Zirain (2009) to describe
components of computer systems which are fundamentally incomplete.1 Zirain gives the
operating system as one example, as a system which need not be tied to particular underly-
ing systems (i.e. the hardware layer) or constrain systems running on it (i.e. the application
layer). In other words, generative systems are designed to be used in ways which the original
designers do not necessarily anticipate. Zirain (2009) sees generativity as under threat due
to security issues which generative systems are prone to, but the threat also comes from aes-
thetic and moral control; for example Apple have blocked soware from distribution on the
basis of aesthetic appearance, depiction of sexuality and for political commentary in the form
1is use of the word generative is distinct from the use in generative art (x1.1.2).
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of ridicule of public ﬁgures. As Lessig (2006) argues, those in control of code eﬀectively set the
rules for everyone else. It is no surprise then to see that in following their vision for a hardware
platform, vendors seek to limit and control the ability to program it.
Interpretation is of central concern in creative use of computers, and so the creep towards
centralised, corporate control over interpretation is deeply worrying. e home computer
revolution in the 1980s brought BBC Microcomputers and Sinclair Spectrums into schools and
the home, which encouraged programming from the moment they were switched on. Using
these computers empowered children to create with language under their own terms (Turkle,
2005). It would be a great shame if this exposure to programming was lost. One way to protect
the freedom of interpretation may simply be through the development of novel approaches to
programming language design. If newways of programming engage end-users, then consumer
pressure may be enough to preserve their freedom to program. is can already be seen in the
development of Codea, which is hopefully just the beginning of a soware genre, engaging end
users in programming in and of these new platforms.
7.2 Soware engineering standards
As soware takes an ever increasing role in structuring life in the developing world, consider-
able work has been put into the processes of soware engineering. Methodologies of soware
design promote methods to streamline the speciﬁcation, planning, development, testing, and
deployment of soware. However like the design of programming notations (x5.1), standard
development practices (such as the application of ISO 9000 to soware engineering) are de-
signed within particular constraints of commercial development which may not necessarily
apply to more experimental or creative situations. Bricolage programming (x6.3.1) is a case in
point, where speciﬁcations are deﬁned by the act of programming, rather than vice-versa. As
the programmer is engaged in end-user programming, there is no other user to satisfy, and
formal discussions with audience members are hardly practical. e design goals are therefore
internal and highly changeable.
Practices such as pair programming and test-driven development are intended to make
development both reliable and responsive to requirements, and are collectively known as agile
programming. However built-in assumptions of reaction to external requirements, rather than
an individual’s exploration and experimentation, mean they are inappropriate for the processes
of artist-programmers, who may quite rightly resist formalisation of their personal creative
processes, which may carry important aspects of their artistic style.
Bricolage programming is in stark opposition to the test-driven development movement,
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where a suite of small programs are wrien to test new features and ﬁxes before they are im-
plemented. A program is then judged to be feature complete when all the tests pass. is is
akin to describing a program’s behaviour twice, ﬁrstly to outwardly test it and secondly to
inwardly implement it. Rather than developing programmatic deﬁnitions of behaviour before
implementation, bricolage programmers make decisions on the basis of behaviourwhile imple-
menting it. ese are diﬀerent ways of navigating a problem space, test-driven development
is useful for arriving at a pre-arranged target, whereas bricolage programming is useful for
exploring, looking for novel outputs that are valuable in potentially surprising ways.
Another point of diversion is the manner in which programmers collaborate. In industry,
there is strong emphasis on group work in teams, with group overriding individual identity,
particularly where individuals are employed on ﬁxed term contracts. In the arts programmers
may be employed on larger projects under similar terms, as technical, artist assistants. However
the artist-programmer oen works alone, to realise their own individual works. Practices such
as pair programming, where two programmers work together on one computer, are rather alien
to this situation. While artists and musicians do work together on large, free/open source
projects, the development is usually centred around a particular individual. is is even the case
in large projects, such as the development of programming languages for creative work. is
was the case both for Impromptu and SuperCollider, where development followed a paern
where the ﬁrst years of development is conducted by a single individual. Only when their
vision has been fully scoped out is the codebase opened, and a wider free/open source soware
development community formed.
7.3 Cyclic revision control
We have seen how artist-programmers may have unconventional soware design processes
(x6.3), placing particular demands on their languages and tools. Revision control systems are
among the most important members of a programmer’s toolbox, allowing the history of a pro-
gram to be annotated and managed. Modern revision control systems allow diﬀerent pro-
grammers to work on their own ‘branches’ of code, which are then merged back into the main
ﬂow at a later date. Where problems arise in development, revision control systems can help
developers understand the source of the problem, by providing historical reference. ese sys-
tems already have much to oﬀer artist-programmers, but could revision control be rethought
to beer meet their particular needs?
Consider a live coder, writing soware to generate a music performance. In terms of re-
vision control they are in an unusual situation. Normally we think of programmers making
147
C 7: F 
revisions towards a ﬁnal result or milestone, at which point they ‘ship’, packaging and releas-
ing their code for others to use. For live coders, every revision they make is part of the ﬁnal
result. In this case nothing gets shipped, as they are already the end users. Wemight somewhat
crassly think of live coding in terms of shipping a product to an audience, but really what is
being shipped is not soware, but a soware development process, as musical development.
Also unusual in live coding revisions is that whereas conventional soware development
may begin with nothing, and ﬁnish with a complete, complex structure, a live coder both begins
and ends with nothing. Rather than aim for a linear path towards a predeﬁned goal, musicians
instead are concerned with how to return back to nothing in a satisfying arc. A live coder may
begin their performance with a blank editor, and be faced with an immediate decision about
what to build, and how. As they improvise by encoding and modifying musical ideas, they
eventually progress towards a conclusion. eir ﬁnal challenge is how to end; some increase
complexity to a crescendo and ﬁnish abruptly, and others decrease complexity to the minimum,
before ﬁnal reduction back to an empty editor and silence.
ere are two ways of thinking about time, either as a linear progression, or as a recurrent
cycle or oscillation, as shown in Figure 7.1. ese approaches are not mutually exclusive, they
rather provide diﬀerentways of looking at the same temporal processes. Conventional soware
design processes are characterised in terms of cycles of development, with repeating paerns
between milestones. Nonetheless, it is not conventional to think of the code itself ending up
back where it started, while during music performance, we oen do return to prior states.
We are all familiar with chorus and verse structure for example, and performances necessarily
begin and end at silence.
It may be that if we reconsider code development in terms of time cycles rather than linear
progression, then we could ﬁnd new ways of supporting soware development of music and
other time based arts. Without further speculative research it is diﬃcult to visualise what the
outcome of this might be, but there is already some active, radical work in the representation
of development time. For example revision control is a central part of the Field language en-
vironment (http://openendedgroup.com/field/), and allows the programmer to ‘scrub’
the development timeline. It seems however that in such experimental systems, the revision
control timeline has so far been treated as a linear structure, with occasional parts branching
and re-meeting the main ﬂow later on. It is not unheard of for timelines to feed back on them-
selves in conventional soware development, a process called baporting, but this is generally
avoided, only done in urgent circumstances such as in applying security ﬁxes to old soware
versions.
What if instead of being linear, soware development timelines were of cycles within cy-
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Figure 7.1: Below ﬁgure and caption reproduced from Buzsaki (2006, pg .7) with permission
period time
phase
am
pli
tud
e phase
amplitude
Pantha reiCircle of life
Oscillations illustrate the orthogonal relationship between frequency and time
and space and time. An event can repeat over and over, giving the impression of
no change (e.g., circle of life). Alternatively, the event evolves over time (pantha
rei). e forward order of succession is a main argument for causality. One period
(right) corresponds to the perimeter of the circle (le).
cles, with revision control designed not to aid progression towards future features, but help
the programmer wrestle their code back towards the state it was in ten minutes ago, and ten
minutes before that? We leave this as a question for future research, but suggest the result
could be a system that beer supports thematic development in music and video animation.
7.4 Conclusion
“My view is that today’s computer world is based on techie misunderstandings
of human thought and human life, and the imposition of inappropriate structures
… on things we want to do in the human world.” Ted Nelson (2008; http://
youtu.be/zumdnI4EG14)
Day to day, it does not particularly maer that we do not know the mechanisms behind
our own actions, we can simply learn through doing. e need for theory is sometimes derided
in music culture, the long-lived phrase “writing about music is like singing about economics”
traced back nearly 100 years (H. K. M., 1918), more recently taking the form of comparison with
dancing about architecture. e sentiment is that music is about activity, and not theorising.
eorising is diﬃcult for artist-programmers to avoid however, including those making
music. In order to write a generative music program, an artist-programmer must necessarily
theorise and encode musical structure in language. Indeed writing computer programs to make
music is a form of writing about music: it requires the introspection, abstraction and formal-
isation that many have derided by comparison with architectural dance. Not only is writing
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about the processes of art necessary, but in the process, coming to greater understanding of
ourselves allows us to reach beyond what would otherwise be possible.
With introspection as our motivation, we have tried to characterise the inner processes of
artist-programmers, in terms of intertwined analogue and digital representations. is leaves
many questions unanswered and indeed unposed, but promotes a balanced view of the artist-
programmer engaged closely both with their target medium, and the meta-medium of the
source code. We propose that this creative approach should be embraced with the full range
of human faculties available.
e ideas of the artist-programmer are wrapped in both analogue and digital packages, and
as they are unwrapped, the programs that spring forth from ﬁngers at keyboard have a trace
of analogue relations in conceptual space, as well as high level, structural reﬂections cast from
the language of the mind. Source code may be organised into discrete trees, but those trees
sway in an analogue breeze from the activity of perception. We hope the artworks, languages
and notations introduced through this thesis demonstrate the fertile ground available to the
artist-programmer, and inspire greater works to follow.
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Live coding survey
e following contains freeform answers given in response to the survey discussed in x6.9.
A.1 Deﬁnitions of live coding
e following are the twenty nine answers to the question “How would you deﬁne live coding,
in one sentence?”, presented here unedited.
 Live coding is instrument building, composing and performing in one performative act.
 Exposing, for an audience, the thought processes behind making music algorithmically.
 Coding as a performance art. (I’m not very good at it yet)
 a way to entertain, the geeks and the noobs.
 An audio visual performance practice where computer soware that generates the audi
visuals is wrien as part of the performance.
 A live performance practice which uses computer programming languages and environ-
ments as an interface for the interactive manipulation of media rich soware runtime
systems.
 Live coding is performing awork bywriting andmodifying computer programming code
which is responsible for creating the resultant work.
 Live coding is a performance practice of constructing and interacting with algorithmic
processes to create art.
 An exchange of knowledge and experience between two or more performers/coders.
 Creating logic, structure and meaning as part of a performance instead of beforehand.
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 maing real-time changes to sound generation
 coding stuﬀ .. live
 listening to changes
 Build from scratch, make it trandparent.
 live coding is improvisation on the ”instrument computer”
 I’m a bit hard core, and prefer live coding to be on the ﬂy, and from scratch - none of this
executing pre-built patches / code. I also have a tendency to think it should be ’code’ and
not graphic apps such as MAX/ PD.
 Programming as creative journey or ritual.
 electronic improvising freedom
 Coding music/animation with direct sounding/viewable results.
 I oen deﬁne it as an improvisional way of doing music with computers, thus being to
electronic music what free jazz is to jazz. It’s also a way of considering the computer as
an instrument. (sorry two sentences)
 e use of instructions and/or rules for the control of computer(s) (or person(s)) as a
method of creative expression.
 several iterations of coding/executing within the span of a song/piece
 a more natural interface to the creative process to those of us that think more like com-
puters than bipedal meatbags
 performace as in performance art
 building your instrument while playing it
 the art of creating music from a procedure yet to be started
 Reformalising an active formal system.
 Creating and sharing algorithms live.
 An improvised performance of music or animation by using interactive programming to
describe and control process.
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A.2 Comparing live coding
e following are the twenty eight freeform, unedited responses to the question “What is the
diﬀerence between live coding a piece of music and composing it in the sequencer (live coding
an animation and drawing one)? In other words, how does live coding aﬀect the way you
produce your work, and how does it aﬀect the end result?”
 It is very much live. Temporality comes strongly in. e sequenced piece has its own
formal structure deﬁned in the sequencer. e formal structure of the live coded piece
is deﬁned by the complexity of the language. Live coding pieces can therefore be boring
to listen to. : ) But they can be fun to watch being programmed. erefore, I ﬁnd
livecoding more interesting as a performative practice than a musical practice (if this
distinction makes any sense).
 (is question might be too open to answer in a meaningful way.) Live coding is per-
forming, composing is not.
 To date, my live coding has only been a process of assembling code alreadywrien, when
to turn this on or oﬀ, tweak gain/pan, etc.
 it is more about the experience of the audience than about my own concepts. yes, some-
times you try to integrate them, but if it doesn’t appeal it won’t help you in the contest.
while making ﬁxed media music, one can choose for a certain amount of extremity, al-
though one might not sell a lot of cd’s than, but hey, that’s up to you.
 Live coding is a meta compositional process that emphasises paerns and how they play
out, while sequencing is oen capturing of performed gestures or sound.
 Live coding is about abstractions. is is really the only diﬀerence between me live cod-
ing andme using a sequencer. Amore interesting question is maybewhat’s the diﬀerence
between using impromptu and using a guitar. en it becomes about the symbolic vs the
gestural as well as the many vs the few (concurrent activities that is).
 Live coding forces a work to be performed, and possibly (ideally?) improvised. I ﬁnd this
a very diﬀerent prospect to ’composing’ music in a sequencer (or even writing notation
on paper) for a later performance. However, while Live Coding is a performance prac-
tice, it also oﬀers the tantalising prospect of manipulating musical structure at a similar
abstract level as ’deferred time’ composition. To do this eﬀectively in performance is
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I think an entirely diﬀerent skill to the standard ’one-acoustic-event-per-action’ physi-
cal instrumental performance, but also quite diﬀerent to compositional methods which
typically allow for rework.
 Live coding encourages creative thinking at a more abstract level, for example, the
parametrisation of large scale formal structures. Sequencing can provide a composer
with a highly detailed representation of the music, which can be useful when trying to
realise a very concrete idea. However, I would argue that sequencing is, on the whole,
a more passive medium, in that it generally contributes less to the creative process than
a live coding environment. Perhaps a reason for this is that sequencing aims to provide
an analogical representation of music, where as there is much more scope for the repre-
sentation of musical ideas in live coding. Serendipity is also more likely to ﬁgure in live
coding, where subtle random processes or plain bugs might result in interesting unin-
tended ideas. Plus the live aspect imposes its own set of constraints that are not present
in oﬀ-line composition, as well as opens up possibilities for real-time collaboration.
 Live coding connects me with the music or sound the same way playing guitar does; it
givesme a feeling of control andmakesmemore conscious of the now. My ﬁrst concern is
to produce a sound, much the same way as a jazz improviser’s ﬁrst concern is a melody.
Structure is something to start working on once you have suitable sounds (or scales,
melodies, harmonies, rhythms, whatever). Note: I am a beginning livecoder, so my view
on livecoding could very well change over the years.
 Sequenced music isn’t performed, it’s just playback. Following this logic, and assuming
I want to improvise in a performance, there’s no way to properly perform using a com-
puter if I had to sequence everything. e other part of me thinks that writing code is
the same as sequencing, it’s just a shorthand. To answer your question, this all hinges on
the need to be improvising at a performance. If this wasn’t necessary, and it was merely
about a playback, then there would be no need for livecoding.
 I’ve only played around with this at home, but Live coding has far less perfection and
the product is more ore immediate. It allows for improvisation and spontaneity and
discourages over-thinking.
 As someone who isnt very apt in the manual world of realtime composition with phys-
ical, traditional instruments I probably struggle with both approaches. Live coding is
just another instrument to me, just one which has a more signiﬁcant setup time and lin-
guistic interface. When I do use sequencers I frequently use a lot of embedded algo type
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processes and code external apps (pd etc) to process alongside. Is the distinction more
apparent when its live to a live audience? as that implies a deadline, expectations etc. If
you compose music at home on your own gear, including a day long workout with se-
quencers and soware (generally with liel pause in the actual loop) is that livecoding?
semantics schemantix…..
 there is only a recording le, but i can’t repeat the coding.
 Coding live: intuitive decisions with no pre-built sequences. Freedom, danger and punk.
 generally i ﬁnd composing in sequencers very boring as a process (so i hardly do it nowa-
days), whereas live coding (LC) adds more excitement to the process (”will it actually
work at all?”). whenever i do sequence-like structures in LC, they are usually generated
(using e.g. randomness (with constraints to ﬁt them into the musical context)), so they
are not totally predictable. sequences will eventually be re-generated. however, i oen
don’t use sequences at all, but rather try generate all the non-live structures algorithmi-
cally.
 Well, the live-coding soware provides greater scope for sound manipulation than other
audio editing soware (eg pro tools etc), but doing it on the ﬂy (live coding) vs writing
code in my own time is more of a psychological hurdle - It’s harder to be satisﬁed with
the outcome with live coding. When I work on writing a piece, in my own time (and
taking a long time) I can perfect each sound to be precisely as I intend it to be, whereas
doing it on the ﬂy , i.e. live coding I have to be more generalised as to my intentions.
 Essentially the main diﬀerence is the ability to improvise. e live aspect becomes more
important than the end result. Collaboration becomes easier, and more natural - as it’s
easier to adapt the work to diﬀerent people and new situations.
 I use live coding to develop ideas and test them then I would use them in composed
pieces, but the process and imprvising is almost more interesting as the end result.
 Mostly the fact that while livecoding I always found sounds that I could never had found
otherwise. us, when I ﬁnd a sound that seems interesting to me, I try to tweek every
parameter to see how beer it could be. I am used to keep track of every session I am
doing, but I oen feel a bit disappointed by the static feeling of the last sound I get.
But most importantly, even if sometimes I make sessions that is totally crap, I always
learn something new. And as I come back to livecoding, all the knowledge I got from all
sessions is here readily available to use in my head. Another advantage is the fact that
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even if you use rather the same structures every now and then, it always sounds diﬀerent.
On a mental process way of thinking, livecoding gives the opportunity to always foster
new ideas while not coding. It’s a real creative way of making music.
 Live Coding is riskier, and one has to live with unﬁing decissions. You can’t just go one
step back unless you do it with a nice pirouee. erefore the end result is not as clean
as an ”oﬄine-composition”, but it can lead you to places you usally never would have
ended.
 I’m not sure they need be diﬀerent at all, as a basic sequencer is fairly easy to implement.
Mostly I use larger gestures to place a whole series of notes at once, this is faster than
clicking them all in and leads oen leads to unexpected results. In homebrew soware
we can have a tighter link between the paern generation and the signal generation
processes but in livecoding creating this link may become a form of expression itself,
which is of course quite exciting. Perhaps most importantly the higher pace of livecoding
leads to more impulsive choices which keeps things more interesting to create. Not sure
how oen that also creates a more interesting end result but at least sometimes it does.
e shorter setup time before we can get started with making music (less gear to turn
on, no patch cables) makes it more suitable for impulsive playing as well.
 i don’t think of it as diﬀerent to a sequencer, it’s just a diﬀerent user interface. i think in
the same way using both. i just oen ﬁnd the programmatic interface to ﬁt my thought
processes beer.
 You don’t have the opportunity to do re-takes
 the whole process becomes more improvisational. like sketching. never ﬁnished compo-
sitions (on a timeline / with a ﬁxed form). for me it’s more about having fun coding than
the end result anyway.
 Live coding forces me to experiment and move faster within the compositional/ impro-
visational process. Personally I consider live coding to be the improvisation of the com-
puter music world.
 I’ve never really done much with sequencers, so I don’t know the diﬀerence. I like the
fact that live coding is more sculptural and passive.
 Live coding exposes the beauty of programming languages (or programmatic practices)
and the invention of interface live. ough you could do live coding with an established
tool, I believe part of the interest is seeing the building of tools, even if they are meta
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tools. I have all but abandonned live coding as a regular performance practice, but I use
the skills and conﬁdence acquired to modify my soware live if I get a new idea while
on stage.
 You have diﬀerent kind of canvas, and it favors results within your technique.
172
